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FOREWORD
In May of 1982, the Industrial Union Department's (IUD) Labor
Policy Institute initiated a project to assess the impact on trade unions
and collective bargaining of worker participation or quality of worklife
plans.
Individual unions have had different experiences with, and reactions
to, such programs. In some cases unions have rejected such plans, citing
their negative impact on collective bargaining. In other situations,
typically those involving unions that have been integrally involved in for
mulating and operating worker participation programs, the reaction has
been much more positive. Given this diversity, we thought that it would
be useful to sponsor research that could document the variety of positive
and negative experiences unions have encountered.
Professor Tom Kochan from MIT, who undertook the research with
his colleagues Harry Katz and Nancy Mower, has had wide experience in
the field of industrial relations. In addition, a number of IUD affiliates
assisted the MIT researchers in defining the questions and helped assess
the results of the study. We owe special thanks to those unions which
made special efforts to facilitate access to members and officials for Pro
fessor Kochan and his associates.
We feel that this study is a useful tool for workers considering par
ticipation in QWL and QWL-related schemes. Those contemplating such
approaches will, as a result of this research, be better able to identify pit
falls as well as a variety of means for enhancing the potential success of
their efforts.
Howard D. Samuel, President
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
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Chapter 1________________
What's the Problem?
The growth of quality of working life (QWL) programs,
related forms of worker participation processes, and ex
periments with new forms of work organization in the past
decade have posed both new challenges and potential oppor
tunities to the American labor movement. On the one hand,
these informal mechanisms require union leaders and
managers to modify their traditional roles and relationships
in significant ways. On the other hand, they open new chan
nels for direct worker involvement and, possibly, for greater
worker and union influence. These developments have
generated a vigorous debate among union leaders concerning
whether QWL and related participation processes will, in the
long run, be good or bad for labor unions and for the
workers they represent. Yet, the debate has, to date, largely
taken place in a vacuum. While strong rhetorical arguments
have been presented by both the supporters and the critics of
worker participation processes, little direct examination of
union experiences with these processes has informed the
discussions.
In early 1982, however, a group of labor leaders meeting
under the auspices of the Industrial Union Department of
the AFL-CIO agreed to commission an independent study of
the experiences of unions with worker participation pro
cesses. The processes studied operate under a variety of
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labels in addition to QWL, such as Quality Circles (QC),
Employee Involvement (El), Labor-Management Participa
tion Teams (LMPT), socio-technical work systems, etc. The
purpose of this book is to report the results of that study.
The common characteristics of the QWL and related forms
of worker participation studied are that all these programs
involve small groups of union members and/or officers in in
formal workplace participation processes which supplement
the formal collective bargaining procedures. Some of these
programs also go on to modify the way jobs and work are
structured and organized at the workplace. These shop floor
or office level forms of direct worker participation stand in
contrast to the more long-standing form of indirect par
ticipation commonly found in U.S. industrial relations: the
joint labor-management committee. Indeed, a comparison
of these two forms of participation can be instructive since
they are likely to focus on different issues and have different
effects on workers, unions, and the larger bargaining rela
tionship. For this reason, one of the cases reported in this
study is a labor-management committee. We will use that
case to highlight the differences in these two forms of par
ticipation.

Worker Participation
and American Industrial Relations
One might ask, why should representatives of the labor
movement even question the benefits to be gained from ef
forts to increase worker participation in decisionmaking at
the workplace? Shouldn't any process that serves to increase
the voice workers have in issues that affect them be consis
tent with the goals of labor unions? An answer to these ques
tions requires a grounding in the history and basic features
of the American industrial relations system and the role and
status of labor unions in American society.
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Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935, the American industrial relations system has been
designed around the premise that collective bargaining is the
preferred channel for worker representation and participa
tion at the workplace. The American system of collective
bargaining is based on the concept that a duly certified union
is to serve as the exclusive representative of workers. As the
exclusive representative, a union has the right to negotiate
with management over a clearly defined, but limited, scope
of issues pertaining to wages, hours, and working condi
tions.
This legislation emerged out of a political and social en
vironment that had previously been quite hostile toward the
rights of workers to organize to protect their collective in
terests and to participate in decisions at the workplace. Sup
port for the rights of workers to organize and be represented
by national unions (i.e., unions whose membership base ex
tends beyond the boundary and control of the employer)
arose only after the collapse of the American Plan in the
1920s. The American Plan consisted of a mix of strategies
providing limited participation rights to employees through
informal committees or company unions dominated by the
employer. 1 The plan and employer resistance to unions were
weakened by successful organizing drives by industrial
unions in the 1930s. Thus, the power and stability offered by
a legally enforceable collective bargaining contract and an
independent collective bargaining agent were achievements
that American workers and their labor unions fought hard to
achieve in the 1930s and have valued ever since.
Since the 1930s, collective bargaining has served as the
basic institution by which American workers have enhanced
their economic security and expanded their sphere of in
fluence at the workplace. This incremental expansion of col
lective bargaining contracts was achieved through hard
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bargaining supported by the bargaining power achieved
largely through the threat of the strike.
Although collective barganing has expanded in scope since
the 1930s, American unions have never been genuinely ac
cepted by American management as valued partners in in
dustrial relations. The prevailing American managerial
strategy continues to be, on the one hand, to avoid unions
wherever possible, and on the other hand, to deal construc
tively with unions wherever they exist or cannot successfully
be avoided. 2 This management strategy, along with a deeply
ingrained belief that social and economic gains can only be
achieved through struggle and hard bargaining, has produc
ed a sense of insecurity and distrust of employer motivations
among many American labor union leaders. While the above
statements may overdramatize the conditions under which
the American industrial relations system and U.S. labor
unions have evolved, they set the context for the reception
received by early efforts to introduce QWL concepts to
American unions.

Early Responses to QWL
QWL theory in its simplest form is based on the proposi
tion that through collaboration and cooperation of workers
and employers the quality of working life experiences of in
dividual workers and the goals of employers can be
simultaneously enhanced. 3 While this is a laudable objective
that would be difficult for anyone to oppose, more careful
examination of the way it was introduced to American
unions helps us to understand why it was viewed with con
siderable skepticism by the majority of labor leaders.
In order to understand the initial response of the
American labor movement to early proponents of QWL
theories and strategies, we need to look at the origins of
those theories and their mode of introduction to American
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unions. While the theoretical underpinnings for QWL
strategies can be traced back to early human relations
theory,4 for our purposes we need only look back to the late
1960s and early 1970s when the term QWL first became part
of the American vocabulary.
Furthermore, early proponents of QWL largely ignored
the history of industrial relations and collective bargaining
outlined above. While industrial relations recognizes the
need for both hard bargaining and mutual cooperation, 5 the
behavioral science theories upon which the QWL advocates
derived their strategies ignored the conflict side of the
employment relationship and stressed only the need for and
value of cooperation. In their crudest form, the behavioral
science theories were really theories of management
developed for managers rather than theories of the employ
ment relationship from which policies and practices could be
derived for balancing the diversity and maximizing the com
monality of interests at the workplace.
Labor union representatives were quick to point out that
these behavioral science theories left no significant role for
labor unions as representatives of workers. Indeed, most
behavioral science and QWL applications found their homes
in nonunion companies and were used as part of the union
avoidance strategies of these firms. 6 Thus, many observers
within the labor movement saw the QWL strategies as simply
another in the long list of efforts of American employers to
weaken the labor movement. 7 In essence, QWL was perceiv
ed as simply the American Plan revisited. The values of
openness, high trust, extensive communications and par
ticipation of individuals which the behavioral scientists em
phasized were seen as simply another way of avoiding the
need to deal with collective bargaining.
Consequently, QWL started off in the U.S. with a poor
image among labor unions. It did not help that the early pro-
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ponents of QWL experiments also tended to oversell the con
cept as a solution to the "Lordstown" syndrome. That is, in
the minds of the QWL advocates, the problems facing
American workers in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were
that workers were alienated from their work because they
were closed off from meaningful opportunities to influence
their working environment. This alienation allegedly was the
cause of excessive levels of absenteeism, wildcat strikes, and
the blue-collar blues. In addition to diagnosing the problem
in this way, the QWL advocates also had a ready-made solu
tion, namely, to experiment with a predesigned QWL pro
gram and thereby begin to address the "real" needs of
American workers. 8 Little thought was given to how these
new strategies for participation would relate to existing col
lective bargaining and industrial relations systems. Nor were
systematic efforts made to assess the extent to which unions,
through collective bargaining, were in fact effectively
responding to the priorities of their members. Correspond
ingly, the reception given to the early QWL efforts was quite
cool from union, and even from many management,
representatives.
But despite this rocky start, some highly visible experimen
tation did take place in the early 1970s under the auspices of
the National Commission on Productivity and Quality of
Working Life with the support of research and consulting ex
penses provided by the Ford Foundation. These governmentand foundation-sponsored experiments were complemented
by a variety of private initiatives in both nonunion and union
plants. The early experimental sites have now become
household names within quality of working life circles. The
most frequently discussed experiments occurred in the
Rushton Mining Company, General Motors Tarrytown
plant (and subsequently many other plants of General
Motors), the Bolivar, Tennessee plant of Harmon Manufac-
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turing Company, the Topeka General Foods pet food plant,
and several others. 9
While many of these highly visible programs faded away
by the latter part of the 1970s (especially those sponsored by
the government), they were succeeded by a much broader ar
ray of private experiments that emerged near the end of the
decade and in the early 1980s. This second generation of ex
perimentation was fueled by the deepening economic crisis
affecting American industry, the growing awareness of the
stagnant productivity trends experienced in the American
economy in the 1970s, and the increasing attention given to
Japanese management practices by the American mass
media. Indeed, according to one set of estimates, in early
1982 approximately 1,000 companies had Quality Circles
under way, 100 companies had more advanced forms of
work reorganization experiments involving autonomous
work groups and another 500 or so companies were engaged
in Scanlon Plan type (productivity gains sharing) projects. 10
In recent years, interest in various forms of participation has
clearly diffused to a wider spectrum of firms and unions.
Perhaps most significantly, a number of international unions
have negotiated clauses into their agreements that launched
joint union-management participation experiments. The
most notable examples are found in the contracts between
the United Automobile Workers and the major auto firms,
the United Steelworkers of America (USW) and eight major
steel producers, and the Communication Workers of
America (CWA) and AT&T.

The Current Context For Worker Participation
This brings us to the current debate within labor union
circles. Clearly, there is now a much wider diversity of views
within the American labor movement concerning the viabili-
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ty of quality of working life processes than was the case in
the previous decade.
At the same time, fear and suspicion still exist among
many unions and workers regarding QWL programs. The
basic fear expressed by opponents or critics of worker par
ticipation programs is that their ultimate effect will be to
undermine the strength and effectiveness of the local union
and the collective bargaining process. Specifically, critics
have argued that: (1) workers and/or employers may see
these processes as substitutes for, rather than as supplements
to, the collective bargaining process and established
grievance procedures; (2) workers may begin to question the
need for a union if they see employers listening to and solv
ing their problems through QWL or other direct worker par
ticipation processes; (3) union leaders may become too close
ly identified with management or get co-opted into
managerial decisions, lose touch with their members, or ex
perience heightened internal political instability or conflict;
and (4) informal participation processes may turn out to be
simply another short-lived strategy for employers to gain
greater control over and effort from workers without pro
viding them with any real power to influence important deci
sions within the firm. Finally, since these efforts are often
used by nonunion employers as part of their union avoidance
strategy, some labor leaders see these processes as inherently
antiunion in design.
Supporters of worker participation processes generally
argue that the negative consequences outlined above can be
avoided by proper union involvement in the design and im
plementation of participation programs. Supporters also
stress that many employers will be experimenting with these
processes regardless of whether or not the union is involved.
Remaining outside of the process or being involved in only a
minimal way will further erode the status of the union at the
workplace. Others argue that support for worker participa-
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tion should be more than a defensive reaction to employer
initiatives. They believe unions should embrace worker par
ticipation processes as strategies for extending industrial
democracy to individual workers. Finally, some union ad
vocates believe that, by making worker participation pro
cesses an important part of the broad agenda of the labor
movement, unions will enhance their attractiveness to new
workers in future organizing campaigns.

Theoretical and Analytical Issues
The central theoretical argument running through our
analysis of these issues is that worker participation processes
move through several stages of evolution as they unfold. It is
only by understanding the dynamics of these processes
through time that we can hope to understand their effects on
local unions and on the larger collective bargaining relation
ship and assess the arguments of the QWL advocates and
critics.
It is particularly important to follow workplace ex
periments through at least one complete contract cycle, i.e.,
from the initiation of the experiment to at least one followup negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. This
allows us to observe how the participation process affects
and is integrated into the larger collective bargaining rela
tionship. In addition, to test the stability or survival power
of these experiments, it is necessary to watch what happens
to them over time as business conditions change, key
management and/or union supporters turn over or hand
over responsibility for the project to others, union leaders
who support the process stand for reelection, and other
problems or conflicts in the bargaining relationship arise.
Then, exploring how union member and officer views and
experiences change over the cycle of collective bargaining,
we can better understand whether these experiments are tem
porary fads which have a natural but rather limited "half-
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life," or represent changes in the workplace industrial rela
tions system that have lasting effects. The organization of
the chapters follows this approach. We first present case
study descriptions of the evolution of worker participation
processes over the course of at least one contract cycle and
often through changes in the economic circumstances of the
parties. In chapter 3 we explore the especially complex issues
that arise in sustaining worker participation processes
operating under centralized collective bargaining structures.
In centralized structures, many more interests and decisionmakers within both management and union can influence the
course of a participation process thus taking the control over
the process partly out of the hands of local officials. We are
fortunate to have two well known cases to draw on for this
analysis, the United Auto Workers and General Motors and
Ford, and the United Steel Workers and the major steel pro
ducers. Then, we examine through survey and interview data
the views that rank and file members, and local labor leaders
hold toward worker participation.
Models of the dynamics of a joint union-management
change process have been presented elsewhere and need not
be repeated in detail here. 11 It may be useful, however, to
summarize the general points of consensus found in these
models since we use them to structure the analysis that
follows. As noted above, the common argument in models
of organizational change, and particularly in models of joint
union-management change, is that once a change is started,
the process takes on a dynamic character. Thus, it is impor
tant to trace the effects of worker participation processes
from the initial stimulus to change, through the early stages
of implementation, and on to the stage at which the informal
participation experiments are "institutionalized" or once
again integrated into the larger collective bargaining rela
tionship. The basic propositions in these models are as
follows.
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(1) Introducing a worker participation process generally
involves considerable political and economic risks to both
management and union officials. Normally, therefore, both
parties will only begin to explore the idea of starting a
worker participation process if they feel intense pressures to
do so. These pressures may come from external markets,
legal, social, or political sources, or from internal sources
such as from the expectations and preferences of workers or
top managers. Furthermore, the parties can expect to en
counter considerable skepticism and some resistance to these
changes from workers and managers alike.
(2) To generate a joint initial commitment to proceed,
both parties must perceive the process as being useful for
achieving goals that are important to their respective
organizations or constituencies. That is, management must
see the process as having the potential to improve organiza
tional effectiveness and union leaders must see the process as
enhancing economic or psychological goals or needs to
which workers assign high priorities. Broad appeals to the
general, long-run or mutual welfare of the parties will not
provide sufficient incentive to diffuse the process to large
numbers of workers.
(3) Maintaining commitment to the process over time will
be difficult. It will require overcoming the internal political
opposition which is likely to arise from some workers, union
leaders, and/or managers. It will require successful attain
ment of the initial goals of the process, and will require con
tinuation of the pressures that initially stimulated the
change. In short, like all forms of labor-management
cooperation, worker participation processes are fragile in
struments.
(4) Ultimately, continuation of the process over time will
require: (a) attainment of tangible goals valued by the
workers and the employer, and (b) "institutionalizing" the
changes into the ongoing collective bargaining relationship.

12 What's the Problem?
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the American Plan see David Brody, Workers in
Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
2. Thomas A. Kochan and Robert B. McKersie, "Collective Bargaining:
Pressures for Change," Sloan Management Review 24 (Summer 1983).
3. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New
York: Macmillan, 1933).
4. For a clear statement of this purpose see Paul S. Goodman, Assessing
Organizational Change (New York: Wiley, 1979), pp. 7-8.
5. Jack Barbash, "The Elements of Industrial Relations," British Jour
nal of Industrial Relations, 2 (1964), pp. 66-78. See also Thomas A.
Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations (Homewood,
IL: Irwin, 1980), pp. 1-23.
6. Fred Foulkes, Personnel Policies in Large Non-Union Companies
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980).
7. See, for example, William Winpisinger, "Job Enrichment: A Union
View," Monthly Labor Review 96 (April 1973), pp. 54-56.
8. One book that was perceived by many to have adopted this theme was
Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), a report of a Special
Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
9. For a recent review of most of these key experiments see Robert Zager
and Michael P. Rosow, eds., The Innovative Organization: Productivity
Programs in Action (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).
10. Jerome M. Rosow and Robert Zager, eds., Productivity Through
Work Organizations (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).
11. See, for example, Thomas A. Kochan and Lee Dyer, "A Model of
Organizational Change in the Context of Union-Management
Relations," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 12 (1976), pp. 59-78.
See also Michael Schuster, Union-Management Cooperation: Structure,
Process, and Impact (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research), forthcoming.

Chapter 2
Dynamics of Worker
Participation Processes
Single Cases

This chapter will present five case studies which illustrate
the dynamics of worker participation processes. Particular
attention will be given to how experiments which may begin
as relatively narrow efforts focused on involving individuals
and small groups of workers in decisions affecting their jobs
can expand and influence the larger collective bargaining
relationship. By drawing on a number of different cases we
will also demonstrate that there is no one single outcome or
path that participation processes follow. Rather, a wide
range of positive and negative outcomes has been experi
enced by different unions at different points in time.

Local 14B and Xerox
The first case discussed in this chapter is that of Local 14B
of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
(ACTWU) and the Xerox Corporation. We will report the
experiences of these parties in some detail since this case
nicely illustrates many of the central themes developed in this
book. Specifically, the case illustrates the fit between a QWL
process and the larger economic, organizational, and collec
tive bargaining context in which the process is embedded.
13
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This case involves a large, highly skilled, blue-collar
bargaining unit located in the Rochester manufacturing
facility of Xerox. The union and the company began a joint
ly administered QWL program in late 1980 after a clause
authorizing experimentation with such a program was in
cluded in their 1980 bargaining agreement. Data for this
study were gathered through interviews with the parties over
a three-year period starting just after the initiation of the
QWL process and ending after the settlement of the parties'
1983 labor agreement. Survey data were collected from a
sample of 387 workers out of a bargaining unit of approx
imately 4,000 workers. The case data were collected during
the summer of 1982, approximately 20 months after the
start-up of the QWL project. In this case, the union involved
in the QWL project acts as a full joint sponsor and sits with
representatives of management on all of the various steering
and oversight committees. The actual participation process
resembles a Quality Circle (QC) program.

Background and Environment
for the Experiment
Local 14B and Xerox have had a long-standing,
cooperative collective bargaining relationship. The company
voluntarily recognized the union in the late 1940s when the
firm was a small manufacturer of a single product line. From
the outset, the relationship was influenced by the strongly
held philosophy of the founder of the firm. He believed in
the desirability of maintaining cooperative and highly pro
fessional relationships between the union and the company.
His commitment has carried through the relationship up to
the present time and his philosophy was passed on to his
various successors in later years, largely through the con
tinued leadership of the director of industrial relations for
the Corporation.
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In the 1950s, Xerox began to capitalize on a series of
technological breakthroughs that transformed the firm from
a small and largely unknown business to one of the leading
Fortune 500 corporations. The company continued to enjoy
rapid rates of growth and high profits through the 1960s
since its technological advances had continued to provide a
near monopoly in the major product line. As the company
expanded, new plants were opened and the union was volun
tarily recognized on the basis of card checks or uncontested
representation elections in each new facility. The major
manufacturing facilities of the Corporation are located in
one medium-sized city in the Northeast. Smaller facilities are
located in other cities in various regions of the country. The
company also acquired several smaller firms within the last
decade as it sought to diversify into related product lines seen
as having higher growth potential than the products on
which the company's previous growth was built.
The competitive environment for this company changed
dramatically during the last decade. Both domestic and
foreign competition intensified at the same time that the
growth in the overall market for its products began to slow
down and decline toward the end of the 1970s. The market
decline continued at an even more rapid rate during the
recession of the early 1980s. By 1982, the company announc
ed that it would be necessary to reduce its blue- and whitecollar labor force by at least 30 percent as it struggled to
regain its competitive position in its basic product line and to
slowly but surely shift its new product development
resources to the newer, more promising lines of business it
had developed through acquisitions in recent years. Thus,
the QWL process in this case exists in a bargaining relation
ship that historically was characterized by higher levels of
cooperation and an economic environment that had turned
from one that had been expanding for a long period of time
to one that was rapidly deteriorating.
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Origin and Structure of the QWL Process
The QWL process was launched with a provision included
in the parties' 1980 collective bargaining agreement. That
provision reads as follows:
Employee Involvement
A Joint Company-Union Employee Involvement Com
mittee shall be established to investigate and pursue op
portunities for enhancing employees' work satisfaction
and productivity. To this end, the Joint Committee shall
meet regularly to undertake the following respon
sibilities:
A. Review and evaluate ongoing programs, pro
jects, and experiments, both within and out
side the Company, designed to encourage
employee involvement.
B.

Develop programs, projects, and experiments
that might ultimately be broadly applied.

C. Establish subcommittees to develop suggested
programs for specific areas. Hear and review
reports from these subcommittees.
D. Submit reports and recommendations to the
Company and Union regarding the implemen
tation and subsequent progress of specific pro
grams.
The original idea for this provision came from the chair
man of the board of the company. He indicated an interest in
developing some type of employee involvement program.
Both the industrial relations staff of the Corporation and the
international union representatives were prepared to discuss
this issue in negotiations since both groups had been examin
ing the experiences of other companies and unions with
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various worker participation experiments during the year
prior to the beginning of formal negotiations.

Program Structure and Content
The structure used to implement the QWL process consists
of several different joint committees and groups. At the top
of the structure is the Planning and Policy Committee which
consists of four union officers and four management
representatives including the vice-president of manufactur
ing, the manager of personnel, the manager of industrial
relations, and the manager of QWL services. This committee
meets approximately every four to six weeks and is responsi
ble for establishing broad guidelines and policies for the
QWL process. Each of the four central plants in the com
pany's major manufacturing complex has an Advisory Com
mittee consisting of 10 union and 10 management represen
tatives. The job of these advisory committees is to develop
plans for implementing the QWL process and monitoring its
progress and coordinating its activities with other
developments in the plant. Within each plant the various
business centers also have a steering committee consisting of
the manager of the center, two foremen, two technical per
sonnel, and four union representatives. The task of this com
mittee is to provide support for the QWL teams that undergo
training in problemsolving techniques.
The basic unit of the QWL process is the QWL team. Each
team consists of six to eight employees from the same work
area. Participation in a team is voluntary; however, both
bargaining unit and other employees are encouraged to par
ticipate. Each team elects its own leader who may or may not
be the supervisor for that work group. Approximately 50
percent of the leaders in these groups are not supervisors.
Each team undergoes an initial 40-hour training program
of which 28 hours are paid for by the employer and 12 hours
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are contributed by the employee. The training program is
spread over approximately a 10-week period and emphasizes
problemsolving skills and team building. Figure 2.1 il
lustrates some of the material typically covered in a training
program. At the end of the training program, a graduation
ceremony is held in which each team presents its analysis of
workplace problems and suggested solutions to the manage
ment of that plant. Union representatives normally are pre
sent and speak at these graduation ceremonies.
Figure 2.1
Putting QWL into Practice
Problem Solving Team - Education & Training
QWL/EI Concepts
Problem Solving Skills
• Data gathering techniques
• Cause and effect analysis
• Pareto analysis and histogram
• Check sheets and control charts
• Using statistics
Team Building and Functioning
• Interpersonal communications
• Effective team meetings
• Team records and reports
• Work on real problems
• Using technical staff support
• Presentation skills
Program = 40 hours (28 paid, 12 voluntary)
: 4 hours over 10 weeks
Graduation - team presentations on real problems
Presented to: steering committee and management

After graduating, each QWL team meets once a week for
approximately one hour to discuss problems and to review
the status of suggestions for improvements made at previous
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meetings. The groups cannot make changes that would con
flict with the provisions of the collective bargaining agree
ment. The parties refer to items which are "on line," i.e.,
those issues which fall within the legitimate scope of discus
sion of a QWL team, and "off line" issues which are
covered by the collective bargaining agreement and therefore
cannot be altered by a specific suggestion from a team.
The efforts of these teams are supported by eight full-time
union and eight full-time management QWL coordinators.
The coordinators provide technical advice and help train the
teams. Each coordinator has agreed to remain in this posi
tion for at least two years. In addition, a full-time manager
of QWL services monitors the overall program for the Cor
poration. He is assisted by an outside consultant who initial
ly worked approximately four days a week with the union
and the company and now has scaled his involvement down
to approximately one to two days a week. The hiring of the
consultant was also a joint activity of the local union
representatives and the company. In fact, the first individual
to be considered was replaced by the present consultant
because both the union and the management representatives
felt that the present person was more successful in develop
ing a rapport with union officers and committee members.
The teams can be accurately described as Quality Circle
groups. The focus is on problemsolving around job-related
issues. No changes had been made in the organization of the
work, the roles of supervisors, the compensation structure,
or other structural aspects of the plant level work organiza
tion as of June 1982. The manager of QWL services,
however, saw this as only the first phase of a more
amibitious organizational change process. In addition to in
creasing the number of workers trained for the QWL process
(his goal is to train and involve 80 percent of the workforce
by the end of 1985), this manager sees the process moving on
to the point where workers and QWL teams would address a
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wider array of issues related to work organization, job
design and work layout, and work group management. This
would move the QWL process closer to an autonomous work
group type of organization. As of the summer of 1982,
however, none of the teams had moved to this stage nor had
the company and the union agreed to this objective.
By the summer of 1982, approximately 25 percent of the
members of the bargaining unit had been trained and were
participating in a QWL team. Because the company has been
experiencing layoffs since mid-1981, a number of people
who have completed training are not participating in teams
because the teams have been disrupted by movements of peo
ple through the seniority bumping process.

Initial Union Response to QWL
According to the international representative of this
union, the officers and members of the local were not sure
how the QWL process would affect them. He stated:
We weren't making a quality product and we
knew if we could produce a better product it would
enhance job security. But the stewards were skep
tical, the shop chairmen didn't want to get involv
ed. They didn't know what QWL meant and it was
a gimmick to them. The company has had so many
programs each beginning and ending at various
points in time. At the same time, the union's
perception of the company's goals at the outset of
the program was that this was an honest approach
to get workers involved in improving efficiency and
quality. We thought that the top executives of the
corporation (the Chairman of the Board and the
President and Chief Executive) were sincere.
Thus, despite some initial apprehension, the union decided
to go ahead, include the language in the agreement reported
above, and actively participate in the development and im-
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plementation of the program. A year after the initiation of
the QWL process, the key union representatives reviewed
their own views of the process to date. The international
union representative stated that:
This has been a real eye opener to me. Manage
ment wanted to make certain changes and produce
more to meet their schedules. The workers agreed
to cooperate. They understand the competitive
threat better now. They see the relationship be
tween their work and the success of the product
they make.
The business agent for Local 14B has been with the com
pany for more than 15 years and was also quite skeptical of
the program at the beginning. He assessed the status of the
program one year into its life as follows.
Management is really sharing information with
us. This would not have been possible three or four
years ago and I see this as a result of the QWL pro
gram. At a meeting yesterday, for example, the vice
president of manufacturing shared all the numbers
on costs and future orders that he has so we could
really get behind this layoff problem. [The union
representatives and the company had met to try to
avoid the layoffs of approximately thirty people
and had been successful in doing so.]
Another long-time company employee and union official
is the general shop chairman. He is currently a full-time
employee paid by the company. In addition to being respon
sible for coordinating the work of the shop stewards, he is
the key union representative who oversees the QWL process.
He started out as a strong skeptic of the QWL program but
later became a strong supporter. He stated, for example,
At first I saw little point in all of this. We wor
ried that this sort of program would make the shop
stewards superfluous. But we have had no regrets.
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The program is running very efficiently. The
management director of the QWL program is very
fair in his dealings with the union. We have had
great confidence in the consultant that the com
pany hired to work with us and we trust him. The
key is that we are considered to be equals by
management. It's not like a short-lived program
run by management where we will be left to pick up
the crumbs.
The support of the shop stewards was a bit slower in
developing in this case, as in most cases. Still, however, when
we interviewed them at two years into the process, none of
the shop stewards voiced opposition to the program, none
saw serious overlaps or jurisdictional conflicts between the
QWL process and the handling of grievances or with provi
sions of the collective bargaining agreement, and all of them
agreed that the union should continue to support the QWL
process and be actively involved in it. Consequently, the first
two and one-half years of the QWL process was a time of
growing support and commitment on the part of top union
leaders and union stewards. In addition, the union represen
tatives serving as QWL facilitators were emerging as another
important group of union activists supporting the process.

Evolution of Management Support
As noted earlier, the initial impetus to the QWL process
came from the chairman of the board of Xerox. Within one
year of the negotiations over the 1980 agreement, this chair
man was scheduled to step down and be replaced by the cur
rent president of the Corporation. This president and future
chief executive officer also shared a strong commitment to
develop the QWL process. Thus, the commitment from the
top levels of the Corporation was very strong at the begin
ning of the program and remained strong through its initial
implementation phase.
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While support at the top had been strong from the start,
support at the plant level and among middle managers was
reported by both company and union representatives to be
more variable and problematic. The first real test of the con
tinuity of the program came near the end of the first year of
the program. At that time a new vice-president of manufac
turing had just taken over, and the budget for the second
year of the program was under discussion. At the same time,
the company was experiencing increasing competitive
pressures and it was clear that layoffs would be coming in the
second year.
The issue of funding and cost of the second year of the
program came to a head in a meeting that involved the
managers of the four plants in the manufacturing complex,
the vice-president of manufacturing, the QWL consultant,
the director of QWL services for the Corporation, and the
three key union officials discussed above. The meeting began
with the vice-president indicating that the estimated $6
million price tag for the second year of the program was too
high, that the money was just not available for the program.
The outside consultant reported the dynamics of this meeting
from that point on as follows:
The dynamics of this meeting were interesting in
two respects. First the General Shop Chairman
(who is the union representative on the QWL pro
gram) took on the new Vice President of Manufac
turing and challenged him directly by asking him if
the company was "decommitting" to the program.
Second, the plant managers took a much more ac
tive role in challenging the new vice president as
well and in trying to look for alternative solutions.
The General Shop Chairman initially brought up
issues that the plant managers should have raised
themselves such as, what's the consequence of
backing off the program the first time money
becomes an issue?

24 Dynamics of Worker Participation

These discussions ultimately produced an agreement that
the plant managers agreed would absorb some of the costs of
the second year of the program within their own line budgets
and would look for ways to bring the cost of the program
down without slowing its progress. Eventually the cost of the
second year was pared down to $3 million as opposed to the
original estimate of $6 million. Consequently, with the joint
support of the local union representatives and the line
managers, the QWL process survived its first initial test, the
turnover of a key management decisionmaker.
The lack of support for the program from middle
managers and first-line supervisors was recognized by all of
the parties. Indeed, after two years of experience with the
program, the QWL manager was asked by the vice-president
of manufacturing to develop a strategy for dealing directly
with the lack of support from middle managers. They titled
the new strategy "Changing the Management Culture."
Local union representatives estimated that perhaps 80 to
85 percent of the line managers above the first-line super
visors and below the plant managers were opposed to the
QWL process. Opposition of these managers was attributed
to their fear of losing power and having their roles changed
while they failed to see the leadership styles and decisionmaking processes of managers above them changing in ways
that were consistent with the QWL process. Opposition also
appeared from some support groups such as the manufactur
ing engineering personnel who felt threatened by the idea of
having hourly workers suggesting changes in work practices
or layouts that had heretofore been within the jurisdiction
and discretion of engineering.

Evolving Views of the Rank and File
Rank and file employees explicitly agreed to initiate the
QWL process when they voted to ratify the 1980 collective
bargaining agreement. Although that agreement was ratified
by an overwhelming margin, the QWL provision included in
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the agreement did not play a significant role in the discussion
of the contract or in the vote itself. Thus, the first real
evidence available concerning rank and file reactions to the
QWL process came from the response to initial requests for
volunteer participants. According to both the manager of
QWL services and union representatives, there was some in
itial reluctance on the part of most employees to be the "first
to get involved." Just as the union representatives indicated
in their statements, rank and file members had already seen a
number of management initiatives to improve productivity
or try out a new communications program or enhance at
titudes and were fearful that this was another "gimmick."
However, a number of groups were convinced to consider
the process. After the first several groups responded very
positively to the QWL training, interest in the concept spread
more easily and rapidly. The manager of QWL services
reported that after the program was initiated and several
teams had completed training, most requests for volunteers
resulted in a positive response from 50 to 70 percent of the
employees in a work group.
There were clear signs, however, that rank and file interest
in participating began to decline during the second year of
the program. The general shop chairman reported that by
the midpoint of the second year of the process, it was getting
more difficult to get volunteers to participate. Indeed, when
we conducted our survey two and one-half years into the
process, only 25 percent of those not yet participating in
dicated a willingness to join the QWL process. Moreover,
analysis of the perceptions of those involved showed that
those who had gotten involved early in the process were
beginning to express more negative attitudes toward the
union's handling of QWL issues. (More detailed analysis of
the survey data is found in chapter 4.) These quantitative
data were reinforced by the statements of the general shop
chairman. In discussing our survey data he stated:
Those numbers seem to coincide with what I
thought was going on. Those who got involved ear-
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ly are saying to us "We took some big risks in get
ting involved early. Then we see that we are im
proving productivity and quality in our shops. At
the same time layoffs are occurring all around us
and the workforce continues to shrink. We are now
asking what are we getting out of this process."

Links to the Larger Collective
Bargaining Relationship
The experiences surrounding two events illustrate the rela
tionship which emerged between the QWL process and
broader collective bargaining issues. The first event concerns
a high labor cost operation that the firm was threatening to
subcontract to outside vendors. The second event is the pro
cess and results of the negotiation of the 1983 labor agree
ment, the first agreement to be negotiated after the QWL
process had been in effect.
The High Cost Operation. One of the most difficult and
controversial issues to arise between the company and Local
14B in the last several years has been the question of what to
do with approximately 200 workers involved in the manufac
turing of wiring harnesses, an electronic component that
goes into the overall product. When Xerox first developed
the technology for its copying machines, no other firms had
the capability of manufacturing the necessary types of
harnesses. Therefore, the company developed this capability
in-house and has always produced its own wiring harnesses.
Yet, as this technology became more routine and the market
for these parts grew, many new small firms entered the
market and sold these components to larger firms for use in
their final products. Almost all of these newer and smaller
firms are nonunion and pay wages considerably below the
rate paid for unionized employees covered under the Local
14B agreement. Indeed, the average total wage and fringe
benefit cost for Local 14B employees in this particular opera
tion in 1982 was approximately $19 per hour, compared to
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estimates from one vendor of $8 and another of $12 per
hour. Productivity comparisons also failed to show any
significant offsetting advantage to the Local 14B employees.
Consequently, many managers within Xerox had been argu
ing for several years that wiring harness operations should be
subcontracted to an outside vendor. The pressure to do so
was intensified by the fact that all of the firm's domestic
competitors that had entered this market considerably later
than Xerox were currently subcontracting this component to
outside vendors. Thus, the cost of this particular part of the
manufacturing process was considerably higher for Xerox
than for its competitors.
This problem had been recognized by both the industrial
relations staff of the Corporation and the local union leader
ship for a number of years. Indeed, an agreement had been
worked out prior to 1980 to slowly phase out the manufac
ture of wiring harnesses but to do so without laying anyone
off. This agreement became unworkable, however, as the
market for the firm's products began to deteriorate in 1980.
Therefore, the union and the company recognized they need
ed to return to this issue in search of an alternative arrange
ment. While there was strong pressure within management to
simply contract out the work, there was strong opposition to
this proposal from the local union. The vice-president of
manufacturing described the discussions that ensued around
this issue in 1981 as follows:
Management three levels above me made a deci
sion to close down this operation. The international
representative of the union responded to that deci
sion by pointing out that his shop stewards were
just livid about this decision because it contradicted
an earlier negotiated effort to reach an accom
modation on this problem. As a result several of us
within management said "Let's not just put these
people out on the street but let's give the problem
to them to see if something can be worked out. Let
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the people themselves select a team to decide what
is needed in this area." So this is what we did.
A group of workers and supervisors organized a task force
to examine alternatives for reducing the costs of operations
in this area. After one year of study and research the group
came back with a number of, as the vice-president of
manufacturing described them, "astonishing recommenda
tions." Below is his description of what the task force
recommended.
The group found that management was doing a
number of things wrong. The layout of the plant
was wrong and they showed how it could be
redesigned. The amount of overhead allocated to
this area of the plant was also found to be wrong.
They found lots of things that could be done dif
ferently. For example, they want to alter the con
tract language governing transfers and promotions
to slow down the movement of people across jobs.
They would like to have a separate seniority unit
for people working in this area to also cut down on
the number of moves in and out of the operation.
They would like to fix the jobs so that people don't
desire to rotate out of them but make them more
flexible and interesting. They would like to use
more part-time workers at peak periods of produc
tion to smooth out the workforce and to allow the
payment of lower wages and fringe benefits. They
propose eliminating a number of supervisors and
working as a semi-autonomous work group.
Overall, they have come up with a twenty-nine per
cent cost reduction proposal. Companies can't get
twenty-nine percent cost reductions these days
through management studies alone.
Obviously the changes proposed by this group strike
directly at the heart of the collective bargaining agreement.
The union and company representatives studied these recom-
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mendations, accepted those that did not significantly alter
the bargaining agreement, modified several in ways that did
not cause significant problems for the agreement, and agreed
to put those that required major changes in the bargaining
agreement on the table for negotiations during the next
round of contract talks.
This example illustrates a point that comes out in all the
cases we examined in this research, namely, that it is difficult
to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the
QWL or worker participation process and the collective
bargaining agreement. While the contract language govern
ing the QWL process clearly provided the boilerplate
"shelter agreement" provision stating that nothing in the
QWL process would alter the provisions of the agreement, it
is clear that as groups such as the one described above begin
to explore alternative arrangements for organizing work,
reducing costs, or increasing productivity, their explorations
are very likely to lead them directly into contractual provi
sions. As long as the participation process is limited to
specific Quality Circle types of activities, it may be possible
to limit discussions to topics described as "on line" and to
avoid those "off line" topics that are the province of the
bargaining agreement. Over time, however, it is likely that
this distinction will become more difficult to enforce, as was
the case in this example. At the same time, it does not
necessarily mean that solutions cannot be identified that
both preserve the integrity of the bargaining agreement and
do not frustrate the change process. As we will see, the key to
the parties' successful handling of this issue at Xerox was
that they clearly recognized the need for union and manage
ment representatives to negotiate those issues that did in
volve contractual language.
The 1983 Contract Negotiations. Contract negotiations
for the first agreement after start-up of the QWL experiment
began in late 1982 in anticipation of a contract expiration
date of March 31, 1983. Both parties knew that this was go-
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ing to be the most difficult negotiations they had faced in
more than 30 years. Since the 1980 contract was signed, the
market for the firm's products had shrunk drastically, the
recession of 1981-83 had depressed sales across the industry,
and the firm had embraced a new business strategy of at
tempting to compete on the basis of price for the first time in
its history. These changes in competitive conditions and
strategy necessitated deep price discounts which in turn put
intense pressure on manufacturing costs. The firm also made
a decision to permanently reduce its blue- and white-collar
labor force by over 30 percent, with the heaviest concentra
tions in workforce reductions coming in the manufacturing
facilities where the QWL process was in place. Furthermore,
the concession bargaining that had dominated negotiations
in many other industries in 1981 and 1982 meant that many
of the industries and unions traditionally used as bases of
comparison had already implemented contract concessions
and wage deferrals. Finally, accompanying the transition to
the new business strategy and the increased pressure on
manufacturing and labor costs, came a shift in the distribu
tion of power within top managerial circles. The power of
the financial cost-conscious managers had increased at the
expense of industrial relations. As a result, the industrial
relations staff lost much of the autonomy it had previously
enjoyed over the planning and strategy formulation for labor
negotiations. Thus, the union representatives recognized that
other management officials were in direct control or "calling
the shots" for these negotiations and that the industrial rela
tions staff would be under intense pressure to negotiate labor
cost reductions and tighter contractual language.
Just where concern for the QWL process stood within
management as negotiations opened was in serious question.
The union representatives believed that the hard-line posi
tion advocated by management negotiators signaled that the
company really did not care about whether the QWL process
survived these negotiations or not. They felt that the com-

Dynamics of Worker Participation 31

pany was being hypocritical in the approach it was taking to
negotiations. On the one hand, all during the term of the
agreement the company was preaching the values of QWL
with its stress on openness, problemsolving, high trust, and
information sharing. On the other hand, when it came time
for negotiations, the company's initial proposals called for
major concessions in the areas of subcontracting language,
job transfers and promotions, and other sensitive areas. In
addition, the employer representatives appeared, in the eyes
of the union negotiating team, to take a rather closedminded approach to negotiations rather than indicate a will
ingness to consider alternatives in a problemsolving fashion.
The union, for its part, opened negotiations by making
two basic points. First, it stressed that it had cooperated with
the company throughout the term of the agreement to
develop and sustain the QWL process and that it wanted to
maintain and strengthen that process. Second, it stressed
that in order for the process to be sustained through a second
term of the contract, some provision for job security and for
sharing the gains of the QWL process needed to be included
in the new agreement.
The parties eventually reached an agreement after extend
ing the old contract two weeks beyond its scheduled expira
tion date. Four provisions included in the new contract are
relevant to the QWL process:
1. The parties agreed to continue the QWL process with no
significant changes in the language governing this pro
cess.
2. The parties agreed to extend the wiring harness experi
ment to all subcontracting situations. That is, if the
company proposes to subcontract out work that it
believes is not currently being done at a competitive
level, the issue will first be given to the QWL team in
that area to see if it can propose a strategy for making
the operations competitive. If the work is contracted
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out, the company agrees to bring in other work that can
be performed at competitive costs. Any worker assigned
to this new work will retain his current rate of pay.
3. The company agreed to a guarantee of no layoffs for the
three years of the new agreement.
4. All remaining issues involving the wiring harness area
were resolved.
This agreement represented a major step toward the in
tegration of the QWL process with collective bargaining.
Essentially, the process of experimentation with new work
organization (the wiring harness proposals) was generalized
to all similar situations and made a part of standard
operating practice. In addition, the union achieved the job
security guarantee (at least for the term of this agreement)
believed needed to maintain rank and file and leadership
support for the QWL process. Finally, those issues which the
parties were not able to settle through the QWL process
because they were too central to the overall bargaining agree
ment were appropriately referred to the bargaining table and
resolved there as part of the overall renegotiation of the
agreement. Thus, without judging the merits of the specific
terms agreed to by the union and the company, this case
serves as a model for linking the QWL and collective
bargaining processes.

Summary and Conclusions
This case illustrates how a narrowly focused agreement to
experiment with a QWL process evolved over time in the face
of changing economic circumstances. It grew from an effort
to improve the QWL experiences of individual workers into
an integral part of the parties' strategies for addressing the
basic economic problems of the firm and the job security
concerns of the union membership. Innovations first sug
gested by participants in the QWL process have since been
transformed into standard operating procedures. The QWL
process survived its first set of severe tests because the parties
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successfully responded to the job security concerns that had
caused worker support for the QWL process to plateau and
decline.
While the parties were successful in this case in negotiating
an agreement that reinforced the QWL process in the face of
an extremely harsh economic environment, these negotia
tions could just as easily have led to the demise of QWL and
a return to a lower trust, arms-length union-management
relationship. The high level of trust built up over the years
between industrial relations professionals and union leaders
in this company were clearly instrumental in seeing the par
ties through these difficult times.
Local 717 and Packard Electric
The QWL process between Local 717 of the International
Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) and Packard Electric is
the longest running worker participation project in our sam
ple. Since Packard Electric is a division of General Motors,
the development of a QWL program at this company is not
independent of the origins and history of QWL in the auto
industry. As will be outlined below, however, the content of
the program has gone considerably farther than most of the
QWL activities described elsewhere in this book. Indeed, this
case provides the best example of a local union that saw the
QWL process right from the beginning as a strategy for pro
tecting job security. Thus, there has always been a close link
between the QWL process and this union's broader strategies
for representing the basic economic interests of its members.
Background to the Q WL Process
The beginning of the QWL process can be traced to an an
nouncement made in 1973 by the general manager of
Packard that there would be no more hiring or major capital
investment in Warren, Ohio due to the high cost of produc
tion. As a result, job security became a major concern to the
Packard employees during the mid-1970s. The current union
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administration, although not in office at that time, ran in
1977 on a platform to save the workforce through closer
cooperation with management.
Evidence that the joint efforts were viewed as a means of
addressing concerns over job security can be seen in the
following statement by the chairman of the shop committee
who was elected in 1977.
Between 1956 and 1973, Packard had grown to
13,500 employees. Between 1970 and 1973, we still
hired but in 1973 started to implement a long-range
strategy. ... so highly labor-intense production
was subcontracted and new plants were opened in
the South. In 1975 I was not the Chairman—I had
been defeated—so I went back to the machine for
two years. Working there and listening to the peo
ple gave me good insight as to what people wanted.
In 1974-75 started the industrial decline and the
biggest concern was job security—[the workers] felt
the threat. There was a lot of emotion in the plant.
[The President] and I got together in 1977 and ran
on the platform that we would try to save jobs and
have closer cooperation with management; that,
yes, the union and its people could have an impact
on the future. When elected, I began to implement
that.
After that union election, weekly labor-management
meetings were initiated involving the shop chairman, presi
dent of the union, plant manager, and personnel director.
That group, or the Steering Committee as it was later called,
started its joint efforts with several noncontroversial joint
projects, such as blood drives, the collection of funds for
United Way and the Employee Assistance Program.
At about the same time as the Steering Committee was
formed in 1978, a management task force was created to im
prove the performance of Packard in Warren. The shop
chairman then offered the union's participation in that
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group and the result was a joint union-management Jobs
Committee. The purpose of this committee is to:
. . . develop an ongoing union-management ap
proach that will maintain job security and identify
opportunities for hiring in the Warren operations.
In addition to saving and creating jobs, the Jobs Committee
is concerned with employee involvement in Packard's opera
tions. The joint committee operates by examining various
methods for saving and/or creating jobs and then develops
projects to accomplish that purpose. These projects tend to
address operational problems such as improving quality,
production or product delivery.
As noted above, employee involvement is included in the
philosophy of the Jobs Committee. While it is difficult to
separate the formal "quality of working life" activities from
the projects initiated by the committee, a wide spectrum of
employee involvement or worker participation projects at
Packard Electric has been started since 1978.

The Jobs Committee
As noted earlier, one of the objectives of the Jobs Com
mittee is to build the concept of worker participation into the
projects it undertakes to save and/or create jobs. That com
mittee consists of eight union and eight management
representatives. The union members include the president,
shop chairman, two subchairmen, two committeemen, one
benefits representative and one skilled trades representative,
while the management representatives consist of members
from each staff area. In order to illustrate the ac
complishments of the Jobs Committee, three successful pro
jects from 1978 and 1979 are briefly described below.
(1) The Maintenance Survey Project—Four new
employees were hired as a result of this project. Its
purpose was to identify ways to improve construction
performance. Two teams observed construction-
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maintenance personnel, noted how time was wasted,
and recommended the purchase of machinery and
tooling and the creation of new jobs.
(2) The Metal Parts Project—A team of employees was
organized to reduce costs in the metal parts area so
the company could successfully compete for metal
parts business on a worldwide basis. The team recom
mended the purchase of several new presses, which
resulted in a cost reduction and the subsequent hiring
of 46 employees.
(3) The Skilled Trades Requirement—As a result of the
branch plants' operations, office expansion, pro
jected requirements and experience gained from the
previous two projects, the Jobs Committee recom
mended that 115 new jobs be filled in the skilled
trades area. The result was the hiring of 115 people.
Between 1978 and 1980 the Jobs Committee participated
in the decision to hire employees as well as the purchase and
construction of three new plants in the Warren area. In re
cent years, however, the committee has had a more difficult
task, since the company announced late in 1981 that 3,900
jobs in Warren were noncompetitive and had to be
eliminated. In response to that announcement, the Jobs
Committee began to search for alternatives to layoffs. As a
result, it reduced the workforce by 900 employees through
accelerated attrition programs. A voluntary termination of
employment program and an early retirement program were
developed and the parties are currently in the process of
establishing a part-time workforce. All of these ideas were
developed in the Jobs Committee and subsequently taken to
the bargaining table and agreed upon during 1982 negotia
tions.

Committees of Hourly Employees
By the summer of 1983 there were approximately 60-65
committees of hourly employees operating. While all these
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committees could be classified as QWL groups, in fact their
scope and functions vary considerably. The parties classify
the committees into four groups: (1) "Non-Risky" Commit
tees, (2) Task Forces, (3) Employee Participation Groups
and/or Statistical Process Control Groups, and (4) SemiAutonomous Work Groups. The types of hourly committees
are listed and then defined below in order of increasing
worker involvement.
The "Non-Risky" Committees deal with "safe" topics
such as health and safety, housekeeping, and substance
abuse within a work group. A greater level of involvement
exists in Task Forces, which usually are offshoots of the Jobs
Committee. A Task Force searches for causes of problems
identified by the Committee and then recommends solutions.
Employee Participation Groups or EPGs (similar to
Quality Circles) are voluntary groups of 8 to 12 employees
who typically meet once a week for an hour to discuss workrelated issues, identify problems and search for causes and
solutions. Statistical Process Control Groups or SPCs are
groups of employees using the company's concept of SPC,
which basically is a statistical system of identifying control
limits for defects as opposed to traditional inspection. SPC is
not perceived by everyone to be "worker participation" but
the employees in a work group are involved in the process as
a team.
Three production lines in one of the new plants operate as
Semi-Autonomous Work Groups without a direct super
visor. These employees are involved in the most extensive
form of worker participation.

Summary
As in the Xerox case, at Packard it is impossible to draw a
line between the collective bargaining strategies and activities
of this local union and its worker participation strategies and
efforts. Improving the quality of working life was not the
driving motivation behind the development of joint efforts.
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The driving motivation was, and still is, to save jobs by mak
ing the operations performed by these workers more com
petitive. The various worker participation efforts and the
joint union-management committee structures that oversee
them are means used to achieve these economic objectives.
Thus, the Packard case brings our argument full circle. In
the previous case we documented how QWL efforts gradual
ly move into the traditional territory of collective bargaining.
In the Packard case, the process moved in the opposite direc
tion as the parties carried traditional topics of negotiations
into the worker participation process.

Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company
This case illustrates the pitfalls of a narrowly focused
Quality Circle type of program that operates largely in a
vacuum, without consideration for the larger set of events
occurring in the collective bargaining relationship between
the company and the local union. We will call this the case of
Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company (disguised name)
since the company is a small manufacturer of auto parts
employing a bargaining unit of approximately 300 semi
skilled and unskilled workers.

Background to the "Group 33" Program
The worker participation program at this company evolv
ed out of a "jobs evaluation committee" formed by the com
pany and the union during the summer of 1979. The original
committee met to discuss problems and make recommenda
tions concerning the general work environment in the plant.
When people realized that this committee created the type of
communications that should be encouraged throughout the
organization, the concept of work teams (called "Group
33s") covering the whole company was developed. As a
result, a central QWL Committee was created as an umbrella
group to encourage the formation of work teams. It is im
portant to note, therefore, that in this case the QWL process
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evolved out of an informal labor-management committee's
decision to experiment, not out of a clause negotiated into
the collective bargaining agreement.
Program Structure and Content
The members of the central QWL Committee are a cross
section of the various interest groups in the organization so
that different departments, ages and sexes are represented,
as are both union and management. In addition, current
members of the committee have all served as QWL
facilitators for the Group 33s at some point in time.
Group 33s are considered by the organization to be "peo
ple building tools." Their name is derived from the three
phases of a person's life: community, work and home. The
goal is to improve all three phases of the employees' lives
through the teaching of problemsolving techniques at work.
All participation is voluntary and groups are formed when
people volunteer.
The Group 33s operate under the same guidelines and
philosophy as does the QWL Committee. Each Group 33
meets to discuss mutual problems and to develop solutions as
often as necessary, but meetings are limited to one hour per
week. If the entire group agrees, it will work on any problem
that does not interfere with the negotiated contract or in
volve any of the following subjects:
— wages and salaries
— benefits
— disciplinary policies
— employment policies
— termination policies
— personalities
— company rules
Although there is no formal training for Group 33s,
facilitators spend two to four weeks working closely with
new groups in order to familiarize the members with the

40 Dynamics of Worker Participation

QWL process. Facilitators can be either union members or
salaried personnel and are selected by union officials and
management representatives. Facilitators also return to
groups periodically to ensure their progress.

Union Views of the "Group 33" Process
Twenty-five percent of the workers in the bargaining unit
were participating in Group 33s in September 1982, one-andone-half years after the start of the QWL process. Interviews
with the local union officials indicated general satisfaction
with the status of the QWL process. However, a number of
clouds appear on the horizon of this program. The problems
did not spring from what is occurring in the groups or within
the QWL process itself, but were a consequence of the weak
presence of the local union in the administration of the QWL
process and in the larger strategic decisions being made by
the company. We will draw on our interviews with the local
union representatives to illustrate this problem.
Separation of Problemsolving from Union-Management
Relations. While the union is formally involved in the QWL
structure, the actual role of the union is more one of a
"watchdog" than an active partner. As a result, the activities
of the local union appear to be limited largely to issues that
involve conflicts and disagreements with management, while
the QWL process is becoming identified as the central forum
for cooperative problemsolving. Thus, the union is
associated with largely adversarial issues and the more infor
mal QWL process is given credit for solving problems. The
following quote by the vice-president of the union illustrates
the difference in management's attitude toward him when he
raises an issue in the QWL process compared to when he
raises an issue as a union official.
When I come in to QWL Committee meetings
I'm an employee working to solve a problem. The
QWL Committee is easier [than formal union-
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management meetings]. The people from the com
pany are not against [the union] right off the
bat—they're willing to work with us with no prob
lem. If we disagree with them in QWL, we discuss
it. But as a union, if we disagree, then they get mad
and leave—they hold grudges and it filters out into
the shop. . . . Management is more honest in the
QWL program than they are with union problems
overall.
The separation between the QWL process and the han
dling of contractual items was further illustrated by a pro
blem that occurred when one of the QWL groups made a
proposal for an employee evaluation system. This proposal
was forwarded to the QWL Committee, which in turn for
warded it to management, which in turn approved it. The
union, however, viewed this new proposal as an infringe
ment on the collective bargaining agreement and thus re
jected it. This proposal arose at the time the company and
the union were negotiating the 1981 contract. The net result
was that the company and the union did not agree to include
any language on this issue in their new agreement. Subse
quently, however, the company unilaterally implemented
part of the employee evaluation proposal outside of both the
collective bargaining agreement and the QWL process.
Both the local union and management representatives
agreed that this employee evaluation proposal and its han
dling had a negative impact on the QWL process. The
management representative responsible for the QWL process
indicated that this controversy almost "wiped out" the par
ticipation program. The president of the local union said
that the union was "almost ready to throw QWL out of the
plant" because of the proposal. Since management approved
the proposal, the union president viewed QWL as "a union
busting tactic." He resigned from the Group 33 of which he
was a member in December 1981 because of this controversy.

42 Dynamics of Worker Participation

The company and the union did reach an accommodation
in negotiations over the 1982 contract on the issues deemed
to be outside the jurisdiction of the QWL process. This con
vinced the local union officials that management's objectives
for the QWL process were legitimate and the union subse
quently dropped its objections to the continuation of the
QWL process. The union president expressed his feelings
after these negotiations as follows:
They're not touching our contract as far as we
can see. . . . Management is asking employees
about quite a few things. I don't think they are try
ing to pull anything over the union any more. They
know they couldn't get away with it.
The Opening of a Nonunion Plant. Another issue surfaced
in early 1982 when the company opened a new nonunion
plant in a southern state and subsequently began laying off
employees in the northern unionized plant where the QWL
process was underway. This was only the second layoff ex
perienced by employees of this company in over one hundred
years. The president of the union expressed his lack of trust
in management as a result of this development as follows:
The company took a lot of our work out of the
plant and put it in the new plant in the South and
now they are working and we have people laid off.
The people out here aren't trusting management on
a lot of things. ... If we'd still had that work that
is being done in the South, those people would not
have been laid off.

Implications of this Case
This case illustrates a number of potential pitfalls for a
local union that can arise out of a worker participation pro
cess that is not linked to the collective bargaining relation
ship through contractual language at the outset and where
the QWL process at the workplace is isolated from the larger
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strategic decisions of the company. If the QWL process takes
over more of the problemsolving functions at the workplace,
the union is left with a more limited agenda of adversarial
issues that it can claim as its own. New ideas, such as the
employee evaluation proposal, which generate enthusiasm
among a subset of employees, then create the appearance
that the union is only an opposition force. Finally, this case
is an example where an employer is asking its local union and
union members to cooperate at the workplace in the short
run while it is in the process of making a strategic decision to
divert investments to a nonunion plant in another part of the
country. Because the local union officials are not directly in
volved in the design and administration of the QWL process
and have not used the QWL process to open a dialogue with
company officials over strategic decisions, the union is not in
a position to link efforts to preserve jobs to the participation
process.

Local 70 and Freeman, Inc.
A Case Study of a Demoralized QWL Process
This case summarizes the quality of working life efforts at
Freeman, Inc. (disguised name), a major Canadian grocery
chain. QWL programs were initiated in several of the
grocery stores in Freeman's Ontario division and in a new
meatcutting plant also located in Ontario.
Freeman operates approximately 75 stores in the Toronto
metropolitan area, all of which are organized by the same in
ternational union (we will refer to this union as Local 70). In
late 1981, the company also opened a new meatcutting plant
just outside of Toronto on the same property as the Ontario
division headquarters. This plant is also organized by Local
70. The union participated jointly with the company in
designing the plant on a socio-technical basis. The plant ran
for approximately eight months on that basis but it lost
money and operated at an unacceptably low level of produc-
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tivity and quality. As a result, the company decided to bring
in a new plant manager and revert back to a very traditional
management and organization style and work organization
system.
The QWL program in the retail store division predated the
opening of the meatcutting facility by about three years.
Four stores were involved in some form of QWL process at
one time or another. Experience with these QWL efforts en
couraged the company to use the socio-technical design to set
up the meatcutting facility. In 1981, the company began ex
periencing severe financial pressures, largely due to the reces
sion and to the increase in competition from independent
grocery stores and other retail outlets. Partly because of this
pressure and partly for other reasons, QWL programs in the
stores faded out of existence. In short, this is a case study of
a demoralized QWL program both in the retail stores and in
the meatcutting plant.

Background to the Meat Plant
In the late 1970s, Freeman's management decided it was
necessary to build a meatcutting and packaging facility. The
general manager indicated that the decision to set up the
plant on a socio-technical design and to work jointly with the
union was made right at the outset. He stated,
We saw an opportunity to design a plant with a
new approach. We wanted to do it on a quality of
working life and socio-technical system basis. We
saw this as an extension of the QWL philosophy
that we were developing in our retail division.
Union and employer representatives visited meat facilities in
the United States. The union also received advice from its in
ternational union concerning the designs and blueprints for
the plant as they were developed.
The personnel manager for the plant indicated that,
although the union was involved right from the beginning,
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its involvement was generally limited to reacting to designs as
they were drawn up. In other words, the union took little in
itiative in developing its own ideas or suggestions. There was
also a tapering off of union involvement about half way
through the design phase, according to the personnel
manager. He believed that the union's involvement in the
design of the plant was consistent with its posture in relation
to other QWL efforts:
Instead of committing themselves to joint
decision-making they preferred to take the position
of "you show us what you plan to do and we will
tell you if it's okay." Instead of taking a joint
design approach, the union prefers to maintain its
veto authority role.
The union representatives indicated that they did have full
opportunity to participate in the design of the plant and that
they had confidence in the outside consultant hired by the
company to help install the new work system. Indeed, the
key union business agent involved in the QWL efforts in
dicated that she was very satisfied with the role that the con
sultant played and his efforts to insure that union points of
view were taken into consideration.

The Design and Operation of the Plant
The plant cost approximately $27 million to build and
equip. Approximately $1 million of equipment was placed at
the front and the back end of short manufacturing lines,
whereas a traditional plant would have had much longer
lines and required only about $500,000 of front and back end
equipment. In a traditional meatcutting plant with long
lines, jobs are very highly specialized. In this plant there were
five short lines with fewer specialized jobs. In addition, the
lines were designed to allow workers to move across different
operations more easily.
The work was organized around work teams of 12 to 16
people with the goal of having everyone learn all the dif-
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ferent jobs in the plant. There were to be no dead-end jobs in
the plant and no discrimination based on sex or race in the
allocation of jobs to different individuals. Furthermore, the
jobs were designed in a way so that the physical requirements
did not exclude any individuals from any jobs. For example,
in a traditional meatpacking plant, beef carcasses arrive in
railroad cars or trucks and require considerable hoisting at
all stages of the front end operations. In this plant there was
no heavy hoisting except at one point where the carcass had
to be raised up to the first saw. Conveyors and mechanized
hoisting were built into the design to allow women and other
individuals with less lifting power to work on jobs at the
front end of the plant.
In traditional plants there are finely defined job classifica
tions with the meatcutter being the topmost skilled classifica
tion. Payment is based on the job being performed at a par
ticular point in time. The design of this plant called for peo
ple to progress through the six levels of the job classification
system by learning the various jobs and being certified as be
ing capable of performing the different tasks. The system
design called for "pay for knowledge" rather than pay for
the work performed.
The original design called for very few managers and no
traditional foremen. Instead, work was organized in work
teams on an autonomous work group basis with facilitators
providing assistance and help in organizing the work. The
collective bargaining agreement governing the first year of
operation in the plant was a very simple and short document.
It covered the economic terms of the contract but did not
contain detailed provisions on seniority, bumping, or other
job classification and work organization provisions. Instead,
it provided that the progression system would be monitored
by a review board which also handled recommendations,
grievances, discipline cases, and other issues. The review
board was made up of three workers and three managers
from the plant, and the union business agent.
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Experiences Under the Socio-Technical System
According to the personnel manager, the workforce had a
mixed reaction to the initial organization of work in the
plant. The greatest sources of resistance came from the most
skilled meatcutters. The personnel manager indicated that in
the traditional organizations, meatcutters prefer to work
with red meat, i.e., beef rather than poultry or pork. Some
of the top flight butchers who earlier had transferred from
the company's stores to the plant resented the idea that they
had to rotate around to less skilled jobs and that other peo
ple could be working in the high skilled classifications
without going through the long periods of training and
seniority accumulation that the butchers had gone through.
According to the personnel manager, the top butcher also
tended to be a "rough tough type guy" who served as an in
formal work group leader.
In addition, in the past there were few women in the skill
ed jobs in meatpacking operations because of the heavy lift
ing and dangerous nature of the work. Finally, the idea of
conducting team meetings where the authority and status of
the top butcher or meatcutter was being challenged made it
difficult for some of the workers to adapt to the new
organization. On the other hand, many employees had an
opportunity to learn new jobs and obtain new skills in the
plant at a very swift pace. As a result, the overall reaction to
the new arrangement was mixed.

Problems with the Work System
Design and Implementation
The company expected to lose approximately $8 million in
the first year of plant operations. However, in the first eight
months it had already lost $20 million. Productivity and pro
duct quality were both very poor in the months that the plant
was operated under this system. The business agent in charge
of the plant indicated that she saw many problems develop
ing in the plant, both with the way in which the workers
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handled their newly found ambiguity and freedom, and in
the general operation of the plant. Some of the workers, ac
cording to the business agent, took the new arrangements as
"a license to steal." For example, workers took longer cof
fee breaks, the team meetings failed to focus on substantive
workplace issues and accomplished little, and in some cases
workers even rigged up a bogus reporting system where at
one point nine workers were falsely reported to be at work.
Workers were also being certified at classification levels well
beyond their ability. These are only examples of the more ex
treme problems which developed under the system.
After the plant had been operating for eight months, the
top executives of the corporation made a decision to replace
the plant manager and to abandon the socio-technical work
system. Interviews with the managers and union officials in
volved suggested the following reasons for the failure of the
new system. First, it is clear that management made a major
mistake in failing to staff the plant with managers experienc
ed in either general manufacturing or meatpacking manufac
turing. Instead, all the managers of the new plant came from
the retail food operations and brought retail orientations and
experience into the factory environment. Thus, they did not
understand either the technical or the social system they were
getting into. Second, although there was a well-articulated
design for the social side of the plant, the consultants lacked
knowledge of the technical nature of a meatcutting plant.
Their prior experience in implementing socio-technical
systems came from other manufacturing environments.
Third, inadequate workforce training was provided regard
ing problemsolving techniques, workers' responsibilities
under the new work organization and semi-autonomous
system, and management's expectations for production.

The Change to a Traditional Operation
The regional director of Local 70 believes the central
reason for the failure of the socio-technical program was
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that people took advantage of the freedom offered under the
system. In addition, he believes that the management was
afraid of the union in the plant. He said, "They went along
with anything the union wanted and didn't know how to
manage this type of plant environment." Essentially, he
reinforced the earlier statements that management was not
prepared to manage this type of participatory system. In ad
dition, he stressed that the company made a serious strategic
mistake at the same time they were trying to get this new
meat processing plant off the ground. The company had
changed its marketing strategy by opening discount stores
and cutting prices. At the same time prices were being
lowered considerably to fit the discount model, the new meat
processing plant was starting up and delivering meat of
substandard quality to the supermarkets. Thus, the
customers associated the drop in prices with lower quality
products and the company's previous high reputation rapid
ly declined.
Eventually new plant management turned the organization
back to a traditionally-run operation. Team meetings were
eliminated. Any meetings are now conducted under direct
management control. In addition, time clocks were installed
and production lines were sped up. Job rotation was stop
ped.

The Aftermath of the Socio-Technical System
Six months after the shift to the traditional organization
and management system, the union and the company com
pleted negotiations over a successor agreement to the oneyear contract used to establish the new plant. The union had
originally planned to introduce only a very short list of con
tract proposals and modifications to the skeleton agreement
that governed the plant for the first year. The new manage
ment, however, according to the business agent, "forced us
to cover our ass." Therefore, the union proposed a tradi
tional collective bargaining agreement. It essentially brought
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all of the standard seniority, job classification, union securi
ty, management rights, and other work organization clauses
back into the plant agreement. The management organiza
tion was quite "shocked" at this approach since it preferred
to maintain the skeleton agreement. However, the final
negotiated agreement did contain most of the standard con
tract language. In the future, the company would still like to
have some form of team organization and would like to re
tain the quality of work life aspects of the earlier experiment,
but not go back to the overall socio-technical design.
Management also is now determined to maintain traditional
management controls and supervisory roles in any future
participation effort in order to avoid the problems experienc
ed under the experiment.

The Views of the General Manager
The key driving force in the development of the QWL ef
forts and the socio-technical design of the meat plant was the
vice-president and general manager of this company. He was
a very strong supporter of the QWL concept and believed
that the key to the future of labor-management relations lies
in the development of a high-trust relationship. His com
ments on the QWL efforts and the experience with the meat
plant, in an interview shortly after the start of the negotia
tion of the second year contract, are outlined below.
My overall opinion of where we are with our
QWL efforts is that with all the excellent things
that we have accomplished we are fundamentally
failing. We have not yet rid ourselves of fear and
distrust of each other. Fear and distrust are under
mining our ability to bring about meaningful
change. This distrust is leading to the negotiation
of a new labor agreement in the same old way that
we negotiated earlier agreements instead of
building on the positive experiences we have been
trying to develop. Instead, the union is responding
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this time the same way it has in the past. I can
understand this because of the way we have han
dled the socio-technical plant and the way we have
now had to regress in our operations there.
Our hope is after we do this we can go back to
our original intentions. Basically what we need to
do is to eventually get on to some core issues in our
relationship with workers and with the union to
open ourselves up to real significant change by un
freezing our relationship. I was really disappointed
in our inability to move on to core issues and bring
about change.
I believe after all I have been through so far that
we will not get significant change until we jointly
agree to confront the market changes and what
they imply for employees. We can't be afraid to use
our vision and take risks. We have to stop faking
around the issue of productivity and recognize that
we are in a mature industry. We have to educate the
union and employees to know what the retail life
cycle is all about and to recognize and realize that
there will have to be change if we are to survive in
this industry.

Views of the Business Agent
The business agent responsible for the plant generally
agreed with the view that the change to a more traditional
management system was needed to get the plant operating ef
ficiently and profitably. At the same time, she remained
strongly committed to the belief that some form of worker
participation, if properly structured and managed, should be
designed into future plans of the union and the company.
She stated her specific views as follows:
We have to look into these ideas and develop
them. Look at what happened here. Even though
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we had a disaster from the standpoint of the plant
operations we had nothing to lose for trying and in
fact no one has lost anything yet. No workers are
worse off now than they would have been if we
hadn't got into this effort.
In the future the union's role should be one
that's focused more at lower levels of our organiza
tion. We should rely less on the involvement of
people like myself as business agents and work
much more with our stewards and members of
plant committees. We cannot bring about change
from the top down through the company unionmanagement core group down to the plant level
and to the stewards in the store or plant. We have
to work from the stewards and the membership on
upward. The union staff has to be more of a
resource rather than a direct coordinator or
manager of the program.

The Broader QWL Program in the Retail Stores
In addition to the failure of the socio-technical program,
the broader QWL process in the retail stores that had been in
place for several years fizzled out within the last year and a
half. Again, the regional director of Local 70 stressed the in
teraction of the tougher economic times that the company
faced and the internal political changes within management
that led to the demise of the QWL experiments in the four
stores. He described the issue as follows:
The problem was very much internal manage
ment politics. Middle management never really got
committed to the effort. Especially the regional
managers were not impressed or supportive.
The regional director went on to describe the politics at the
top of the company as well:
The whole QWL concept started because Fred
Freeman was behind it [the chief executive officer
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and chairman of the board and the family head
who controlled the corporation]. Fred sold the idea
to the former president of the company and he sold
it to three or four of the other top people in the
company but this was still only less than half of the
top key management officials. Then Fred died and
the direction of the program was left in the hands
of the other board of director members who were
less enthusiastic about the idea in the first place.
The other board members were not part of the
family but approached the process from more of a
professional management standpoint and were
much more focused on dollars, profits, and pro
ductivity. Therefore they panicked much quicker
when the program began to experience problems
and the company began to go through this period
of tough competition and losses.

Aftereffects of the Demise ofQWL
When asked whether there were any traces of the QWL or
socio-technical programs left on the union as an organiza
tion, both the regional director and the business agent
responded that there were no adverse consequences. They
said, "We can honestly say that nobody was ever hurt by the
QWL efforts." In fact, they believe that some very positive
by-products came out of the process. They stated that they
are the only union that was able to negotiate a guarantee of
jobs for full-time workers in the stores and they attribute this
directly to the improved climate and relationship that came
out of the QWL process. They also saw some progress
toward solving long-standing problems for night crews by
bringing them into the mainstream of the company and giv
ing them an opportunity to get onto the day crews for the
first time. However, these efforts also fizzled somewhat as
the QWL process eroded.
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Summary
In summary, this union's experience with both the QWL
and the socio-technical design process illustrates that a union
can experiment with worker participation efforts and
manage its way through the demise of these efforts without
any lasting negative consequences. This union did so by
maintaining sufficient distance from the design of the pro
gram so that it could always react to what the company was
doing and be involved in it, but not be out in front leading
the effort. The union, on the other hand, did not have con
trol over the rise and fall of the process, nor could it con
tribute to the avoidance of the disastrous consequences that
it saw occurring under the socio-technical system. Conse
quently, this is an example of the case where the union was
both a junior partner in success and in failure. The parties
are now back working under a standard contract and carry
ing on in traditional collective bargaining fashion.

Newspaper Guild and Minneapolis Star and Tribune
The Case of a Labor-Management Committee
In contrast to the other cases reported in this chapter, this
case illustrates the unique features of an indirect form of
worker participation, namely, a Labor-Management Par
ticipation Committee. In addition, this case stands out as our
only example of a professional employee bargaining unit. It
is the case of a major newspaper and a group of reporters
and other newsroom workers represented by Local 2 of the
Newspaper Guild employed by the Minneapolis Star and
Tribune.

Background to the Worker Participation Program
A system of worker participation was formally proposed
by the Newspaper Guild during 1972 negotiations. Manage
ment argued against it, saying it "wasn't necessary," but the
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Guild succeeded in making the worker participation pro
posal a part of the contract. That provision called for a joint
labor-management committee which would meet at least
once a month and would discuss any topics it wished, with
the exception of contractual matters. In 1976 the authority
of the committee was extended to include problems arising
out of technological change.
The Guild had first become involved in worker participa
tion in 1971 when it consulted with management regarding
the appointment of two assistant city editors. The position of
assistant city editor is crucial to the efficient flow of the news
system, a fact of which the Guild was well aware, especially
after some "unfortunate" appointments were made to those
jobs in the past. As a result, the Guild approached manage
ment with the proposal that the Guild have advice and con
sent authority over the appointment of the two assistant city
editors. Although management representatives said they
would not give veto authority to the Guild, the executive
editor said he would be willing to consult with the Guild
about these appointments as well as future appointments to
supervisory positions.
Management and the Guild then had a meeting during
which management discussed their candidates for the two
positions and the Guild subsequently recommended two of
those persons. It turned out that the Guild's choices matched
those of management and those two persons were appointed.
It should be noted that assistant city editors are part of the
Guild's bargaining unit, so the Guild was participating in a
decision which involved its own members. This was the
Guild's "first taste" of what its members called "worker
participation" and thus led to the Guild's proposal during
1972 negotiations.

Program Structure and Content
The structure of the worker participation process consists
of a joint labor-management committee known as the
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Worker Participation Committee (WPC) which meets ap
proximately once a month. WPC members often form sub
committees for the purpose of investigating issues and
researching solutions to problem areas. Each news depart
ment initially had a WPC, so there was one committee for
the Minneapolis Star and one for the Minneapolis Tribune.
However, the two newspapers merged in 1982, so that cur
rently there is a single WPC. The merger and its effects on
the worker participation process are discussed in a later sec
tion of this case.
Guild members of the WPC are elected annually by the
membership and represent each area of the newsroom. The
Guild's business agent also attends all WPC meetings, as an
observer rather than as an active participant in the discus
sions. The editor-in-chief and assistant editor attend all
meetings. The remaining management representatives who
attend change from one meeting to the next. Each WPC thus
consists of approximately 12 Guild members and a varying
number of management representatives. In addition, any
other interested members of both parties may attend a WPC
meeting if they so desire.
Prior to the WPC meetings, the Guild members caucus to
discuss possible agenda items. Then one Guild representative
meets with a management member to formally set up the
agenda. There is no formal process for soliciting ideas or
suggestions regarding topics for discussion. However, Guild
members are encouraged by the WPC representatives in their
area to bring up any issues they wish, and Guild represen
tatives regularly take informal polls to solicit topics for
discussion. Minutes of the WPC meetings are posted each
month on departmental bulletin boards and usually serve as
a springboard for comments made by Guild members to
their representatives on the committee.
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During the WPC's 10 years of existence, it has moved
from a kind of "grievance committee" for noncontractual
matters to much more of a participative decisionmaking pro
cess for the Guild. According to the business agent, expecta
tions of the Guild initially were "not too high," so that
topics during the first couple of years primarily were based
on complaints about necessary equipment for the newsroom
and cafeteria food. Initial accomplishments of the Guild in
cluded the installation of a refrigerator for employees'
lunches and showers for female employees.
One of the earliest "nongrievance" type of joint decision
by the WPC which greatly increased its visibility concerned
the strategic direction of the afternoon paper. In response to
the question "What kind of paper shall we be?" the WPC
agreed that the strategy should be to become a state paper.
The "acceptability" of the WPC was proven in 1974,
when negotiations did not involve an attempt by manage
ment to weaken the language of the worker participation
provision. As both management and the Guild became more
comfortable with worker participation, the WPC meeting
began to include broader issues. Management also started
giving the Guild annual departmental budget figures.
As a result of 1976 negotiations, the language regarding
worker participation was changed in order to give the WPC
authority over any problem concerning technological
change. This was regarded as a significant accomplishment
by the Guild, since the newspaper industry was beginning to
undergo massive changes in technology—the use of com
puter terminals and VDTs was drastically changing the way
of life in the newsroom. Due to the revised provision, the
Guild secured permission to bring in a consultant to measure
for radiation, and management agreed to buy glasses for
job-related cases of eye strain.

58

Dynamics of Worker Participation

During the past five years, the WPC has been involved in a
substantial number of newsroom issues. The following is a
list of topics discussed at WPC meetings during which Guild
members contributed ideas and recommendations:
— policy on confidentiality of sources
— how additional news space might be used
— writing seminars
— seminars on law and newspaper reporting
— newsprint
— staff size
— orientation program for new staff members
— free lance policy
— office redesign
— criteria for selection of editors
— parking
— minority hiring program
— promotion campaigns
— by-line policy
— readership projects
— circulation problems
— schedules for reporters

Current Status of Worker Participation
The Merger of the Newspapers. The merger of the Star
and Tribune in the spring of 1982 had a dramatic impact on
the Guild members and WPC. The merger resulted in the
layoff of 70 people, 54 of whom voluntarily agreed to resign
with a year of severance pay. Since prior to 1982 only four
Guild members had been laid off for economic reasons (and
subsequently reinstated through arbitration), the layoff due
to the merger was a severe blow. However, it was the manner
in which management handled the merger that was viewed as
damaging to the Guild: the WPC was not allowed to par
ticipate in deciding the details of the merger prior to its oc
currence. Each Guild member of the WPC who was inter-
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viewed agreed that the merger had a " negative" impact on
the WPC. One stated, for example:
Everyone knew the Tribune was in trouble and it
was just a matter of time before the papers were
merged, but no one knew whether it was 3 months,
5 months, or 5 years. It was about 4 or 5 months
before the merger that [the editor-in-chief and head
of the management side of the WPC] . . . went to
some of the people on the WPC and said, "Listen,
there may be some changes coming down, we may
have to merge some special sections and things like
that. What I'd like to do is sit down with you and
have the Worker Participation Committee help
plan this." And in the meantime, [the editor] was
working with some of the top people in this
organization to merge the two papers completely,
and never told us a word about it! All of a sudden,
it comes to a day we find out, "Hey, the papers
have been merged." So it was just a complete sham
and that was just something in terms of how
[management] saw the Worker Participation Com
mittee in making important decisions at this place.
And so that left a bad taste in the mouths of a lot
of people about the Worker Participation Commit
tee and the process that I would say still hasn't gone
away. It was like a great breach of faith, we felt, on
the part of management. . . . and it was very dif
ficult to conceive of continuing the committee at
that point.
Thus, even a process that has survived for almost a decade
can be seriously threatened by one visible action by manage
ment (or, for that matter, by the union) which is perceived to
be inconsistent with the trust relationship that has been built
up by the participation process. This example illustrates the
fragile lifeline upon which the continuity of worker par
ticipation processes rests.
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Problems in the Worker Participation Process. In addi
tion, many of the Guild WPC members who were interview
ed were concerned about several other problems regarding
the committee and the future of the process. The majority
believed that a primary concern was the personality of the
editor-in-chief, who acts as the chairman of the WPC
meetings. The significance of his philosophy, particularly
regarding his efforts to limit the scope of influence of the
participatory process, is shown by the following statements
about the WPC made by Guild members.
[Management] holds the cards— they decide what
the committee will do. They have complete power
over it. The committee will do only what manage
ment will allow it to do. . . . but as negative as I've
been ... my problems are more with simply [the
editor] and the way he ran this committee, rather
than the idea itself. I think it can work ... it
should work ... it's a good idea, even the way it's
set up now. Even with the way [the editor] runs it,
it's better than nothing, just in terms of simple
communication. At least you're airing those
views. . . . [The WPC] is valuable, but it's just got
ta be done with the right person. And with the
wrong person, it can be very, very frustrating. It
probably can even become useless. I don't think
ours was, but it was certainly very frustrating.
Another problem with the committee, according to some
of the Guild members interviewed, is the length of time re
quired to accomplish something. One member attributes that
difficulty to adversarial relations:
Because there's a tendency to see [the WPC] as
an adversarial situation, it seems that there's too
much time spent defining things. It's getting into
details that really aren't that relevant. And it results
in a sort of reluctance to try new things. That's one
of the comments I've always heard about the com-
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mittee every since I began to work here—is that it
takes forever for anything to get done. And having
sat on the committee, I can see why—there's a lot
of rhetoric on both sides, there's a lot of smokescreening, a lot of devil's advocacy. All of that I
don't particularly enjoy. I don't see why people
just don't lay their cards on the table—"There it is,
let's decide what would be to everyone's mutual
benefit."
This comment points out two facts that are often
overlooked by the most vocal advocates of worker participa
tion processes. First, true participation by people with
diverse viewpoints generates debates, disagreements, and
open conflicts. While participation processes must en
courage the building of trust and problemsolving, they do
not necessarily mean an end to conflict and negotiations.
Second, involvement in participation processes inevitably
produces some degree of stress and frustration among par
ticipants with the pace of decisionmaking and change.
Democracy can be the enemy of decisiveness!

Evolution of the WPC
The future of worker participation for the Newspaper
Guild members was believed to be "up in the air" by the
WPC members who were interviewed. First, the impact of
the merger has caused the Guild members to feel "betrayed"
and led some to distrust management's motives. Second, a
new editor was to joint the staff shortly after we completed
our interviews and committee members believed that the
WPC's functioning would be highly dependent on that per
son.
In addition to the changeover to the new editor, others
recognized the need for the committee to continue evolving
by addressing bigger, more important issues.
I think that the committee has evolved, to a cer
tain extent, from what it started out to be, and I
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think that to remain healthy, it has to change some
more. I don't know the degree to which that is go
ing to be acceptable to management, but I'd like to
see it take on some bigger problems. That isn't
something, I think, that management has an in
terest at this point in agreeing to. But that again
depends on the kind of person, the kind of people
who are involved in management. If the people
who are there from top management are the people
who favor a reactive, bureaucratic sort of organiza
tion that . . . kind of discourages the sharing of
that sort of responsibility, then I think that we're
probably going to see a slide backward.
The business agent is determined to keep the WPC function
ing, as shown by the following statement.
Not to let [the WPC] fail is our number one goal.
As long as the system survives, it will grow.

Summary and Conclusions
The WPC is a long-standing union-management participa
tion committee that has survived several threats to its ex
istence and has proven to be an effective supplement to the
collective bargaining process. Its primary impact appears to
be that it provides the Guild and its members with an ongo
ing forum for communicating with management and for
discussing issues of employer, union, and individual
employee concern that extend beyond the normal scope of
bargaining. As the survey data reported in chapter 4 will
show, these Guild members appear to see their union as be
ing more effective in representing members' interests in
management decisionmaking on strategic topics than a com
parison sister unit in the same local without any participation
process. It is likely that this is due, at least in part, to the
presence of the WPC.
Two implications emerge out of this case. First, it appears
that this type of organization-wide labor-management com-
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mittee has improved the ability of this group of professionals
to communicate with management and influence manage
ment decisionmaking on some strategic issues that are not
possible to address within the formal collective bargaining
process. Second, if there is interest in extending the concept
of worker participation down to the individual employee,
this type of indirect or organization level structure must be
accompanied by experimenting with more decentralized and
informal participation processes that bring small groups of
employees into the process in a more direct way.

Summary and Conclusions—All Cases
The five cases of worker participation discussed in this
chapter all demonstrate the difficulty of drawing a clear line
of demarcation between the participation "experiment" and
the collective bargaining process. ACTWU and Xerox and
the lUE/Packard Electric cases suggest that to maintain
momentum and support for the QWL process, the job
security needs and interests of the workforce had to be met.
In turn, the only way to maintain the interest and commit
ment of management to the QWL process was to find ways
to integrate the process into the corporation's broader
strategies for controlling manufacturing costs, improving
productivity and adjusting to a more highly competitive en
vironment.
The case of the Newspaper Guild demonstrated that even a
labor-management committee that had survived for almost a
decade was badly shaken and almost destroyed by a sudden
management decision to merge two operations without prior
notice or consultation with union representatives. Yet, the
process survived this shock largely because union represen
tatives and rank and file members see the participation com
mittee as an integral part of their overall representational
strategy. As one committee member put it, communications
are not that good with the committee but without it they
would be even worse and the union would not have any ef-
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fective on-going channel to discuss issues that affect the pro
fessional interests of the workforce.
The case of Local 3 and the Uniform Piston Corporation
illustrates the organizational and political pitfalls that a
union is likely to experience when it adopts a "watchdog"
rather than a "full partner" role in the QWL program
dominated by an employer that is channeling investment
resources into a nonunion plant. While no visible signs of
trouble were evident to the union in this case at the current
time, the seeds of destruction for the QWL process, and
perhaps for the union itself, were firmly rooted in this situa
tion.
Finally, Local 70's experience with a defunct QWL pro
gram and a failed experiment with a socio-technical work
redesign operation demonstrates that even given the best in
tentions and good faith on the part of all parties involved,
absent adequate worker training, management and consul
tant expertise, and a viable technical and market foundation
for worker participation, the process is doomed to fail. Even
given the failure of the socio-technical experiment, this case
suggests that if both the employer and union recognize a
failure when one exists and deal with it openly and in good
faith, a stable traditional relationship can be reestablished
without serious harm to either party. Indeed, by learning
from the lessons of the failure, it may be possible to experi
ment with forms of worker participation again at some point
in the future, albeit in a more cautious and thoughtful man
ner.
Perhaps the central lesson of these cases is that there is not
a magical single line of steady positive results or im
provements that automatically flow from a worker participa
tion process. Each type of experiment is likely to go through
periods of enthusiasm followed by skepticism and perhaps
even disillusionment and decline. What appears to separate
out those cases that survive is an awareness of the need to
negotiate a way through problems and conflicts without
destroying trust.

Chapter 3
Worker Participation Under
Centralized Collective Bargaining
In this chapter we review the experiences of two major na
tional unions with worker participation processes scattered
across multiple plants as they moved through the difficult
economic period of the early 1980s. Each case illustrates the
challenges involved in linking workplace participation pro
grams to the broader, more centralized collective bargaining
structure and the broader strategies of the union and
employers involved. The cases are: (1) The United
Steelworkers (USW) and the seven major steel companies
covered under the Basic Steel Agreement, and (2) The
United Automobile Workers (UAW) and General Motors
and Ford Motor Company.

The USW and the Steel Industry
The worker participation programs in the steel industry go
under the label of Labor-Management Participation Teams
(LMPTs). This program originated out of the 1980 collective
bargaining agreement. The language governing this program
(as amended slightly in 1983) states the intent of the LMPTs
as follows:
The strength and effectiveness of an industrial
enterprise in a democratic society require a joint ef
fort between labor and management at several
65
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levels of interaction. The parties hereto recognize
that if steelworkers are to continue among the best
compensated employees in the industrial world and
if steel companies are to meet international com
petition, the parties must pursue their mutual ob
jectives with renewed dedication, initiative, and
cooperation.
Collective bargaining has proven to be a suc
cessful instrument in achieving common goals and
objectives in the employment relationship between
labor and steel management. However, there are
problems of a continuing nature at the level of the
work site which significantly impact that relation
ship. Solutions to those problems are vital if the
quality of work for employees is to be enhanced
and if the proficiency of the business enterprise is
to be improved.
The LMPTs can be viewed as a third generation labormanagement joint venture in this industry. One of the early
predecessors of this effort was the Human Relations Com
mittee that was formed after the long 1959 steel strike. That
Committee was composed of high-level company and union
representatives and charged with the mission of developing a
more cooperative relationship. While it was credited with im
proving the relations between union officers and company
representatives, it was discarded in 1964 when I. W. Abel
defeated David MacDonald for the presidency of the USW.
Part of Abel's campaign was the contention that the union
leadership had lost touch with the rank and file and it was
time to return control of collective bargaining back to the
membership.
A second generation of efforts to improve the relationship
between steel management and the union and solve
workplace problems was the formation of plant level Pro
ductivity and Employment Security Committees in the early
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1970s. These were promoted by President Abel as a
mechanism for improving the competitive position of the in
dustry and the job security of the membership. These com
mittees, however, never were well-accepted by plant
managers or by local union representatives and this initiative
quietly faded away by the mid-1970s.
By the time the USW and the major steel companies began
negotiating their 1980 Basic Agreement, economic pressures
were once again posing severe challenges to the industry and
the union. The 1970s were a decade of rising import penetra
tion in the markets of the major steel producers and growing
excess capacity in the steel industry worldwide. In addition,
the visibility of quality of working life efforts in the auto in
dustry and the interest of several key union and management
representatives led to the inclusion of the language quoted
above in the 1980 agreement.
Thus, after the signing of the 1980 agreement, local unions
in each plant and local managers could agree to experiment
with the formation of LMPTs at their locations. Between
1980 and the negotiation of a successor agreement in 1983,
13 plants scattered across the seven companies covered under
the agreement formed an LMPT program. In addition, dur
ing this time several companies and unions in the steel in
dustry organized by the USW, but covered under separate
agreements, established similar worker participation pro
grams.
To examine experiences under this provision, interview
data were collected from representatives of five locals with
LMPTs and one local outside of the Basic Steel Agreement
with a QWL program. Initial interviews were held with the
local union presidents or representatives of these locals in the
late summer of 1982 when the industry and the union were
attempting to negotiate a successor agreement. The first at
tempt at an agreement had broken down and another at
tempt later failed before a new agreement was successfully
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negotiated and ratified by the USW in February 1983.
Follow-up interviews were then held with several of the
representatives of these locals after the signing of the suc
cessor agreement in order to trace their experiences through
the negotiations.
As we review the experiences of these locals, it should be
kept in mind that the LMPT program has been operating
during the worst depression in this industry since the 1930s.
At the time of our interviews in 1982, the industry was
operating at less than 30 percent capacity and layoffs had
reduced the workforce by more than 50 percent.

Initial Stages ofLMPTs
The experiences of the first local to start an LMPT (and
the most advanced and model project in the industry) il
lustrates the typical LMPT start-up process. This plant open
ed in 1903. Its peak employment was approximately 8,600
workers during the late 1970s. As of the middle of 1982, ap
proximately 4,600 workers were employed within the
bargaining unit. The plant had experienced major layoffs
starting in October 1981. Although at that time four blast
furnaces were operating, by February 1982 the company had
scaled its operations down to only one-half a blast furnace
and was producing only about 1,500 tons of steel per day.
Although there had not been any actual local union strikes
in this plant in recent years, the local union president
described labor relations prior to the development of LMPTs
as highly adversarial. He stated:
We always had a bad relationship. It was highly
adversarial and each side thought the other side was
not capable of bargaining in good faith. We did not
have any strikes but a lot of our disputes went right
down to the wire.
The LMPT program got started when Sam Camens, the
USW international union representative who coordinates all

Participation Under Collective Bargaining 69

of the unions' efforts in worker participation, asked the
president of this local union if he was interested in starting a
process based on the provision negotiated in the 1980 con
tract. The union president indicated his response was as
follows:
Of course I was quite leery of what the members
would think. But because I was already viewed as a
strong anti-company person it was easier for me to
bring this idea to the members. The executive board
was also at this meeting where Sam approached me
about the idea. They took a very positive approach
to the idea of getting involved.
We started in May of 1981. We believe that the
company saw as its basic objectives in this effort
the improvement of productivity, quality, and the
working relationship with the union. On our part, I
was hopeful this effort would provide more dignity
to workers, increase their input into decision mak
ing, ease the adversarial relationship between the
foremen and workers, and give workers a feeling of
participating in company and union affairs.

Structure and Operation of the LMPT Program
Most of the LMPTs are structured in the same general
fashion. The president of the union, or a representative for
the president, normally serves as co-chairman of a Steering
Committee for the plant with a management counterpart.
Often this management representative is the plant manager
or the director of plant operations. The larger plants normal
ly also have joint departmental or unit committees at lower
levels of the organization. The work teams are the central
unit within the LMPTs, normally consisting of between 7
and 10 workers and the supervisors located within a depart
ment. These teams normally meet one or two hours a week to
discuss problems involving their work and review informa-
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don on competitive costs, quality, productivity, and other
data relevant to the performance of their group. In most of
the programs, especially those progams supported by outside
consultants, union and management representatives and the
members of the work teams have received training on problemsolving. Team leaders are also often given additional
training in group processes.
In all cases, care is taken to assure that the issues discussed
by the teams and the suggestions offered do not violate the
collective bargaining agreement. Union representatives on
steering committees or on other committees above the level
of the work teams monitor the suggestions coming from the
teams to assure that they are not straying into contractual
issues. From time to time, examples were cited in the inter
views where the local union representatives had to inform the
teams that they were talking about issues that were offlimits.

Gaining Initial Support Within the Plant
Each of the union representatives indicated that there was
initial resistance to the program from a variety of sources
within the union and within the plant. Active efforts to ex
plain the program to union stewards, officers, and rank and
file workers were needed in each location in order to over
come initial skepticism with which these groups greeted the
idea of worker participation. Skepticism was greatest in
those locals with the most active internal political opposition
to the union leadership. For examples, in one plant where
there had been a history of a "two party system" in the
local, the union president described initial reactions of rank
and file workers to the LMPT concept as follows:
It depended on who talked to the members first.
If those who opposed me politically talked to the
members first the workers saw it as a company trick
or another simple effort to increase productivity at
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the expense of the workers. If I talked to them,
then they understood the program as a reasonable
idea.
In some plants the members of the union executive board
were also initially quite cautious or generally opposed. In
one case, for example, the executive board was initially split
with half of the members fearing that the program would cut
into their authority. Their approach, therefore, was to take
the idea directly to rank and file workers, make it clear to
them that this was a voluntary effort, and leave it to them
whether or not they wanted to participate, without any en
dorsement or nonendorsement by the executive board. That
approach, however, was the exception. In most other plants,
after some initial discussion, a majority of the executive
board endorsed the program. Over time, the support of the
executive board typically increased as board members gained
more experience with the program and rank and file workers
reacted positively to the program.
Rank and file workers also were frequently somewhat
skeptical at the beginning. Although the estimates of the
degree of interest in the program varied from plant to plant,
generally between 40 and 70 percent signed up for an LMPT
team when given the opportunity. Most of the union
representatives indicated that support for the process was
strong among those workers who had been exposed to it,
although there continued to be a good deal of skepticism on
the part of rank and file workers who had not yet been in
volved. The most common response was that "Support is
strong where we have it and people tend to oppose it where it
doesn't yet exist."
In one plant, the union representative estimated that 90
percent of the workers were in favor of the LMPT process.
This, however, is a very special case. In this plant, after the
LMPT program was in progress for several months, the
company closed the plant for a full one-day meeting of all
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workers at an off-site location, described the needs for pro
ductivity improvements and reductions in costs, and put in
motion a major effort to improve the cost performance of
the plant. The company and union representatives joined
forces in using the problemsolving processes and work teams
to involve all employees in the plant in the search for solu
tions to problems. Thus, in this plant all of the workers have
been exposed to the LMPT concept and to a more farreaching cost improvement program. This accounts for the
high percentage of workers who support the process in this
plant.
Among the other five plants where interviews were con
ducted, only one union representative estimated that more
than 50 percent of the rank and file workers support the ef
fort. Clearly, the local and national union representatives
face an important education and advocacy role in diffusing
worker participation through these plants.
On the other hand, interview data collected between one
and two years into these programs also indicated that sup
port among union stewards and executive board members
generally increased over time. In three out of six plants, 100
percent of these union officers supported the process. In
another plant, 90 percent (all but one) of the local represen
tatives supported the program. In only one plant was there as
much as a 50-50 split within the executive board over the pro
gram.
While the support of the rank and file depended on their
exposure to the process and the union officer support grew
over time, virtually all union representatives believed that
first-line supervisors and middle managers continued to
resist the process. For example, one union president stated:
They [supervisors] are the problem. They are not
educated by top management. Management has no
means of communicating with their foremen. The
foremen will go along with the program but they
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will do it only because they have to. On the other
hand, those who are now in it like it. It makes them
look good and they have less to do such as less
discipline and fewer grievances.
This same union president had even stronger comments
about the problems with middle managers above the firstlevel supervisors.
They are the lost people. There is no communica
tions there. The general foreman is trapped. He is
under the most pressure for production and has to
both make decisions of his own and implement the
decisions of higher management of which he is
often not a part. This is why they are such a dif
ficult group to deal with and have not bought into
the idea of the program yet.
In most plants it appears that the labor relations managers
were also initially threatened by the program. The participa
tion process required changes in their role and often was
viewed as a threat to their own security. These managers
were being asked to discard their long standing roles as the
front-line adversaries protecting the firm against union en
croachments on management rights. For example, a union
representative described the reactions of the labor relations
people in one plant as follows:
In those zones where the program (LMPTs] ex
ists the labor relations staff have trouble justifying
their existence so they don't like it. Each zone in
our plant has a labor relations administrator whose
central job is to manage grievances. As the LMPT
program goes on, these grievance and discipline
problems go away and therefore these people have
less to do. The company has tried to use these peo
ple in other ways but they still fear for their own
job security.
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Just as the management labor relations representatives
may see the program as a threat to their job security, union
stewards or grievance committee representatives can also see
this process as a threat to their political positions within the
union. The union in one plant handled this problem by
establishing an advisory committee made up of the grievance
committeemen and the departmental foremen. This innova
tion appeared to work quite well in getting the grievance
committeemen and the foremen involved in and committed
to the LMPT process. It also served the "watchdog" func
tion of resolving any jurisdictional problems that arose bet
ween the LMPT process and the grievance procedure and
day-to-day contract administration.

Diffusion of the Process Through the Plant
The slow diffusion process reflects the need to first gain
the commitment of the various interest groups, the need to
provide adequate training to workers and supervisors before
they establish their work teams, and the need to provide time
and resources to the union and management facilitators,
trainers, and internal and external consultants. In none of
the programs of these six plants had more than one-third of
the bargaining unit members been participating in work
teams at the time of our interviews (approximately one-andone-half years into the LMPT process). The percentage of
bargaining unit members actually participating ranged from
less than 10 percent in three plants to 33 percent in one plant.
These data reinforce a conclusion that cannot be overem
phasized, namely, that for worker participation efforts to
survive and endure over time, there must be a strong and
steady commitment to their development and evolution, and
all parties involved must take a long term time perspective
from the outset. Results come slowly because the process
moves through these plants at a relatively slow pace.
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Obstacles to Continuity
Internal Union Politics. Perhaps the obstacle to continuity
in worker participation programs that has received the
greatest degree of attention in the literature is the fear that
worker participation processes will lead to political opposi
tion within the local union and threaten the security of the
union leadership. Ironically, this turned out to be the least
significant threat to program continuity, not only in these six
USW locals, but also in every other case we examined in this
research. In only two out of the six locals did the LMPT pro
cess become an issue in the election of union officers after
the process had been underway.
In one of these two locals, the candidate opposing the
union president who had helped initiate the LMPT program
campaigned against the process. The result was that the in
cumbent union president won by a stronger margin (3 to 1)
than he had in his initial union election. Indeed, he reported
(and it was confirmed by international union representatives)
that this was the first time an incumbent president had been
reelected in this local union in over 20 years. In the second
case, where the issue became part of the internal union
political election process, the results were more complex.
The union president was reelected but believed his support
for the program hurt him somewhat, especially in those areas
of the plants where workers had not yet been exposed to the
LMPT process. On the other hand, a number of people on
the executive board who opposed the LMPT process were
defeated. He described this process as follows:
After the program got started and we began to
approach the time for union elections several
members of the executive board began to get ner
vous about their political support for the program
and began to back away from it. However, those
who did drop their support for it were defeated in
the election.
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Perhaps the best summary of the effects the LMPT pro
cess and other worker participation efforts had on internal
union politics is that they can and sometimes do become an
issue, but have not proven to be a determining factor in the
union elections studied. Nor have internal union politics
served as a serious threat to the continuity of the program in
the cases studied in this research.
Layoffs. All of the plants in the steel industry have been
experiencing employment cutbacks during the period in
which the LMPT process was getting started. While the
union representatives indicated in five out of six of these
plants that the layoffs were posing some problem, in only
one plant did the layoffs seriously erode support for the pro
cess. The dynamics of this particular layoff process and its
impact in that plant are worth describing in some detail since
they illustrate the severe threat that employment cutbacks
can pose to a worker participation program.
The union representative responsible for developing the
LMPT process in this plant summarized the situation as
follows:
The QWL process in this plant is dead in the
water. We had a large layoff in November and our
members thought that was when the QWL process
should have helped but it didn't. Management call
ed it off without any discussion. They laid off the
management coordinator of QWL and the
facilitator but kept all of the other vice presidents,
managers, and superintendents. Our union officers
feel that the majority of upper management wasn't
as supportive of the program as we thought. Now
the union officers aren't interested in starting it
back up again even though the vice president of in
dustrial relations wants to get it going again.
This case illustrates the important difference that a
management commitment to maintain the program through
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hard times can make. In this plant, management's commit
ment did not withstand the severe market pressures ex
perienced by the firm. This, in turn, reduced the trust and
support of union officers who were then viewed as being
"less than supportive" by the managers. Management then
decided to set the program aside. Later, management slowly
tried to rebuild support for the program but faced opposi
tion from union officers. Their only hope then was to appeal
to the job security interests of the workers. In addition,
because upper management failed to maintain the principles
of consultation and problemsolving in dealing with super
visors during the cutbacks, similar opposition arose towards
the program from people at this level of their organization.
In the other five plants studied, although employment
reductions occurred, their net effect was to slow the growth
of the LMPT process rather than seriously threaten its ex
istence.
Industry Level Negotiations. Another challenge en
countered by the LMPTs was the process of negotiating a
new collective bargaining agreement. Nineteen eighty-two
was a year of widespread concessions in negotiations in other
industries. Because of the depressed state of the steel in
dustry, the steel companies requested an early opening of
negotiations over the 1983 contract and proposed significant
wage reductions. The first effort to negotiate a new agree
ment took place in the summer of 1982 and received a lot of
public visibility and press coverage. The process broke
down, however, after the chief union negotiators took a ten
tative agreement calling for wage cuts back to the Wage
Policy Committee, a council of local union presidents which
soundly rejected that agreement. Several of the local union
representatives commented on the effects that experience
had on the LMPTs in their plants. For example, one presi
dent stated:
If we had just been starting up, [LMPT process]
that [the negotiations] would have killed it. The im-
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pression was going around the plant that, here we
have this program and it is just here to help the
company get concessions. But we addressed this
concern directly by talking to our local people and
have overcome that impression. It will [the com
pany's strong approach in negotiations] have a bad
effect.
Another local president stated:
We will survive the effects of the climate set up
by these negotiations but if it continues I don't
know how much longer workers will be willing to
continue to be involved in the LMPTs. If we had
taken the industry offer to a vote in our plant it
might have turned some people who were for our
LMPT program against it.
Both of these union representatives, as well as the other
local leaders, stressed that it was as much the way in which
the company approached the negotiations process as the
substance of the concession proposals that bothered them.
Union leaders stated that their members would accept some
concessions, particularly if the concessions were tied to a
commitment to reinvest funds in the steel industry. For ex
ample, a representative of a local from the U.S. Steel Com
pany described the mood of the membership as follows:
There are two basic reasons why we won't agree.
If U.S. Steel were willing to sign on the line for
deferrals and that all of the money that they were
saving would go back into these plants we would do
that. We also believe that management is excessive
in these plants given all of the layoffs that have oc
curred. The members do not want to give up more
concessions only to see U.S. Steel use our money to
purchase another big oil company.
Prior to a third effort in negotiating a new national agree
ment, the USW held a Wage Policy Committee meeting to
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outline its goals and objectives for the negotiations with the
Basic Steel Industry and with other employers in steel and
other industries. It decided to prepare two separate Wage
Policy Committee recommendations. One set of objectives
covered "distressed" industries including Basic Steel, while
another set was drafted for industries in better states of
health. The Wage Policy Committee report for the distressed
industries included a statement outlining the union's objec
tives for strengthening the LMPT process. That statement is
provided below.
The Labor-Management participation team ex
periment in the Steel industry has proven in
valuable to both parties whenever it has been
tested. Armed with these results, we are determined
to expand and strengthen this program which pro
vides workers with a voice in shop-floor deci
sions—even those decisions once deemed to be the
exclusive prerogative of management. The program
should be installed in additional steel plants and in
troduced into other industries, but only with local
union agreement. Workplace Democracy is the way
of the future.
The final contract agreed to by the union and the company
did include a revision of the basic language on LMPTs that
strengthens the program in many of the ways proposed by
the Wage Policy Committee. The major changes in the con
tract language can be summarized as follows.
(1) The words "joint efforts" were inserted as substitutes
for "cooperative efforts" at several points in the pro
vision. This reflected the recognition that the worker
participation process is more than a cooperative pro
cess but one that involves a variety of processes, in
search of solutions that meet the parties' needs.
(2) The agreement was changed from an experimental
program to a basic part of the permanent relation
ship. That is, the intent of the changes in the language
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was to take the program out of the experimental stage
and make it an ongoing permanent part of the
bargaining relationship.
(3) The language was changed to provide that any local
union could have an LMPT process if it so requested.
This put the initiative for the program in the hands of
the local union as opposed to the prior agreement
which required more joint agreement to start a pro
gram between the company and the union leaders.
(4) A new body of international union representatives
and company representatives was established to
oversee the development of the LMPT process and
promote its diffusion to additional sites.
As a result of the industry level contract negotiations, a
number of local unions have requested that international
union officers begin to help them develop an LMPT pro
gram in their plants. Thus, it appears that the participation
program has withstood the negotiation of a successor agree
ment, a farther step has been taken toward building the ex
perimental program into the ongoing relationship, and
LMPTs are likely to spread to additional plants and local
unions during the term of this second agreement.
Company Level Negotiations. Although the LMPT pro
cess survived the industry level negotiations, conflicts be
tween the U.S. Steel Corporation and the USW at both the
national and local union levels have produced a crisis which
led to at least a temporary and perhaps a permanent
withdrawal of local union support for the LMPT process.
The conflict with national union officials developed over the
company's announcement that it planned to curtail produc
tion, purchase foreign steel, and maintain only the finishing
portion of the steelmaking operations in one of its major
plants. The union saw this shift in strategy as a breach of
faith in that the announcement came shortly after the signing
of the concession agreement in which union members ac
cepted a pay cut in return for a promise that the money saved
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would be reinvested in steel plants. Thus, this unioncompany dispute was a disagreement over the linkage the
union thought it had achieved between the collective
bargaining agreement and the employer's basic business
strategy.
Conflict also arose in a U.S. Steel plant over a local work
rules dispute. Following the signing of the industry-wide
contract, management proposed to the local union that a
number of key job classifications be consolidated. When the
local union rejected this proposal, the company began mak
ing the changes unilaterally and thus precipitated a major
conflict with local union leaders. The local union leadership
took the position that any changes in the organization of
jobs should be discussed within existing LMPTs or through
collective bargaining. Since the unilateral management ac
tions were viewed as an act of bad faith, the local union ex
ecutive board announced it would not participate in any
LMPT activities unless this crisis was successfully resolved.
At the time of this writing, the conflict had not been resolved
and, therefore, the LMPT process was suspended. Whether
it is only a temporary or a permanent breakdown of the pro
cess in this plant remains to be seen.
This breakdown illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a
cooperative worker participation process in the context of
fundamental union-company conflicts over basic business
strategies. What makes the LMPT process especially
vulnerable to these conflicts is that there is generally a low
level of trust between this firm and the union. Furthermore,
the company is known to prefer a traditional arms-length
relationship with the union and to have a relatively weak
commitment to the LMPT process.
In contrast, in one plant of a different corporation, the
worker participation process expanded beyond its original
intent and successfully addressed work rule issues as part of
a major effort by the company and the union to attack their
cost problems. A summary of this joint effort is presented
below.
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Early in 1982, this company began to lose significant
amounts of money. The company and the union represen
tatives had both believed that it would take about five years
before the LMPTs would develop to the point where they
would be paying off, so that more direct action was
necessary to address the financial losses. They therefore
agreed to use the basic philosophy and approach underlying
the LMPT, namely, discussing the problems of the plant
directly with the workers.
A team of approximately 70 people was formed to try to
decide what to do. This team in turn recommended they take
the problem to the entire plant population. The president
agreed to shut the plant down for one full day, rented a large
auditorium, and invited all employees to the meeting. At the
meeting, the president, the plant manager and the industrial
relations manager, outlined the cost, profit, and competitive
restrictions facing the plant. The workforce was then divided
into groups of about 50 to 60 people. Workers who had been
trained as leaders of teams under the LMPT program led the
sessions in group problemsolving and brainstorming. About
3,000 suggestions came out of these sessions and were later
reduced to approximately 900 ideas. Between May and
August of 1982 the implementation of these suggestions was
estimated to have saved the company approximately $13
million. This was a result of an investment of approximately
$250,000 (the cost of shutting the mill down for one day and
paying the workers for the time at the plant meeting). The
company and the union hoped to save approximately $26
million by the end of the year by implementing additional
suggestions on their list.
The president of the local indicated that this strategy was
successful in making that mill the low-cost producer within
the company. In fact, it was getting some work that had
previously gone to other mills. Finally, the union president
summarized his view of where the LMPT program was
leading.
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We always told management that we could run
the plant and they are now essentially giving us a
chance to show that we can. If we are successful in
doing so there will be fewer management people
around in the future. We have already seen this
happen since they just combined two of the general
foremen's jobs into one by not replacing someone
who had retired.

Summary
The experiences of the USW and the steel industry il
lustrate the various obstacles to continuity which arise as
participation programs move through changes in the
business cycle, the internal political processes within local
unions and management organizations, and contract
negotiations. Yet the majority of these programs (four out of
the six examined here) survived. In the absence of strong
local and national union support, the programs are likely to
fail. Also, the absence of strong management commitment
to the worker participation process, the absence of a hightrust relationship between the company and the union, or the
unwillingness of management to adopt a business or in
dustrial relations strategy that is compatible with labormanagement cooperation will kill the programs. In these
cases the participation process is likely to succumb to the
polemics often associated with hard negotiations during for
mal contract renewal discussions. This apparently was the
fate of the LMPT process at the U.S. Steel Corporation.
It is clear that, over time, it becomes increasingly difficult
to completely separate out the LMPT process or any other
worker participation program from the larger collective
bargaining relationship. The strongest supporters of worker
participation at the local level escalate their interest in problemsolving activities, and see grave inconsistencies between
the problemsolving behaviors they have learned to use and
the adversarial strategies and tactics traditionally used by
unions and employers to negotiate new labor agreements.
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They also see inconsistencies between the open sharing of in
formation and consultation processes and traditional
management practices in responding to economic pressures
and short term crises. Finally, the statements of the local
union leaders further suggest that experience with worker
participation in its very narrowest sense may lead to an
escalation of interest in involvement in decisionmaking on
broader issues. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is
with a statement made by one of the union presidents in sum
marizing his views of the process.
I would like to think we will get more involved in
bigger issues over time. We are satisfied with the in
volvement we have now but as the program grows
our input should also grow. We should become
more involved in the running of the plant if only no
more than in an advisory role.

The UAW and the Automobile Industry
The auto industry's experimentation with worker par
ticipation programs began in the early 1970s. The wellpublicized strike at General Motors' Lordstown plant in
1972 led to wide-ranging discussions in and out of the in
dustry concerning the workplace environment, worker
motivation, and potential avenues by which work might be
reorganized and enriched.
In 1973, a letter of understanding was added to the GMUAW national agreement recognizing
. . . the desirability of mutual effort to improve the
quality of work life for the employees. In consulta
tion with union representatives, certain projects
have been undertaken by management in the field
of organizational development, involving the par
ticipation of represented employees. These and
other projects and experiments which may be
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undertaken in the future are designed to improve
the quality of work life thereby advantaging the
worker by making work a more satisfying ex
perience, advantaging the Corporation by leading
to a reduction in employee absenteeism and turn
over, and advantaging the consumer through im
provement in the quality of the products manufac
tured.
A joint national committee was created to review and en
courage the QWL projects.
A variety of experimental projects followed. Among these
projects was a program to enhance communication between
workers and managers accompanied by a survey of worker
attitudes which showed signs of early success at the GMLakewood assembly plant. At a van assembly plant in
Detroit, assembly line operations in one work station were
replaced by a team (stall) work organization. Later, the
QWL program at the GM-Tarrytown assembly plant was
heralded as successfully reducing absentee rates and
grievance rates, and improving worker attitudes.
The pace and extent of these experimental programs
varied widely within companies and across the industry. At
Ford, the development of such programs stalled after a few
unsuccessful pilot projects and was not revived until the end
of the decade. Meanwhile, at Chrysler and American
Motors, very few participation projects have been initiated.
At GM, where the widest diversity of programs emerged
under the leadership of Irving Bluestone of the UAW, there
were failures as well as successes. For example, the team
organization at the van assembly plant mentioned above fail
ed to reach performance expectations and soon ended. The
new cooperative relationship at the Lakewood assembly
plant lasted only for a few years and then evaporated when
plant management changed.
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In some other GM plants, such as Tarrytown, there ap
parently are continuing successes. In the early and
mid-1970s, GM also was experimenting with new work
systems and managerial styles in their southern plants, most
of which remained nonunion until the late 1970s. In a few of
these plants workers were organized into "operating teams"
with a single job classification for production workers (ex
cluding tradesmen) and a "pay for knowledge" wage system
which contained six pay levels. One of these facilities, the
Delco-Remy plant in Albany, Georgia was organized by the
UAW, but continued to use the team concept with the
union's approval. After GM management's adoption of a
neutrality pledge in 1976 and an automatic recognition
clause in 1979, all of the nonunion southern plants were
organized by the UAW. The development of the operating
team concept, however, has had lasting effects as the use of
such teams spread in the late 1970s to GM plants. This team
system also is significant because, as discussed in more detail
below, the system integrates basic changes in work organiza
tion and collective bargaining with worker participation.
The late 1970s witnessed a sharp economic decline in the
auto industry which precipitated the development of a sec
ond generation and wider range of worker participation pro
grams. The scale of the industry's economic decline has been
massive. The employment of production workers in the in
dustry has dropped from a peak of 802,800 in December
1978 to 511,500 as of July 1982. Furthermore, shifts in the
demand for autos, heightened international competition,
and the resulting imperative for rapid technological change
suggest that employment levels are unlikely to return to
anywhere near their earlier peaks. In addition, the enormous
success of the Japanese production system raised doubts
about the soundness of American labor relations practices
and helped to induce a new wave of experimentation.
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The economic troubles in the industry after 1979 led to
significant changes in the conduct of labor-management
relations. These changes include the initiation of Quality
Circles at the shop floor level, and enhanced communication
between workers and management through other less formal
channels. To preserve jobs, a number of plants have
modified local agreements and work rule practices. In the
process, the role of union officers has changed dramatically.
Union officials in many plants now communicate frequently
with management outside of normal collective bargaining
channels and receive information regarding business plans,
new technologies, and supplier relations information on sub
jects that heretofore were deemed to be exclusive managerial
prerogatives.
At Ford, worker participation programs had largely disap
peared until 1980 and were encouraged by the appointment
of Donald Ephlin as the vice-president of the Ford-UAW
department and Peter Pestillo as the Ford vice-president of
industrial relations. A further push for participation pro
grams came in the national agreements at GM and Ford sign
ed in 1982 which created new training programs, guaranteed
income stream benefits, pilot employment guarantee pro
jects, plant closing moratoriums, and outsourcing limita
tions. These agreements also included significant pay conces
sions (the removal of the annual improvement factor and
deferral of COLA payments) and reduced the number of
paid holidays by 10 per year.
The elaboration of worker participation programs in the
early 1980s in the auto industry confronted two central
issues. First, economic pressure clearly was a major force
which spurred these programs and raised the issue of how
participation programs were to relate to other cost cutting
measures adopted in response to this economic pressure. Sec
ond, labor and management faced a decision regarding
whether or not participation programs were to expand to the
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point that they entailed a more systematic transformation in
industrial relations. The operating team concept adopted in a
few plants provides one potential route by which this type of
transformation can occur. The question is whether plants
that so far have adopted more piecemeal participation pro
grams can and will choose to move to this sort of full scale
revision in the conduct of labor-management relations. To il
lustrate the dynamics of the participation process and the
emergence of these issues, in the next section we describe
events within one plant that has adopted both Quality Circles
and a major work rule concessionary agreement. Then, the
experiences of plants which utilize operating teams are
reviewed.

A Piecemeal Participation Process
Participation programs began in this plant in 1980 in the
aftermath of enormous layoffs and the emergence of doubts
regarding the long term viability of the plant. This plant
manufactures parts for the Ford Motor Company. Employ
ment peaked in 1979 at 3400 hourly workers and by 1982 had
fallen to 1400. Labor relations in the plant always had been,
in the words of the bargaining chairman, "extremely adver
sarial." Facing layoffs and frustrated by their acrimonious
relationship, labor and management set out in early 1980 to
experiment with a worker participation process. The local
union shortly discovered that language encouraging such
programs had been included in their company's 1979 na
tional agreement. Following the guidelines of the national
agreement, and with advice and encouragement provided by
national UAW officers, labor and management then em
barked on a new program.
The participation program initially centered around the
creation of "Employee Involvement" (El) groups, essential
ly Quality Circles, where workers on a voluntary basis would
meet for one hour a week (on paid time) and discuss
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workplace issues. These groups, as of the spring of 1983, in
cluded 20 percent of the hourly workforce. Expansion of El
groups has been limited by two factors—the disruptive in
fluence of continuing layoffs and the large resources needed
for group start-up. Specific issues that have been addressed
by the El groups include: the placement of a conveyor belt,
the improvement of gauging operations, better lighting and
the rearrangement of some work stations to better coor
dinate work.
The local union has made sure that contractual issues are
not discussed in the El groups. If issues such as job jurisdic
tion or production standards come up, discussion is "halted
by the union committeeman" and the issue is sent to the
plant's bargaining committee. However, in some depart
ments, workers have become involved in broader workplace
issues. A few involvement groups have been in touch with
vendors to resolve production problems. Another involve
ment group performed a feasibility study of the use of a
robot and in the process altered the ultimate decision reached
by the engineering staff.
On a separate track, the relationship between union of
ficers and plant management was changing in the plant.
Union officers were being provided with information regard
ing business plans. For the first time, the plant manager was
forewarning union officials about upcoming layoffs and new
machinery, and asking for advice regarding how these
changes might best be implemented. Some of their discus
sions have occurred as part of "Mutual Growth Forums"
which follow the guidelines outlined in the 1982 national
Ford-UAW agreement. Other discussions occur on a more
informal basis.
An important part of the communication between plant
and union officials concerned the competitive pressures fac
ed by the plant and steps that might be taken to lower inhouse production costs so as to compete more successfully
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for new business. These discussions led to a local agreement
in 1982 which modified a number of work rules. The con
tractual modifications included agreements to: increase pro
duction standards; have production workers perform some
housekeeping, inspection and incidental maintenance job
functions; alter overtime and shift preference arrangements;
and allow production workers to assist tradesmen in the
repair of machines. These concessions were provided by the
union on the grounds that they would lead to the arrival of
new business (the plant would become a parts source for
Ford's new models). In the work areas involved in any new
business, it also was agreed that workers would be selected
(transferred) with some consideration of ability rather than
rely exclusively on existing contractual seniority provisions.
In one work area in the plant where new business has been
brought in, a single ("universal") classification system has
been adopted. The original plan was to include a "pay for
knowledge" system in this area, though so far implementa
tion issues have postponed that step. Management hopes
that positive experience with the single classification system
will encourage the system's expansion to other work areas.
Expansion of this system to the whole plant essentially would
amount to introduction of the operating team system.
Discussion in this plant recently has focused on shifting
the Employee Involvement groups to a department team
basis. Like the use of a single classification system, this shift
entails a fundamental redirection of the participation pro
cess. At the core, the issue is how the participation process
can be linked more closely to work rule issues, and thereby,
to many of the rules currently resolved through collective
bargaining procedures. From management's side, the need
to more closely integrate participation and work rule issues
arises from their concern that the participation process not
only address "housekeeping issues," but rather focus on the
problems that affect this plant's competitive position.
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To date, work rule issues and the Employee Involvement
process (the Quality Circles) have been procedurally kept
apart. This has created two central problems. By not focus
ing on work rules, the agenda within the Employee Involve
ment groups has been limited to the point that some
employees and management have become disillusioned with
the outputs of the process. Furthermore, insecurities have
been created within the workforce. Employees are hesitant to
give up the traditional classification system and experiment
with a universal classification system or other work rule
changes because the job specifications and seniority rights
embedded in the traditional system provide the workers with
protection from the abuse of discretion by managers. If this
security and protection is given up, the workers want
something to be put in its place. As we will see in the later
discussion of the operating team system, there it is enhanced
information and participation through team structures that
partially satisfies these needs.
In this plant, union officials have acquired more informa
tion and input into business decisions. Yet, this has occurred
in a disassociated manner from other programs in the plant
and, perhaps most important, has not fully involved the
hourly workforce. Thus, although enormous change has oc
curred within the plant, a series of problems exist which
jeopardize the future of the participation process. First, both
workers and managers complain that many of the Employee
Involvement groups seem to have plateaued and need to be
invigorated. Second, the pace at which work rule changes
have been adopted and classification systems revised has
slowed due to the resistance of some work groups. Third,
debilitating problems, such as whether participation in the
new department teams or a new statistical quality control
program are voluntary (as with the Employee Involvement
groups), have slowed the adoption of these programs. Addi
tionally, there is a sense of unease within both union and
management ranks concerning where the participation pro-
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cess is headed and how it relates to the economic pressures
confronting the plant.
To allay some of the anxieties which surfaced regarding
the participation programs, a plant-wide meeting was held
which involved the participation of the hourly workforce,
corporate management, and national officers of the UAW.
One purpose of this meeting was to show workers that the
participation programs had the support of the national
union. The meeting also provided the opportunity to point
out the relationships between this plant's particular pro
grams and the novel programs adopted at the national level
in the 1982 negotiations.
This meeting apparently did help to broaden the support
within the rank and file for the participation process.
However, labor and management are still left with the prob
lem of how to institutionalize the connection between the
participation process and mainstream collective bargaining
issues and procedures. The operating team system described
below sets out one possible solution.

The Operating Team System
Operating teams are now utilized in 10 GM plants in
cluding the Delco-Remy plant in Albany, Georgia, Cadillac
engine plant in Livonia, Michigan, and Buick 81 plant in
Flint, Michigan. These plants provide an example of how the
participation process can be integrated more fully with other
industrial relations systems and processes.
The core of the operating team system is the departmental
teams which contain a single production classification. A
worker's pay thereby no longer is explicitly linked to a par
ticular set of job tasks. Instead, there exist six pay levels
which workers move up as they master a wider variety of job
tasks. The work team also has responsibility for such things
as inspection, material handling, housekeeping and repairs.
In this way, the system involves an expansion of job tasks.
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There is a "team coordinator" who functions as super
visor of the team (the former first-line supervisor's role) and
an assistant team coordinator (an hourly worker). The teams
regularly meet to discuss production problems, review the
pay system, and discuss impending business decisions such as
the introduction of new machinery or upcoming work
schedules. Part of the function of team meetings is to
establish a business focus within the work area. To ac
complish this the team regularly reviews the costs and
revenues associated with the work area. In one team meeting
we observed the team coordinator reviewing the purchase
vouchers accumulated by the work area in the previous week
and comparing the total operating costs to operating
revenues generated by the work area.
Two aspects of the typical start-up of the team systems
were particularly important in providing the local union with
assurances regarding management's objectives. Represen
tatives from the local union were involved in the planning
committees that shape the design and implementation of
each team system. Furthermore, local union officials had a
say in the initial selection of the team coordinators and con
tinue to maintain involvement in the placement of super
visory staff.
One of the values of the single classification is that it
allows greater flexibility and coordination across work sta
tions. For instance, absenteeism is less of a problem since
workers are qualified to carry out a variety of jobs. The
"pay for knowledge" system reinforces this flexibility by
providing a direct reward for the mastering of a large
number of jobs. The work teams also allow job rotation and
worker input into job design. Although these forms of work
reorganization have occurred, observation of some of these
plants suggests that the abandonment of assembly line
techniques has not been a frequent product of the teams'
operation. For one thing, the basic technologies within these
plants are traditional, though being of recent vintage, and
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they do tend to involve a high degree of computer control. In
addition, it does not appear that workers within the teams
have chosen to shift away from short cycle jobs, even where
they could have.
What the teams do provide is a process which links the
modification of work rules and work organization to worker
participation. Consider how some of the problems, which
have arisen in the plant engaged in a piecemeal participation
process described earlier, are resolved in the operating team
system. In the piecemeal plant, participation workers are
reluctant to agree to further work rule concessions for fear
that the relaxation of the traditional classification and
seniority system would pass too much unregulated control to
management. Yet, in the operating teams it is the fact that
workers receive information about upcoming changes and
have a right to make their influence felt in the team meetings
that provides a substitute for the security relinquished
through abandonment of the traditional classification
system. Furthermore, local union officials within the
operating team plants receive extensive information from
plant management regarding business plans. In this respect,
the roles of the local union are much the same in the two
plants. The difference is that in the team plants this exchange
of information extends down to the level of hourly workers
and is institutionalized through the team meetings.
This is not to say that all conflicts have evaporated in the
team plants. One of the team plants we visited has con
fronted the following problems. A dispute arose over the
varying pace at which workers had progressed up the levels
of the "pay for knowledge" scheme across the teams. Some
workers resented the fact that pay progression had been
faster in an area of the plant that holds low status and in the
past was a department that workers had bid out of upon ac
cumulating seniority. This has led plant management to
closely monitor and somewhat standardize pay progression
across the teams. Another more serious problem exists in this
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plant as a consequence of the suspicion with which skilled
tradesmen view the team system. In fact, a year after the
start-up of teams, the skilled trades in the plant campaigned
hard to have the "pay for knowledge" system (which applies
only to production workers) removed. An election followed
in which 65 percent of the total plant workforce voted to re
tain the "pay for knowledge" system. However, manage
ment has not been as successful as they initially had hoped in
getting tradesmen to participate in the team system.
Tradesmen apparently believe that the job-broadening and
flexibility inherent in the team system ultimately threaten the
identity of their crafts.
Yet, the use of teams has accomplished the removal of any
artificial separation between work rule issues and participa
tion processes. This has facilitated the creation of bargains
that cut across the various issues, and thereby, allowed the
kinds of compromises that are more difficult to achieve
where collective bargaining and worker participation pro
grams are kept separate.

Summary and Conclusions
The steel and auto industries have gone through their most
serious economic crisis since the Great Depression. It is not
surprising, therefore, that each of the worker participation
processes described in this chapter has been under pressure
to contribute to the economic recovery of their plants and
firms. This has led the parties to search for ways of
reorganizing work, improving product quality, and improv
ing productivity. While none of the parties would agree that
the primary focus of their participation efforts is to improve
productivity, neither would any of the union or management
representatives involved deny that improved productivity
and lower operating costs are valued outcomes of their ef
forts.
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If productivity and costs are part of the agenda, then
employment security is bound to be an equally central agen
da item. When participation processes begin to address these
issues, it becomes increasingly difficult to draw a clear line
between worker participation and collective bargaining.
Thus, as the focus of the process expands, it no longer can be
treated as solely a local union or local plant management
issue. National union leaders and corporate executives must
get involved and must decide whether or not to adjust their
collective bargaining strategies in ways that support the ex
pansion and innovation underway within the participation
process. As the contrasting experiences of U.S. Steel and
Ford, and to a lesser extent General Motors, illustrate, the
adjustments in strategy and practice required are substantial.
Top union leaders must accept significant changes in work
organization and compensation structures and increased
variability within previously standardized local contracts.
Top management must accept greater information sharing
and must stand behind commitments to business strategies
that preserve the employment base of the union. It is clear
that only some top executives and union leaders are ready to
accept these changes.

Chapter 4
Views of the
Rank and File
Unions are political organizations whose leaders need to
be responsive to the interests of their members. Therefore,
no participation process is likely to succeed over an extended
period of time in the absence of rank and file support. Con
versely, if rank and file interest in quality of working life
issues and participation processes is strong, opposition from
higher level union leaders is unlikely to deter management
from developing programs that build on this interest. Thus,
it is appropriate to start our analysis of views toward par
ticipation experiments by assessing the views of the rank and
file. By starting at this grassroot level, we also mirror the
way that QWL activities evolved—from local experiments to
a broader movement of significance to national union
leaders.
This chapter analyzes survey data collected from rank and
file union members in five national unions involved in dif
ferent types of worker participation projects. The
background and dynamics of four of these cases were
described in chapter 2. Our analysis of the views of union
members toward participation programs and the effects of
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these programs on members' perceptions of their jobs and
their local unions will center around the following questions:
(1) Do union members assign a high enough value or
priority to QWL types of issues to warrant union sup
port for a worker participation process?
(2) Does actual participation in a QWL program lead to
even greater worker interest in gaining greater say or
influence over QWL types of issues?
(3) Does actual involvement in a worker participation
process lead to perceptions of greater real influence
over decision areas related to QWL?
(4) Does the participation process modify workers' views
of their job on the key dimensions of work that par
ticipation is expected to affect such as the amount of
employee job involvement, freedom, opportunity to
learn new skills, etc.? These are the dimensions of job
experience most often cited as the targets of QWL
strategies.
(5) Does involvement in worker participation processes
influence members' assessments of the performance
of their union on QWL and/or other issues?
(6) To what extent do union members not currently par
ticipating in a QWL or related process want to get in
volved in the experiments that are underway in their
plants or offices?
The Sample
The five cases for which rank and file survey data are
available are not "random" samples of the experiences of all
unions and their members. They do, however, span the range
of worker participation programs and employer-union rela
tionships needed to make useful comparisons and, with ap-
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propriate caution, some limited generalizations. The cases
might be viewed as "samples of convenience." That is, with
the help of our advisory committee we identified local unions
and employers where some form of worker participation ac
tivity was underway. We then discussed our research in
terests with representatives of these locals. A decision to con
duct a survey of rank and file workers was then made if all of
the following conditions held:
(1) Sufficient time had elapsed under the worker par
ticipation project to allow for a meaningful assess
ment of worker views of their experiences.
(2) Some basis existed for comparing workers who were
covered or actively involved in a worker participation
process with similar workers who were not covered or
actively involved.
(3) Both the union and the employer representatives
agreed to cooperate with a survey. This proved to be
one of the decisive criteria since permission to con
duct a survey was needed from multiple levels of
management (industrial relations or personnel profes
sionals, QWL coordinators, plant managers, and
sometimes corporate officials), multiple levels of the
unions (international representatives, local union
business agents, local union presidents, local union
executive boards, etc.) and in some cases, the joint
union-management steering committees overseeing
the participation processes. Each of these different
groups often had valid reasons for opposing surveys.
Among the most common reasons were: (a) surveys
had been done in the past and workers were tired of
being surveyed; (b) surveys raise expectations of
workers and should not be conducted unless there was
a clear action plan for following up on the results;
(c) the timing of the proposed survey was problematic
because internal union elections were about to be
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held, layoffs were in progress, about or occur, or had
just occurred, or the negotiation of a new collective
bargaining agreement was about to take place; or
(d) the parties belived the participation process had
not advanced to the point where workers were able to
evaluate their experiences.
(4) The group added diversity to the sample. That is, we
wanted to collect data on a range of different types of
participation programs in a variety of different
employer-union relationships.
With these characteristics of the sample selection process
described, we can now turn to the five cases analyzed in this
chapter. It should be noted that in each case the parties were
assured we would not identify individual respondents nor use
the actual names of the unions and the firms without their
permission. Thus fictitious union and employer names are
used to describe two of the five cases (cases 2 and 3). Only
brief descriptions of the cases are provided here since four of
the five are analyzed in more detail in the case studies
presented in chapter 2. (The case of Freeman, Inc. is not in
cluded here since the QWL and socio-technical experiments
had already ended by the time our research started.)

Case 1: Local 14B and Xerox Corporation
As described in chapter 2, this case involves a large, highly
skilled, blue-collar bargaining unit located in Xerox's
manufacturing complex in Rochester, New York. The union
and the company began a jointly administered QWL pro
gram in late 1980 after a clause authorizing experimentation
with such a program was included in their 1980 bargaining
agreement. Survey data were collected from a sample of 387
out of a bargaining unit of approximately 4,000 workers.
The data were collected during the summer of 1982, approx
imately 20 months after the start-up of the QWL project. In
this case the union involved in the QWL project acts as a full
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joint sponsor and sits with representatives of management
on all of the various steering and oversight committees. The
actual participation process resembles a Quality Circle (QC)
program.

Case 2: Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company
This is a bargaining unit of approximately 300 semi-skilled
and unskilled workers located in a small manufacturing
plant. The structure of the participation process again
resembles a QC program. In this case, the union is less cen
trally involved in the different stages of the process and
adopts more of a "watchdog" rather than a joint sponsor
role. The program had been in effect for approximately two
years prior to conducting the survey in the autumn of 1982.

Case 3: Local 25 and the Communication Services Corporation
This is a large bargaining unit of blue-collar workers
covering a wide range of skills employed in a facility of a
large communications services firm. The QWL process in
this firm is only in the early stages of development. It had
been in place less than one year prior to our survey in late
1982. For this reason, we did not conduct a full case study of
the program and therefore this case is not discussed in
chapter 2. It is included here, however, because it provided
data on a sample of workers in the early stages of a QWL
process. The process is part of a nationwide program that
has been underway since the signing of a national agreement
in 1980 in which the union and the company agreed to jointly
develop a QWL program in its various locations. The union
and management serve as joint sponsors of the process which
also is similar to a QC program.

Case 4: Local 717 and Packard Electric
This is a large bargaining unit of approximately 9,000
workers represented by Local 717 of the IUE employed by
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Packard Electric, a division of General Motors Corporation.
Data were collected from 104 workers in various adjacent
plants of a large manufacturing complex located in Warren,
Ohio. This case serves as our longest running QWL process
in the sample. Discussions of joint activities between the
union and the firm date back to 1977 and formal QWL ac
tivities have been underway since 1978. In addition, this case
provides data from union members in a QWL process that
has gone beyond the QC stage by experimenting with
autonomous work groups and work team organizations. The
local union has been a full joint partner in developing and
administering the participation activities since 1977.

Case 5: The Newspaper Guild and the Minneapolis and St.
Paul Newspaper
These data are collected from two units in the same local
of the Newspaper Guild (NG) located in Minneapolis and St.
Paul, Minnesota. The Minneapolis unit is covered by the
labor-management committee called the Worker Participa
tion Committee (WPC) described in chapter 2. The WPC
grew out of a 1972 collective bargaining agreement. It is a
joint union-management committee that discusses a wide
range of topics including working conditions, new
technology, systems for performance appraisal, the selection
of assistant editors, etc. The St. Paul unit of the NG does not
have a labor-management committee in place and therefore
provides a comparison group of comparable workers not
covered by a labor-management committee. This case pro
vides both a different type of participation structure (a
labor-management committee as opposed to direct involve
ment of individuals and small work teams) and a white-collar
professional employee group as opposed to blue-collar
manufacturing or service workers. Because this unit and its
participation program differ in these ways from the others, it
will be treated separately in much of the statistical analysis

Views of the Rank and File

103

that follows and will not be included in the regression
analyses which combine the data from the other four cases.

Research Design Considerations
Obviously, the ideal way to assess the effects of participa
tion processes on a set of workers would be to collect data on
their views of their work and their union prior to the start of
the process and then collect follow-up data at some ap
propriate point after the process has been in effect. That was
not possible given the time and resource constraints of this
study. Instead, we took advantage of the variation in ex
posure to these processes within each organization by com
paring the views of workers participating in the processes
with the views of workers who were not involved at the time
of our survey. Regression analysis was then used to control
for other differences in the characteristics of the workers
that might be correlated with their assessments of their jobs
and their union. The key results of the regressions are
reported in the text. The specific coefficients are reported in
an appendix to the chapter.
Our preference was to collect the survey data from the par
ties directly as part of our case study process. This was possi
ble to arrange in three of the five cases (cases 1,2, and 4).
Surveys were administered to small groups of workers at the
workplace on company time by a member of our research
team. In cases 3 and 5, however, we needed to collect the
data by mail survey since the employees were too dispersed
to make the collection of data in small groups of workers
feasible. The response rate for the mail surveys was 38 per
cent in case 3 and 40 percent in case 5. In both cases the pro
portions of participants and nonparticipants who responded
mirrored the actual proportions in these two groups in the
larger bargaining unit. Analysis of the distributions of the
data across the cases showed no systematic differences due to
the nature of the data collection method used.
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Demographic Characteristics
Table 4-1 provides a demographic profile of the pooled
sample of union members included in these cases. Overall,
survey data are available from approximately 931 workers of
whom approximately 446 are currently participating in or
covered by a worker participation process and 485 are nonparticipants. The exact sample size varies in the analyses
reported below because of missing data on some of the ques
tions.
The average worker in the sample is 39 years old, earns ap
proximately $11.80 per hour and has 13 years of seniority
with his or her employer. Thirty-one percent of the sample is
female and 13 percent are members of a minority group. Six
percent of the sample have less than a high school education,
95 percent completed high school, 29 percent have some col
lege or post high school experience, and 20 percent have a
college degree. As the data in table 4-1 indicate, there are few
significant differences in the characteristics of the par
ticipants and nonparticipants. Participants have, on average,
two years more seniority with the company and are less likely
to be members of a minority group than are nonparticipants.
Although these average differences appear to be relatively in
significant, in the analyses to follow we will control for
variations in these characteristics as we attempt to estimate
the net effects of these worker participation processes.
Participants, on average, have a history of being slightly
more active in union affairs than nonparticipants. These dif
ferences are also highlighted in table 4-1. For example, par
ticipants were more likely to be members of union commit
tees, have attended union meetings, and voted in union elec
tions. While these are not large differences, they do indicate
that those who get involved in worker participation processes
tend to be the same individuals who have higher than average
rates of participation in union affairs. We control for degree
of prior union participation in the regression results reported
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Table 4-1
Demographic Profile

Age (Years)
Sex (% Female)
Race (% Nonwhite)
Education (°7o High
school or beyond)
Company seniority
(Years)
Hourly wage rate
($/hour)
Union steward (%)
Member of a union
committee (%)
Member of union
executive board (%)
Local union
officer (%)
Attended a meeting
in last year (%)
Voted in last union
election (%)
Ran for union
office (%)
Called union office
in last year (%)

Total
sample

Participants

Nonpar ticipants

N = 931

N = 446

N = 485

39.3
30.7
12.3

39.2
28.2
10.4

39.3
33.1
14.0

94.5

94.4

94.6

12.5

11.7*

13.3*

11.80
3.5

12.20
4.1

11.50
3.0

6.2

9.7***

3.0***

3.0

3.1

2.8

1.8

1.2

2.4

48.2

54.4**

42.6**

85.3

90.1***

80.1***

6.2

7.2

5.3

62.2

63.9

60.6

* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
"""Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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below in order to avoid attributing any differences due to
prior union involvement to the effects of involvement in a
participation process.

Interest in Participation
One of the first questions union leaders must consider
when deciding whether or not to support a worker participa
tion process is whether rank and file union members are in
terested enough in gaining some say or influence over the
issues likely to be discussed for the union and the company
to embark on a participation program. More specifically,
union leaders need to ask whether rank and file interest in
QWL types of issues is equal to or greater than interest in the
bread and butter issues that unions have traditionally em
phasized in collective bargaining. In addition, union leaders
must often educate their members to the importance of
longer run strategic issues that may be rather distant from
the consciousness of most workers, yet may affect their long
run interests. Thus, in evaluating the degree of interest
workers express in QWL issues, it is useful to compare the
relative priorities members attach to QWL, traditional bread
and butter, and longer run strategic issues generally reserved
to management.
The data presented in table 4-2 allow this type of com
parison for participants and nonparticipants across the five
cases. To measure the importance of the QWL issues, those
surveyed were asked whether they wanted "no say," "a little
say," "some say" or "a lot of say" over a range of
workplace issues. Table 4-2 reports the percentage of par
ticipants and nonparticipants from each case that responded
they wanted "some" or "a lot" of say over QWL, bread and
butter, and strategic issues.
The responses show there generally is a very high level of
interest among workers in all five cases in the issues most
central to QC or QWL processes. For example, between 67
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percent and 96 percent of these union members want some or
a lot of say over the way work is done or the methods and
procedures used to perform their jobs. Similarly, between 79
percent and 96 percent want some or a lot of say over the
quality of the work produced and between 67 percent and 88
percent want this much influence over the pace of work. In
terest tapers off slightly in having a high degree of influence
over two QWL issues that are central topics of experiments
in work reorganization or autonomous work groups. That is,
between 39 percent and 73 percent of the respondents report
wanting some or a lot of say over how much work should be
done in a day and over how jobs are assigned within a work
group.
While the desire for influence over QWL issues is quite
high, worker interests are not limited to this subset of issues.
For example, between 64 percent and 93 percent of the
respondents want some or a lot of say over the traditional
bread and butter issue of wages. Similarly, approximately
two-thirds to four-fifths of the respondents want to in
fluence the handling of complaints or grievances and a
similar number want to influence the strategic issues of new
technology. There is, however, considerably less interest ex
pressed by the majority of these union members in gaining
say or influence over other personnel decisions that have
traditionally been left to management discretion (subject to
relevant provisions of the bargaining agreement) such as the
hiring, firing, and promotion of bargaining unit members,
the setting of management salaries, and the selection of
managers. The major exception to this statement, however,
is found in the responses of the professional employee group
(case 5). Among this sample there is considerably more in
terest expressed in the issues of selection of supervisors,
managers, and fellow workers and in the handling of promo
tions. These are all critical issues that have been discussed by
the labor-management committee covering this group. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the group expresses a higher
level of interest in these issues.

Table 4-2
Interest in Participation by Areas of Concern
.1. Ml ll%'l|*Mlllty

M11U

o

oo

n

A V Vll|f«lA l.l%*l|*CllllCy

(°7o of respondents agreeing they want "some say" or ' 'a lot of say")

Case!

Case 1

QWL Concerns

V)

Case 4

Case 3

O

Case 5

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

N = 218

N=169

N=15

N = 45

N = 31

N=139

N = 52

N = 49

N=130

N = 83

fa

3

Ct

The way the work is done —
methods and procedures

87

79

67**

91**

87

92

96**

78**

96

94

The level of quality of work

85

79

80

81

94

87

92

82

96

96

How fast the work should be
done — the work rate

80

68

67

71

84

81

77

76

88

81

How much work people should
do in a day

59

50

47

43

63

65

64

59

72

66

Who should do what job in
your group or section

52*

39*

73

51

42

53

69

56

63

57

Bread and Butter Concerns
When the work days
begin and end

52

48

33

33

74

60

62

69

77

74

Pay scales or wages

70

64

73

80

74

84

73

74

93

90

Who should be fired if they do a
bad job or don't come to work

38

40

33

40

42

38

44*

25*

52***

27***

IT)
oT

Who should be hired into
your work group

39

30

20

24

29

33

42

31

52**

35**

Handling complaints or grievances

66

67

60

73

71

72

62

57

74

Who gets promoted

43

35

27

27

36

43

44

37

83
54*

40*

73*

63*

80*

67*

65

69

85

69

82

77

15*

39

43

27**

15**

52***

30***

63**

49**

Strategic Concerns

The use of new technology
on your job

29

24

20

22

23*

7

9

The selection of your supervisor
Plant expansions, closings,
or new locations

38*
50*

30*

20

47

43

The way the company invests its
profits or spends its money

48

44

Management salaries
Hiring or promotions to
upper management

* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
**Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.

3*

26

27

18

23
36

40

56

35
47

13

24

48

52

67

74

42

39

53

51

36

42

49

38

36

27
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For cases 1 and 4, both blue-collar units where the local
union is actively involved as a joint partner in the QWL pro
cess, there is a tendency for participants to indicate a
stronger interest in having "some" or "a lot" of say over
QWL issues than their comparison group of nonparticipants. The same general position, although weaker in
magnitude, is present in the responses of the white-collar
unit in case 5. In the other two cases, however, there are no
consistent differences in interest in QWL issues across the
two groups. When the average responses of participants and
nonparticipants are compared as a whole across all the cases
(without controlling for other characteristics), there is a
statistically significant difference that indicates participants
do on average have greater interest in QWL issues than nonparticipants.
Participants also indicate a stronger interest in a number
of strategic issues, most notably those relating to manage
ment and supervisor hirings, promotions, salaries and the in
vestment policies of the firm. Again these differences are
more consistent in cases 1 and 5 than in cases 2 and 3.
There are at least two possible explanations for differences
in the preferences observed bejtween participants and nonparticipants. One interpretation is that those who volunteer
for QWL training and team activities had a higher degree of
interest in participation from the outset than those who
chose not to get involved. Alternatively, one could interpret
the data as suggesting that the actual experience of par
ticipating in the QWL process has increased the interest of
employees in gaining some say over these issues and/or over
issues traditionally left to the prerogatives of management.
Undoubtedly, both of these interpretations are partially true.
Indeed, further analysis of these data using a regression
equation are reported in the appendix to this chapter. This
regression controls for differences in demographic
characteristics between participants and nonparticipants in
cases 1 through 4 (the Newspaper Guild observations are ex-
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eluded from these and all subsequent regressions since the
structure of their program is one of a labor-management
committee rather than a direct form of worker
participation). The regression results show that after con
trolling for demographic characteristics, the amount of say
and influence desired over QWL issues by participants is still
higher, but not significantly higher than by nonparticipants.
Similarly, after controlling for demographic differences,
participants show a slightly higher degree of interest than do
nonparticipants in influence over both bread and butter and
strategic issues. These results imply that participation in a
QWL process does marginally increase the average worker's
interest in having greater say over QWL as well as over
selected bread and butter and strategic issues.
The results of the analysis of worker preferences for say or
influence in QWL and other issues can be summarized as
follows. First, a strong majority—more than four out of five
workers—want to have say over the issues typically
associated with Quality Circles, namely, the way work is
done and the quality of the work produced. This suggests
that union efforts to address these issues are well placed. Sec
ond, those who are currently participating in a QWL process
on average report a slightly higher degree of interest in QWL
issues than those not currently involved in such a program.
Furthermore, participants also report a somewhat stronger
interest in gaining a say over several strategic managerial
decisions and over those personnel and working conditions
issues that most directly affect their work group. While some
of these differences in preferences may be due to differences
in the predispositions of participants and nonparticipants
(i.e., those with a higher degree of interest in gaining a say
over these issues volunteered for the programs), some of the
differences between participants and nonparticipants appear
to be due to involvement in QWL programs. Third, a ma
jority of workers, regardless of whether or not they are par
ticipating in QWL activities, want some or a lot of say over
the traditional bread and butter issues of wages and

112 Views of the Rank and File

grievance handling. Fourth, while a majority of blue-collar
workers did not express a strong interest in having a say over
most of the strategic issues generally reserved to manage
ment, between two-thirds to four-fifths do want to be involv
ed in decisions over the use of new technology on their jobs.

Amount of Actual Influence
We now turn to the question of whether workers who are
currently participating in a QWL or other type of worker
participation process perceive actually having greater say or
influence over workplace issues. The data needed to answer
this question are reported in table 4-3.
All workers report having considerably less actual say or
influence over QWL and other issues than they prefer to
have, regardless of whether or not they are currently involv
ed in a worker participation process. Only in the case of the
newspaper workers does a majority report having some or a
lot of say over the way work is done and over the quality of
the work performed. Only in case 4 does a larger percentage
of participants consistently indicate having greater say or in
fluence over QWL types of issues than nonparticipants. In
the other cases, apparently the worker participation pro
cesses have not significantly altered the degree of actual say
or influence workers experience on their jobs.
When cases 1 through 4 are combined and differences in
demographic characteristics are controlled, only marginal
and nonsignificant differences are found between par
ticipants and nonparticipants in the amount of actual in
fluence. Thus, of the worker participation programs studied
here, only case 4 has produced a measurable increase in the
say or influence experienced by the workers involved.

Table 4-3
Perception of Actual Influence by Areas of Concern
Participants and Nonparticipants

i of respondents agreeing they have "some say" or "a lot of say") 1

QWL Concerns
The way the work is done —
methods and procedures
The level of quality of work
How fast the work should be
done — the work rate
How much work people should
do in a day
Who should do what job in
your group or section
Bread and Butter Concerns
When the work days
begin and end
Pay scales or wages
Who should be fired if they do a
bad job or don't come to work
Who should be hired into
your work group

Case 5

Case 4

Case 3

Case 2

Case 1

Part's

Nonpart's

35

25

36

28
40

50

26

23

24

0

5

3

11

20

19

7

7

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

31

38

40

26

32

43

42

47

47

17

16

13

11

9

8

9

Part's

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

47

34

58
57

14

10

32

28

6

8

17

19

?5"
3

18

22

O
•-h

36***

10***

57

n>
4

33*

45*

8

12
12

10

54

47

0

1

4

0

8

10

0

1

4

2

2

16
30*

16
10

13

13

7
53*

3

6

7

7

3

4

2

0

9
11

9
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Table 4-3 (continued)
Case 1

Handling complaints or grievances
Who gets promoted
Strategic Concerns
The use of new technology
on your job
Management salaries
Hiring or promotions to
upper management
The selection of your supervisor
Plant expansions, closings,
or new locations
The way the company invests its
profits or spends its money

Case 2

Case 3

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

14***

22***

40

40

Case 4

Part's

Nonpart's

13

18

Part's
12

n'

Case 5
Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

40

37

?

6

4

p3

CL
Tl
1?

2

4

0

0

0

1

4

2
0

18
2

22

20

17

7

12

22

14

16

13

2

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

1

3
4

2

0

0

4

1

2

1

6

0
0

2

0

0
0

0

4

7

2

3

4

0

2

0

3

8

2

0

0

4

4

0

0

0

4

4

0

0

0

NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2.
'Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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Views of the Job
Another way of examining the effects of worker participa
tion processes is to determine whether participants have dif
ferent perceptions of the nature of their jobs than nonparticipants. Specifically, QWL processes are often viewed as
strategies for allowing workers to learn new skills, increase
their freedom on the job, provide more control over the pace
and content of their work, and provide more information on
how their work fits into the overall production process. To
assess the effects of worker participation processes on these
job dimensions, those surveyed were asked the extent to
which they agreed with the statements listed in table 4-4. We
have reported the percentages of participants and nonparticipants who "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with each of
these statements. Since these questions once again are more
relevant to participation processes that involved workers
directly rather than indirect forms of participation such as a
labor-management committee, data from the Newspaper
Guild local are not included in these analyses.
Responses to these questions in cases 1, 2, and 3 are mixed
and form no consistent pattern. The participants in the QWL
process in case 4, however, consistently rate their jobs more
favorably than nonparticipants. It should be recalled that
case 4 is the bargaining unit in which the union has been a
full joint partner in major work reorganization efforts and
the QWL program there goes considerably beyond the more
limited programs found in the other three cases. Thus, these
data suggest that those participation programs that move
beyond the limited problemsolving focus of the standard QC
process and directly modify the structure and layout of the
organization of work are more likely to have significant ef
fects on the workers' perceptions of the favorableness of
their jobs. Since our sample provides only one case where the
QWL program has evolved to this point and shows this
result, the evidence on this point is only suggestive.

Table 4-4
Views of the Job by Participants and Nonparticipants
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Case 2

Case 1
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Case3
Nonpart's

Case 4

Case 5

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's

86

75**

51**

89

92

61

51

39**

19**

62

64

76**

87

86

83*

65*

91

93

76

71

70

45*

27*

85

86

100*

90

96

100

92

98

94

33

29

48

42

23

25

48

42

67

93

98

61*

76*

35*

18*

59

58

54*

44*

20

29

39

34

23***

56***

37**

23**

80

75

87

78

84

80

79***

52***

87

87

Part's

Nonpart's

Part's

My job requires that I keep
learning new things.

77

69

87

I have the freedom to decide
what I do on my job.

41

41

67

I get to do a number of
different things on my job.

82

84

100**

My job lets me use my skills
and abilities.

66*

58*

60

Most of the time I know what
I have to do on my job.

96

95

I never seem to have enough time
to get everything done on my job.

38

40

I determine the speed at
which I work.

65

It is hard to tell what impact my
work makes on the product or service.
The work I do on my job is
meaningful to me.

93*

Part's

Nonpart's

71

94

47

O
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I feel personally responsible for
the work I do on my job.
My job has rules and regulations
concerning everything I might
do or say.

94

92

87

96

90

94

94*

81*

98

95

58

57

47

56

74

68

54

53

21

17

NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2.
indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
**Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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When we control for demographic differences in the total
sample, a significant difference between participants and
nonparticipants is still observed. Part of this is undoubtedly
due to the influence of the respondents from case 4, but the
marginal differences seen in the other cases also contribute
to this result. Thus, overall, there is some evidence that these
QWL processes are improving the extent to which workers
see their jobs as challenging, offering opportunities to learn
and use existing skills and abilities, and provide more
freedom. The largest differences on these dimensions of
workers' jobs are found in the program that goes the farthest
in broadening the scope of the job and reorganizing the work
to conform to more of a team organization concept.
Views of Union Performance
One of the most important and hotly debated issues within
the labor movement pertains to the effects that union par
ticipation in these QWL types of programs will have on
members' views of their union. Advocates of greater union
involvement in worker participation programs argue that as
a result, workers will see the union as more effectively
representing their interests at the workplace because their job
experiences are improving and union efforts are seen as an
important cause of the improvement. Those who argue
against union involvement in these programs, on the other
hand, fear that membership support for their union will
decline as a result of these participation programs, since the
perceived need for a union will decline.
To address this set of issues, respondents were asked to
rate the performance of their local union on a variety of
QWL, bread and butter, strategic, and internal union ad
ministration issues. In addition, respondents were asked to
rate their overall satisfaction with their local union. The
responses of participants and nonparticipants are shown in
table 4-5.
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Several clear patterns emerge from these data. First, all of
these local unions are given higher performance ratings on
the traditional bread and butter issues than on the strategic,
QWL, or internal union administration issues. For example,
across the sample the five issues for which the unions are
given the highest performance ratings are all bread and but
ter issues, namely, improving wages, improving fringe
benefits, protecting members against unfair treatment,
handling grievances, and improving safety and health. A
strategic issue (challenging management policies) and a
QWL issue (making this a better place to work) only compete
with the remaining bread and butter issue Gob security) for a
place in the performance ranking. Further examination of
the percentages rating their union on QWL issues shows that
only in the case of the white-collar Newspaper Guild group
and case 4, the blue-collar unit that has gone beyond the QC
program to modify the organization of work, do a majority
of union members rate their union as doing a "somewhat
good" or "very good " job. Thus, overall, there appears to
be considerable room for improvement in union perfor
mance on QWL issues.
Examination of the differences in union performance
ratings between participants and nonparticipants suggests
three key conclusions. First, the union in case 4 again receiv
ed significantly more positive ratings from participants ver
sus nonparticipants on all measures of union performance.
No other case approaches the size and strength of the dif
ferences between participants and nonparticipants observed
in this unit. For example, 85 percent of the participants in
this local rate the union as doing a good or very good job in
improving productivity, compared to 57 percent of the nonparticipants. Eighty-one percent of the participants give the
union this rating on the issue of making their plant a better
place to work, compared to 49 percent of the nonpar
ticipants. The same pattern continues for each of the QWL,
strategic, bread and butter, and internal union administra-

Table 4-5
Perceptions of Union Performance by Areas of Concern
Participants and Nonparticipants
(% of respondents rating the union as doing a "good" or "very good job") 1

Case 2

Case 1
Part's
QWL Concerns
Getting workers a say in how
they do their jobs
Helping make jobs more
interesting

Nonpart's

Part's

Case 3
Nonpart's

Part's

Case 4
Nonpart's

Part's

w

Case 5
Nonpart's

Part's

Nonpart's
3
**

39

37

33

50

32

20

62*

43*

58***

29***

20

23

7

24

16**

69

27

53
38

30

28

85***

25***
49***
57***

28**

43

15
49

58***

55

13
45

33

70
23

77***

36***

3
O-

n"
81***

Making this a better place to work
Helping improve productivity

40

52
41

Getting management to listen
to workers' suggestions

51

52

47

32

36

32

69***

39***

Bread and Butter Concerns
Protecting members against
unfair treatment

80***

68***

53***

89***

53

87***

50***

85

84

89

87

67

82

55
84

83

87

67

76

97
86***

98
67***

67

80
41

71
57*

53

81
45

83
77*

73

87

45

60

80

58

Getting good wages
Getting good fringe benefits
Improving job security
Handling grievances

45
73*

82
45
64*

Improving safety and health

68

66

75***

41***

82

88

42

85***

49***

62

83***

55***

85
82***

86
42***

Strategic Concerns
Getting workers a say
in the business

30**

16**

13

23

26

15

52***

20***

57***

16***

36

30

36

40

19

24

64***

33***

78***

46***

59**

45**

60

40

36

41

77***

35***

77

76

Giving members a say in how
the union is run

35

31

53

73

29*

47*

54***

25***

80

75

Telling members what the
local union is doing

32

34

53

65

29*

45*

65*

45*

83

81

55

49

67

84

37

45

75***

31***

84

81

Representing worker interests in
management decisionmaking
Challenging management policies
that are harmful to workers'
interests

Union Administration Concerns

Overall Union Satisfaction

Percent "satisfied" or "very
satisfied" with the union

NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2.
* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
** Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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tion issues. Similarly, in response to the global question on
satisfaction with the union, 75 percent of the participants in
dicated that they are "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with
their union, compared to 31 percent of the nonparticipants.
These differences remain significant even after controlling
for differences in demographic characteristics between par
ticipants and nonparticipants. This provides some assurance
that the differences reported in this table are not due to some
factor other than the worker participation process.
Second, those Newspaper Guild members covered by the
labor-management committee (case 5) rate their union higher
on those QWL and strategic issues that deal with the union's
ability to represent its members in management decisionmaking. For example, the largest differences between those
covered by the committee and those not covered are found
on the issues of: (1) getting management to listen to workers'
suggestions (77 percent to 36 percent); (2) getting workers a
say in the business (57 percent to 16 percent); (3) represent
ing worker interests in management decisionmaking (78 per
cent to 46 percent); and (4) getting workers a say in how they
do their jobs (58 percent to 29 percent). Those covered by the
committee also give the union higher ratings on helping to
make jobs more interesting (28 percent to 16 percent), get
ting good fringe benefits (86 percent to 67 percent), and im
proving safety and health (82 percent to 42 percent). These
differences imply that a labor-management committee that is
successful in engaging management in serious discussions of
issues that normally lie beyond collective bargaining can
enhance the effectiveness of the union in dealing with a set of
strategic issues that it otherwise would have difficulty in
fluencing.
Third, in case 1, the union also receives consistently higher
ratings from those participating in the QWL program on
several issues measuring the union's influence in manage
ment decisionmaking. None of these differences, however,
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approach the size of the differences found in case 4. Further
more, there are no significant differences in the ratings of
participants and nonparticipants for this union on QWL
issues. This pattern is consistent with the responses of
members of the unions in case 2 and 3 as well. Thus, the role
and efforts of the union in case 4 has produced a greater dif
ference in participant versus nonparticipant ratings of union
performance than the other cases.
When the data from all cases are combined and a regres
sion equation is computed that controls for differences in
demographic characteristics, we again find that, on average,
participants rate union performance on QWL issues
marginally, but not significantly, higher than nonpar
ticipants.
In summary, there is no evidence in these data to support
the critics' argument that the presence of a QWL program
will undermine workers' support of their union. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that local unions are rated as being
marginally more effective by members who are involved in
worker participation processes than by nonparticipants. Fur
thermore, the local union is rated as significantly more effec
tive in the case of the union with the highest degree of in
volvement and the most advanced form of participation.

Interest in Future Participation
The final question addressed in the survey was whether
nonparticipants were interested in getting involved in the
worker participation process. Thirty-five percent of the nonparticipants in cases 1 through 4 indicated a desire to get in
volved, however wide variations existed in the response to
this question across these four cases. For example, only 15
percent of the nonparticipants in case 2 indicated an interest
in getting involved in the QWL program and only 25 percent
expressed this interest in case 1. In contrast, 55 percent in-
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dicated an interest in getting involved in the participation
program in case 4, while 63 percent indicated an interest in
joining the QWL program in case 3.
What accounts for these large differences? One thing that
does not appear to explain these differences is variation in
the demographic characteristics of the respondents. A
regression showed there were no significant differences in
age, education, race, sex, company seniority or nature of
current job between those indicating a preference for getting
involved in the worker participation process in their
organization and those indicating that they prefer to not get
involved. Thus, it appears to be the way in which the specific
programs are perceived by nonparticipants that influences
their interest in joining them.
In case 1, where only 25 percent of the nonparticipants in
dicated an interest in joining the QWL process, evidence
gathered in less structured interviews strongly suggests that
worker interest in the QWL process had plateaued and begun
to taper off. We noted the reasons for this in chapter 2,
namely, a large number of layoffs and permanent workforce
reductions were occurring in this bargaining unit. As a
result, at the time of our survey the QWL process was going
through a major testing period with many of its early sup
porters questioning its utility for making their jobs, and the
jobs of their co-workers, more secure. Therefore, it is not
surprising that three out of four of the nonparticipants ques
tioned the benefits to be derived from joining the QWL pro
cess.
In case 2, where only 15 percent of the nonparticipants
want to get involved, we have a similar situation where
layoffs had been occurring as the firm shifted production out
of the plant to a newer nonunion plant in the South. Case 2 is
also a QC type of process with a limited "watchdog" role for
the union. Thus, there appears to be a limited commitment
from the employer to the long-run job security of the
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workers and the organizational security of the union. Not
surprisingly, therefore, there is limited rank and file interest
in joining the QC program.
Case 3 is an emerging QWL process in its first year of
development. At the time of our survey only 18 percent of
the bargaining unit was involved in the QWL program.
However, a great deal of interest was expressed by the parties
in seeing the program expand to more workers consistent
with the finding that 63 percent of the nonparticipants
wanted to join the QWL process.
Case 4 is our best example of a long-standing participation
process with a high degree of union involvement and com
mitment. It also is a case in which the union has treated the
participation process as part of its larger representation
strategy for improving the job security of the membership
and enhancing the competitiveness of the firm. It also is the
case in which the data show that those currently participating
rate their jobs and the local union more favorably than those
not participating. All this helps explain why 55 percent of the
nonparticipants in this organization express an interest in
joining the participation process.

Summary and Conclusions
No survey data should ever stand alone. Conclusions
reached from surveys are always strengthened when combin
ed with more intensive knowledge of the context in which the
data are collected. Therefore, the conclusions reported here
build not only on the specific survey results, but also on the
insights gained from the case studies presented in chapter 2.
In case 1, the QWL process started with a great deal of
rank and file interest in the process (both among those cur
rently involved and those not involved), but tapered off con
siderably as concerns for job security increased in the face of
layoffs. Despite the strong presence of the union in the QWL
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process, neither the participants nor the nonparticipants
gave the union high marks for its performance on QWL
issues. Indeed, the limited QC nature of this program did not
produce any perceptible improvements in the amount of say
or influence on the job experienced by participants, nor did
it significantly alter these workers' evaluations of their jobs.
Thus, from this case we have learned the difficulty a union
will experience in maintaining rank and file support for a
limited QWL process in the face of deteriorating cir
cumstances that challenge the ability of the union to effec
tively represent rank and file interests on traditional bread
and butter issues. It also suggests that a QWL process may
experience a plateauing of support and interest after the first
blush of excitement and experimentation wears off. This
plateauing phenomenon challenges the union and the
employer to decide whether they are to recommit their
organizations to enhancing the QWL process or allow it to
continue to erode and eventually fade out of existence.
Case 2 illustrates the pitfalls a union may experience with a
limited QC program in which it chooses to play only a
"watchdog" role. The survey data in this case suggest that
the union members do not see significant change in their jobs
or their influence in decisionmaking and do not see the union
as performing significantly better on QWL issues as a result
of the program. At the same time, rank and file evaluations
of union performance have not yet suffered from the QC
program.
Case 3 represents a QWL process in the early stages of
development. It demonstrates that QWL programs diffuse
slowly through organizations and that while interest in par
ticipating is often quite strong in its initial stages, positive
results from the process may not be visible in the short run.
Case 4 is an example of a participation process that has
been in place for more than five years, that has moved into
the area of work reorganization, and that has achieved the
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most positive response from rank and file workers. It sug
gests that the participation processes that are likely to have
the most positive long-run outcomes for unions and their
members are ones that become integrated into the union and
the employer's broader strategies for enhancing workers' job
security and the firm's economic performance.
Case 5 is different from the other cases since it includes a
labor-management committee covering white-collar profes
sional workers. The survey results for this group suggest that
while the indirect participation structure of a labormanagement committee is unlikely to significantly affect in
dividual worker experiences on their job on a day-to-day
basis, it can serve as a useful forum for discussing on an on
going basis the larger strategic issues that otherwise are left
to management's discretion.
When considered as a whole, these survey data suggest
that worker participation processes can have a positive effect
on workers' job-related experiences and on their evaluation
of the performance of their union. Positive impacts,
however, are slow in developing and do not stand indepen
dent from other union activities, accomplishments, or short
comings. That is, there is no evidence in these data that a
union would be strengthened by being an active and visible
partner in a worker participation process in the face of poor
union performance on its traditional bread and butter
responsibilities. Stated differently, effective performance on
QWL issues will not serve as an effective substitute for an in
ability to deliver economic benefits, job security and protec
tion from any arbitrary actions on the part of management.
The variations across these cases suggest that improvements
in workers' views of their jobs and their unions are greater
where:
(1) the union serves as a visible joint partner in the pro
cess;
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(2) the participation process leads to actual changes in
work organization that enhance the security of the
labor force and the economic performance of the
firm;
(3) union leaders link their support for QWL to their
larger collective bargaining and representational
strategies, and;
(4) sufficient time has passed for the union's contribu
tion to improving QWL experiences of their members
to be seen while at the same time the union continues
to effectively deal with bread and butter concerns.
Union performance on QWL issues still has considerable
room for improvement. Even in cases where unions are serv
ing as a joint partner in delivering QWL services, union per
formance on these issues is rated lower than performance on
bread and butter issues. On average, less than a majority of
union members rate their union as performing well on QWL
issues, even in those cases where a QWL process is under
way.
QWL programs go through various stages of development
in which worker reactions to the process and to the union's
role are likely to vary. Since interested workers may get in
volved first, there is likely to be an initial burst of enthusiasm
and interest in the process prior to the participants forming a
judgment about its effects on their jobs and their relation
ship to the union. Later, a tapering off or plateauing of en
thusiasm may occur and the remaining nonparticipants are
likely to resist efforts to get them involved. The ultimate
degree of interest in and support for the process is likely to
be determined by the extent to which the union is able to suc
cessfully use the process to both improve individual workers'
direct or day-to-day job experience as well as improve the
long-run security of those jobs.
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While rank and file support provides the essential founda
tion for worker participation processes, their long-run
viability also depends on the views of local and national
union officers and on the ability of the parties to fit the par
ticipation process and its results into their larger bargaining
relationship. In the chapters that follow we move up from
the grass roots level and analyze the views of local union of
ficers and national union leaders to better understand where
participation processes fit into labor-management relations.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
The table contained in this appendix reports the results of
regression equations used to estimate the effects of worker
participation on the workers' views of their job and their
union. The numbers reported in the table are unstandardized
regression coefficients for dummy variables that took the
value of 1 if the worker was participating in a worker par
ticipation process and 0 if the worker was not participating.
The following control variables were entered into each equa
tion: age, race, sex, educational level, years with the firm,
hourly wage rate, and an index of participation in union ac
tivities. Another set of equations was computed which con
tained dummy variables for each union. The conclusions
discussed in the chapter are based on the more conservative
results that contain the controls for differences across the
local unions.
The dependent variables were calculated by first grouping
the issues into (1) quality of work, (2) bread and butter, and
(3) strategic categories as shown in tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-5.
Averages within group scores were then computed and serve
as the dependent variables for these analyses. The dependent
variable for the test of whether participation affects workers'
views of their job content is the average response to all the
items contained in table 4-4. The dependent variable for
overall union satisfaction is the response to a single item
satisfaction question as shown in table 4-5. Copies of the
questionnaires and the actual regression equations used to
obtain these results are available from the authors upon re
quest.

Table 4-A
Regression Results for the Effects of Participation
on Various Dependent Variables
Not controlling for
cross union differences

Controlling for
cross union differences

Dependent Variable
Interest in Participation
QWL Issues
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues

Actual Influence
QWL Issues
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues

Views of Union Performance
QWL Issues
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues

Overall Union Performance
Views of Job Content
* = significant at 10%.
** = significant at 5%.
*** = significant at 1%.

Regression
coefficient

Standard
error

Regression
coefficient

Standard
error

0.88
1.54**
1.12*

0.55
0.72
0.79

0.54
1.27
1.16

0.94
1.20
1.37

1.56**
1.70**
0.46

0.52
0.40
0.31

0.88
0.54
0.28

0.90
0.69
0.55

2.41***
2.96***
1.41***

0.64
0.67
0.24
0.32
0.44

0.98
0.54
0.20
0.13
1.62*

1.07
1.12
0.40
0.23
1.26

0.56*
1.80***
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Chapter 5

Views of Local Union
Activists and Officers
Introduction
This chapter presents our findings on the views of local
union activists and officers toward worker participation pro
grams. The individuals included in the analysis are elected
local officers, executive board members, stewards, members
of union committees and, in a few cases, union represen
tatives serving as union "facilitators" of QWL or other par
ticipation processes.
The views of these groups are critical for a number of
reasons. First, these individuals form the political lifeline of
the local union. Opposition from significant numbers of
these activists would pose severe political problems for any
elected leader who supports the participation process. Sec
ond, the responsibilities of these groups span the entire range
of union-management relations. Therefore, if any conflicts
occur between the participation process and other local
union responsibilities (e.g., handling grievances, negotiating
local bargaining agreements, etc.), representatives of these
groups would be among the first to experience the conflict.
Third, in many respects one might predict that union ac
tivists are likely to be among the most skeptical critics of
133
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worker participation since, like first-line supervisors on the
management side, it is their functions that are most directly
affected by the move toward broader worker participation
and problemsolving. For these reasons, we believe it is
critical to understand how union leaders view worker par
ticipation processes.
The issues addressed in our analysis include local union
leaders' views concerning: (1) the effects of worker par
ticipation programs on workplace issues; (2) the effects of
the programs on local union officers and election outcomes;
(3) the problems which impede the spread or operation of
participation programs; and (4) the relationship between
worker participation programs and traditional collective
bargaining.
The analysis draws from in-depth structured interviews
with local union officials from eight industries which recent
ly experimented with one form of participation program or
another. In total, approximately 30 individuals were inter
viewed. In addition, a detailed survey was administered to
union officials (executive officers and committeemen) within
five auto plants. These plants range from assembly to parts
manufacturing facilities and generated approximately 110
responses.
The discussion which follows goes back and forth in
reviewing both the quantitative survey responses and the
qualitative information gathered in the interviews. In
general, the two data sources reveal very similar views. That
is, union activists and leaders seem to be telling us the same
things in both the interviews and survey.
Effects of Worker Participation Programs
on Workplace Issues
The survey asked union officers in the auto industry to
rank the observed effects participation programs have on a
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wide range of workplace issues on a five point scale ranging
from Very Negative Effect, to No Effect, to Very Positive
Effect. The responses are reported in table 5-1. The strongest
response was registered for Union Officer-Plant Manage
ment Relationship, Product/Service Quality, and Produc
tivity where, respectively, 78.3 percent, 74.6 percent and 73.3
percent of the respondents reported the programs had either
a Somewhat or Very Positive Effect. For a number of other
issues there was a high percentage of union officers who
responded there was a Somewhat or Very Positive Effect.
The respective percentages were: 72.2 percent for Worker
Morale or Job Satisfaction, 73.3 percent for WorkerSupervisor Relations, 64.5 percent for the Grievance Rate,
63.9 percent for Ability to Resolve Grievances, 61.3 percent
for Labor Costs, 55.6 percent for Union Member-Shop
Committeemen Relations, 55.0 percent for Safety and
Health Conditions, and 41.7 percent for the Absenteeism
Rate.
There were no workplace issues on which more than 12
percent of the officers thought the participation programs
had a Very Negative Effect. The most negative responses ap
peared in regard to the effects of the programs on Member
Satisfaction with the Union and Job Security where, respec
tively, 32.4 percent and 25.0 percent of the officers thought
the program had either Very or Somewhat Negative Effects.
However, union officers frequently did respond that they
thought there was No Effect of the programs on some issues.
For instance, officers responded that the programs had No
Effect on Membership Identification with the Union in 39.8
percent of the responses, and No Effect on Member Satisfac
tion with the Union in 27.8 percent of the responses. Since
these responses raise issues concerning the effect of the pro
grams on the local union, which were questioned in more
detail in other sections of the survey, they are discussed more
fully later.

Table 5-1
Effects of Participation Programs on Workplace Issues
Very negative
effect
1 . Worker morale or
job satisfaction
2. Worker-supervisor
relations
3. Productivity
4. Product/service quality
5. Labor costs
6. Job security
7. Union member-shop
committeemen relations
8. Member satisfaction
with the union
9. Grievance rate
10. Union officer-plant
management relationship
1 1 . Absenteeism rate

Somewhat
negative effect

No effect

Somewhat
positive effect

Very positive
effect
r
o

2.8

12.0

13.0

54.6

17.6

0.0
3.8
3.8
4.7
11.1

14.7
5.7
4.7
5.7
13.9

17.4
17.1
17.0
28.3
36.1

56.2
56.2
34.0
50.0
26.9

17.1
17.1
40.6
11.3
12.0

1.9

18.5

24.1

42.6

13.0

6.5
1.9

25.9
4.7

27.8
29.0

31.5
38.3

8.3
26.2

1.9
2.8

4.7
7.4

15.1
48.1

49.1
34.3

29.2
7.4
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12. Safety and health
conditions
13. Union member-officer
relationship
14. Membership identification
with the union
15. Ability to resolve
grievances

2.8

2.8

39.4

44.0

11.0

4.7

11.2

34.6

39.3

10.3

5.6

17.6

39.8

29.6

7.4

1.9

8.3

25.9

42.6

21.3

1
o

r
o
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In the interviews, local union officers repeatedly and
strongly stated their view that the participation programs
had contributed to a significant reduction in the grievance
and absentee rates, a statement consistent with the survey
responses. A number of union officers stated that recent
layoffs which had displaced less senior workers also had con
tributed to a reduction in grievance and absentee rates.
However, they firmly believed that it could be a mistake to
attribute the decline in these rates solely to the layoff of less
experienced workers. It was their view that the participation
programs had significant independent impacts on these rate
declines.
Union activists were able to cite a number of specific work
organization and work process changes which had been iden
tified and adopted through the participation processes.
These changes include better lighting, relocation of par
ticular machines, improvements in physical access to
machinery, and better coordination between workers. It is
their opinion that these changes contributed to both im
provements in product quality and costs, and to a resulting
enhancement in job security.

Effects on the Local Union
As shown in table 5-2, union activists had a mixed view
regarding the effects of worker participation programs on
local union affairs. There was some support for the view that
the programs had positive effects on the local union. When
asked in the survey about the overall effects of the participa
tion programs on the union, 58.0 percent of the officials
thought the programs would either probably or definitely
strengthen the local union. As one union activist summarized
the likely effects of the participation process on his local
union,
Probably strengthen. It's going to give the union
guy more say on his job, how it's designed and

Table 5-2
Effects of Participation Programs on Local Union Affairs

1 . Interfered with the proper role of
the grievance procedure.
2. Given workers another channel to get
their problems solved.
3. Reduced member interest in the union.
4. Improved the ability of union
representatives to solve problems or
complaints workers bring to them.
5. Undermined the union's ability
to enforce the contract.
6. Improved the union's communications
with its members.

7. Overall effect of worker participation
process on the local union

Disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

23.8

29.5

25.7

18.1

2.9

2.8
17.9

5.5
29.2

6.4
34.0

64.2
13.2

21.1
5.7

3.7

14.8

23.1

43.5

14.8

28.4

33.9

18.3

13.8

5.5

2.8
Definitely
weaken

15.0
Probably
weaken

30.8
No
effect

36.4
Probably
strengthen

15.0
Definitely
strengthen

8.4

12.1

21.5

34.6

23.4

Strongly
disagree

r
oo

3
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more knowledge of the business. It will hopefully
strengthen employment. If job security increases,
some credit will go to the union. But the union is
not perceived yet as a 50-50 partner with manage
ment. The union doesn't have all the training
management does.
Another union activist said,
The union's going to change, they won't be so
much adversarial. Once they understand the
benefits of the process, they will solve a lot of prob
lems easier. If it weakens the union, it weakens to
day's role, but it can strengthen the future role of
being more active between contract times. Now the
people have more of a voice, they will learn a lot of
skills. For example, people will learn the union
system. They're a very strong group of people. I
don't think the union leadership really realizes that
yet. Only three percent show up at a membership
meeting. The union leaders now have to be more
exposed, to be part of the people. Otherwise the
people say "Hey, you're never there, I never see
you."
Union officers also frequently agreed (85.3 percent) with
the statement that the participation programs would give
workers another channel to get their problems solved, and
62.3 percent disagreed with the statement that the programs
would undermine the union's ability to enforce the contract.
There were several individuals who conditioned their judg
ment of the effects on the local union upon how the union
participates in the process. The following statements il
lustrate this type of response.
If the union realizes the strength of QWL to the
people, QWL will probably strengthen the union. It
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will weaken the union if the union doesn't get more
involved with the people within the process.
I guess it depends on the definition of weakness
and strength. If we look at the union as encourag
ing grievances and opposing management, if that's
perceived as strength, then I would hope this pro
cess would weaken that. I think the role of the
union might be strengthened if it evolves into
something else, a new role. I'd hope to see lower
decision making in the organization so that it will
be flatter than it is now, one in which good
employees would be given more time and recogni
tion. Now the union is protecting the bad people. If
we could better take care of the good, I'll be happy.
There was also a minority viewpoint expressed that the
participation programs interfered with proper union ac
tivities. Within one auto plant, 6 out of 16 survey
respondents agreed with the statement that the participation
process "interfered with the proper role of the grievance pro
cedure," while in another plant, 6 out of 24 respondents
agreed with that statement. In these two plants, respectively,
19 percent and 25 percent of the survey respondents also
agreed with the view that the participation programs "under
mined the union's ability to enforce the contract."
As one local union official put it:
Some of the issues being discussed [in the par
ticipation program] are in violation of the national
agreement and the union's rights as exclusive
bargaining agent. The younger people are giving
away gains that have been won through much
struggle and hardship in the past.
However, in the other plants a lower percentage of
surveyed union officials agreed with these statements. Thus,
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as stated earlier, on average, union leaders disagreed with the
view that participation programs either interfered with the
proper role of the grievance procedure or undermined the
contract.
At the same time, union officers suggested that there was
no clear evidence that the participation programs increased
member satisfaction or identification with the union. As
described earlier, union officers saw little, if any, effect on
member satisfaction or member identification with the local
union. When asked in the question included in table 5-2
whether the programs reduced member interest in the union,
a large percentage of respondents (34.0 percent) neither
agreed nor disagreed and few officers witnessed strong ef
fects. However, officers tended to agree (51.4 percent) with
the view that the programs improved the union's com
munication with its members.
Interview data supported this ambiguous assessment of
the effect of the worker participation programs on member
interest in the local union. Officers repeatedly stated that
they saw no increase in member participation in union
meetings or activities in the aftermath of the creation of par
ticipation programs. This is consistent with the worker
survey data discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, union
leaders often remarked that any differences in the level of ac
tivism in union affairs arose from the fact that union ac
tivists are more willing to get involved in participation pro
grams. Hence, the participants always were more involved in
union affairs and did not become more involved because of
their experiences in worker participation programs.
Some leaders pondered whether additional steps could be
taken to inform workers of the local union's role in the par
ticipation process. Many officers expressed the view that the
programs had little effect on union affairs because members
did not perceive or understand the role played by the local
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union in the programs. To some extent, this may be a conse
quence of the local union's actions, as union leaders chose
not to become clearly identified with participation programs
in their early stages because of doubts regarding the ultimate
course and worker reaction to the programs. Yet, even in
situations where the local union leadership had decided to
fully support the participation effort, the leaders often were
at a loss to explain why workers did not perceive the union's
active role in the programs.
A number of union activists wrestled with the problem of
both what to decide regarding the proper separation between
collective bargaining and participation programs, and how
to maintain any desired level of separation. A variety of ap
proaches had been tried. In one plant explicit lists were kept
on what were deemed permissible or "on-line" subjects for
consideration in participation processes, and those
"off-line" subjects that were deemed to be the domain of
collective bargaining. As a participant in this process
described it,
We have an online and an offline sheet. It shows
what the teams can work out. If they think an issue
is offline, they will get the shop chairman in on a
meeting to talk. The people generally listen to
supervision when they say "it's offline, it's con
tractual."
In another plant, union officers monitored the activities of
shop floor Quality Circles, a part of the participation pro
gram. Whenever a "contractual" issue arose as a topic
within a circle, these officials intervened, stopped discussion
of the contractual issue, and brought the issue under dispute
to the shop committee so it could be resolved through
negotiations with management. Then, when the issue was
resolved, the settlement terms were brought back to the
Quality Circle for implementation.
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Another issue we probed was the effects of the participa
tion program on union elections. We found no instances
where union officers who strongly supported participation
programs had been turned out of office because of that sup
port. Most union officials expressed the view that support
for participation programs had been irrelevant to election
outcomes. Some officers did state that support for these pro
grams had become an election issue, and that in a few cases
this support had, on net, even lost individuals some votes.
Yet, consistent with the evidence from the steel industry
reported in chapter 3, there were no reports of elections be
ing decided on the basis of participation program views.
The operation of worker participation programs typically
involves the creation of a set of union and employer
representatives who are designated as participation "coor
dinators" who are responsible for training and advising par
ticipation teams in problemsolving activities. This coor
dinator job creates a new role for union representatives.
Since this new job requires the union activists to mediate any
tensions between the participation process and traditional
bargaining procedures, it is illuminating to look more closely
at how these participation coordinators function and what
coordinators say about their jobs.
One participation coordinator described his role as
follows:
I have a couple of different roles. First, I am a
demonstrator of the process, trainer or teacher.
That's the fun and easy part. Second, I'm a
monitor of the process—living it once you're in
volved. We interface with so many organizations:
engineering, plant manager's staff, materials peo
ple. It's a nice job, a learning experience, a con
tinuous high. I enjoy working with people. I held
the job of shop chairman before and also enjoyed
that job.
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Two union coordinators emphasized the intermediary
nature of the role they play as facilitator of the participation
process.
We're neither fish nor fowl. We're a buffer zone
between the union and management. I try not to
take a union line or a management line. That's
where our strength lies.
We train one day per week. Initially it was three
days per week. We also train the Business Center
Steering Committees in groups of three. We train
problem solving teams and then we monitor weekly
meetings and give followup action to help make
sure things are followed through. We also spend a
lot of time debating the philosophy of QWL, the
change it represents to management—first line,
general foremen, and managers. We are constantly
in meetings with the plant manager or the personnel
director or internal or external consultants.
In contrast to the focus on training, improving com
munications and problemsolving, and the intermediary
nature of the coordinators' role, the shop chairmen describe
their jobs as more focused on the enforcement and protec
tion of worker rights under the collective bargaining agree
ment. Still, however, there are common problemsolving
functions that cut across these two positions.
Consider, for example, the following description of his
job provided by one shop chairman.
A lot of times I act as a peacemaker, a lot of
times it is not tied into grievances. Some issues are
contractual and you have to get the message
through. Lots of times people don't like contrac
tual wording. You have to make a decision of right
versus wrong. I also have a lot of personal relation
ships with union members. They need somebody to
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talk to regarding personal problems. I handled
disputes between management and union personnel
on problems. I solve a lot of problems before they
are grievances.
We asked participation coordinators to compare their job
to that of union committeemen. Below are some statements
by coordinators which illustrate their perceptions of the
similarities and differences in these two union positions.
They are similar in that sometimes I feel like an
arbitrator when people have a bitch about
something. They are different—we have more
positives than negatives. The shop chairman's call
ed when something goes wrong. We are helping
people to develop—that's a big role—and the shop
chairman doesn't.
The shop chairmen only deal with the "five
percenters." The shop chairman is there to preserve
jobs. You don't have the time to associate with the
other 95%. As a trainer I'm now associated with all
the kinds of people that are generally concerned
about their job and their organization. They have
the same goals and objectives that I have in my job.
Problems Impeding the Expansion
of Participation Programs
Union officials were asked in the survey to weigh the im
portance of various factors as problems that limited the ex
pansion of participation programs. Their responses are
reported in table 5-3. The factors that were ranked as the big
gest problems were layoffs, management efforts to change
work rules or practices, and supervisor resentment or
resistance. Respectively, 53.2 percent, 44.4 percent and 42.8
percent of the respondents thought these problems had

Table 5-3
Problems that Limit the Expansion of the Participation Process

Worker disenchantment
Supervisor resentment or resistance
Loss of union support
Loss of plant management support
Conflict between workers and supervisors
Management efforts to change work
rules or practices
Layoffs or other employment cutbacks
Disruptions of groups caused by worker
transfers to different jobs

Not at all
3.8
10.5
54.7
43.0
12.4

Somewhat
61.9
46.7
35.8
37.4
57.1

Quite a bit
23.8
29.5
7.5
11.2
21.9

A very
great deal
10.5
13.3
1.9
8.4
8.6

7.4
19.6

48.1
27.1

32.4
28.0

12.0
25.2

21.3

40.7

25.9

12.0
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limited the expansion of the program either quite a bit or a
very great deal.
The interviews were consistent with these survey
responses. Union officials repeatedly stated that a chief
problem in the participation process was resistance en
countered in the ranks of middle management. As one union
official put it,
Front-line managers don't endorse it [worker
participation]. The Vice President and President
think it's great, but the word has not filtered down
to foremen that it is going to be a management
policy.
A number of union officials asserted that the continuing
economic decline in their industry had led to member
frustration and disenchantment with the participation pro
cess. These officials suggested that unless participants saw
some clear gains from participation, activity levels eventually
declined. Here, the problem was that deterioration of the
larger economic environment overwhelmed many of the im
mediate short-run improvements of the participation pro
cess. Thus, although these improvements were real and
valued, it was difficult to sustain the energy needed to sup
port participatory programs in the face of continued large
scale layoffs.
External events also affected workers' willingness to
engage in cooperative efforts with management. In one
plant, a union officer suggested that worker interest in par
ticipation programs waned considerably when management
began to move business out of the plant and into a nonunion
southern facility. As noted in chapter 3, some workers in
steel plants were hesitant to commit themselves to a par
ticipation process because of their suspicion that manage
ment would utilize any cost savings generated by these pro
grams to invest more heavily in businesses other than the
steel industry.
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Overall Assessment and Thoughts
Regarding the Future
In general, union activists and officials had a very positive
attitude toward worker participation programs. Union of
ficials frequently stated that they were in favor of workers
participating more directly in production decisionmaking
and were in favor of workers gaining wider input into the
determination of their working conditions. When asked
whether they advised workers to actively participate in the
program, 81.7 percent indicated that they encourage workers
to participate (see table 5-4). When asked what the union's
role in the participation process should be, 84.3 percent of
the union officials said the union should support and actively
participate in running the program with management.
Another issue relates to the future course of their worker
participation programs. When asked about what kind of
participation process would likely be around in five years,
65.1 percent of the surveyed local union officials in the auto
industry held the view that the participation process will have
grown and expanded (table 5-4). To probe this issue, we ask
ed in the interviews how either a new economic boom or fur
ther decline in economic conditions would affect the course
of the participation program. Some officials expressed the
view that a strong economic recovery would probably lead
management to be less concerned with the participation pro
grams and their associated emphasis on improved product
quality, and rather would lead to the return of an emphasis
on "getting it out the door." Yet, if this were to occur, these
union leaders generally believed workers would resent any
management efforts to roll back worker participation and, in
fact, "would just not let it happen." This supported their
claim that they and the workforce truly valued the additional
input received via the participation programs, and hence
would not willingly let such programs dissipate.
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Table 5-4
Overall Views of the Participation Programs
Question: What do you think the union's role ought to be in the par
ticipation process?
3.7 The union should oppose the program.
12.0 The union should remain neutral but not actively participate
in the process.
84.3 The union should support and actively participate in run
ning the program with management.
Question: If we were to come back five years from now, what kind of
participation process do you think we would find here?
13.8 The participation process will have ended by then.
21.1 The participation process will look about the same as it is to
day.
65.1 The participation process will have grown and expanded.
Question: If workers ask you about whether they should participate in
the participation program, what do you generally advise?
81.7 I encourage them to participate.
17.4 I don't take a position one way or the other.
.9 I discourage them from participating.

Union officials' views regarding the likely course of events
if the participation process actually took hold and expanded
differed according to their views regarding the role of these
participation programs. Some officials viewed the participa
tion process as a useful but limited complement to the collec
tive bargaining process. In their eyes, the proper role of par
ticipation programs is to provide a supplementary channel
through which workers could provide suggestions regarding
working conditions on those issues where there were clear
gains to be had by both sides. In line with this role, these
union leaders thought that even if participation programs
flourished, they always would have a limited function. In
this case, these programs would not preclude the operation
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of the collective bargaining process, and the local union's
place in the bargaining process would continue in much the
same fashion as before introduction of the worker participa
tion program.
Some other union officials envisioned the possible expan
sion of the participation process to the point that workers
would carry out many of the responsibilities now held by
supervisors and middle management. In this scenario, the
participation process would come to play a much more in
tegral role in the determination of work conditions and
thereby take over some, and possibly many, of the functions
now performed by collective bargaining. These local officials
speculated that the local union's role might then shift toward
representation of either wider community interests at the
workplace or towards greater satisfaction of the career goals
or nonwork-related interests of their membership.

Chapter 6
Views from the Top
of the Labor Movement*
The purpose of this chapter is to review the contemporary
thinking of key national labor movement leaders on worker
participation issues. We will draw on data from interviews,
speeches, other public documents and selected internal union
documents to understand how the top of the labor move
ment views worker participation.
While the worker participation processes studied in this
book are inherently local activities, leaders of national
unions and of higher level union federations such as the
AFL-CIO influence participation processes in at least two
important ways. First, through their public statements na
tional labor leaders mold the public's perceptions of the at
titude of the labor movement toward worker participation
and quality of working life improvement efforts. While the
public's perceptions are perhaps not critical in any direct
way, two specific groups of interest to the labor movement
may listen with greater attentiveness, namely, unorganized
workers whom unions would like to recruit and high level ex
ecutives who shape their firm's strategies toward unions and
worker participation programs. Thus, the public statements
*We wish to thank Alan Birbaum for collecting much of the background data for this
chapter while he was a student intern at the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO
in 1982.
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of labor leaders are important in shaping the overall image
of the labor movement in the minds of at least these two key
groups.
Second, top union leaders are responsible for shaping the
overall strategy of their organizations toward worker par
ticipation and designing an organizational structure capable
of implementing that strategy down through the union to its
grass roots level. The structure put into place will in turn
serve as the channel of information from local to top union
leaders. For these reasons, therefore, it is important to
understand how national level labor leaders are responding
to the question of whether worker participation processes
are, indeed, a threat or an opportunity for their organiza
tions.
The AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO does not have any official policy on QWL
or any other form of worker participation program. This is
consistent with its historical role in the structure of the
American labor movement since the AFL-CIO does not
directly negotiate nor administer collective bargaining
agreements. Instead, its role is to provide political leadership
to the labor movement, to share information, to coordinate
the efforts of the^ various national unions, and to provide
staff assistance and advice to national and regional affiliates.
Consistent with their leadership role, however, from time to
time the president and secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO
have outlined their personal views on the matter of worker
participation. Most recently, the clearest and most detailed
statement was provided by Mr. Thomas Donahue, secretarytreasurer of the AFL-CIO. The central points contained in
his January 1982 speech to a QWL conference are summariz
ed below. 1
Donahue indicated to the group that, as noted above, the
Federation has no policy on quality of worklife programs
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and believes it is more appropriate to leave it to each national
union to chart its own course after considering the types of
employers it deals with.
For strong unions, able to insist on an equal and
active voice in how the program works, or able, if
necessary, to veto actions that aim at subverting its
bargaining position, [QWL] isn't an insuperable
problem. That accounts for the general acceptance
of quality of worklife programs by such dominant
and secure unions as the Auto Workers, Steel
Workers, and Communications Workers. Even
they have sometimes had to take strong action to
prevent their employers from using the programs as
conduits for company propaganda in bargaining
situations.
A second key point stressed by Donahue was that while
collective bargaining will always remain an adversarial pro
cess, i.e., the basic conflict of interests between workers and
employers will not go away because of worker participation
or cannot be wished away by QWL advocates, the conflict
should be limited to the negotiation of the labor agreement.
During the period of the contract there should be room for
cooperation.
I do believe that the adversarial role, appropriate
to the conflict of collective bargaining, ought to be
limited to the period of negotiation—and during
the lifetime of a contract so arrived at, it ought to
be replaced by a period of cooperation, aimed at
maximizing the potential success of the joint enter
prise, i.e., the company's business or production.
Above all, Donahue stressed that any QWL or other
worker participation process should be viewed as a supple
ment to, not a replacement for, the collective bargaining pro
cess—"the collective bargaining process is the cornerstone to
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honest labor-management cooperation." He also warned
against elevating QWL efforts to the status of a
"movement" or a "philosophical belief." Instead, he
prefers to treat them for what they are—experiments design
ed to improve productivity and quality and the satisfaction
of workers with their jobs.
In summary, Donahue's approach is one of cautious skep
ticism. He is skeptical because he recognizes that American
employers have embraced worker participation most recently
during times of economic adversity as part of their efforts to
regain a stronger competitive position. Other employers are
using employee involvement strategies to keep unions out of
their organizations. These two facts are consistent with
employer behavior at earlier points in American labor
history—labor and management have banded together to
cooperate during periods of economic or military crisis only
to return to more open periods of conflict when the crisis
eased. Thus, collective bargaining is viewed as a more flexi
ble and appropriate instrument for dealing with American
employers; it allows unions to exert an independent voice for
employee interests in whatever fashion works most effective
ly given the existing environment.
Finally, Donahue noted the biggest obstacle to the
development of a more lasting form of labor-management
cooperation in the U.S.:
I might note parenthetically that the ability of the
trade union movement as a whole to sense a part
nership would be vastly enlarged by the elimination
by management of the "Union-Free Environment"
mentality which nowadays so apparently affects
thousands of employers, large and small, and
leaves the trade union movement embattled and
badly disposed to cooperate on the macroeconomic and political issues which could benefit
from such an approach.
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We [the labor movement] have long
demonstrated our willingness to join with manage
ment in developing more prosperous communities
and in revitalizing our industries, and we'll con
tinue to do so. What we expect in return is a little
less short-term manipulation and more fidelity in
the relationship over the long haul.
As we review the diversity of views of other national union
leaders, we will see that despite differences of opinion on
other matters, all are in essential accord with this basic point.

Representative Views of National Unions
We will now turn to a survey of the views and perspectives
on worker participation issues found across different na
tional unions. These views are generally captured by four
different approaches which are discussed below. As il
lustrated in figure 6-1, the continuum of views across na
tional unions ranges from general opposition to general en
dorsement of worker participation strategies. In between
these two extremes are two decentralized policies. One is a
general policy of leaving the decision of how to respond to
worker participation programs entirely to the local unions.
The other is a modified decentralized policy of leaving it up
to the locals, but providing national level staff and/or
elected leaders who both promote the development of
worker participation processes and provide expert assistance
to locals interested in implementing specific processes. For
each of these types we will summarize some of the ap
proaches of specific unions.

General Opposition: The Case of the IAM
The clearest case of a union that is generally opposed to
worker participation processes as they are currently carried
out is the International Association of Machinists and
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Figure 6-1
Representative Views of National Unions
on Worker Participation
General Opposition
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outspoken critics
resist initial involvement
end any ongoing programs
collective bargaining is sufficient
joint committees may be acceptable

Decentralized Neutrality
* leave decision entirely to local unions
* no statement of general opposition or support
* no international staff support or leadership to interested
locals
* provide locals with summaries of related research
* provide locals with checklist of suggested questions to
answer prior to start-up of project
Decentralized Policy with National Union Support
* leave decision to local unions
* promote development and provide assistance in imple
mentation through international level staff and leaders
* encourage local union experimentation
* no public endorsement by International president
* articulate national promoters
* letters of understanding between parties in bargaining
agreements
General Endorsement
* support from the International president
* promote development and provide assistance in implemen
tation through international level staff and leaders
* encourage local union experimentation

Aerospace Workers (IAM). The president of the IAM,
William Winpisinger, was an early outspoken critic of QWL
programs when they were first introduced into U.S. industry
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in the early 1970s and continues to be their harshest contem
porary critic. 2 1 AM policy toward QWL and QC programs is
outlined in a 1982 letter from Winpisinger to I AM local
lodges. 3 The letter suggests the following guidelines for local
leaders who need to decide how to respond to QWL types of
programs in their plants.
First, notify the management that under IAM
policy every aspect of the employer-employee rela
tionship is subject to negotiation through collective
bargaining.
Second, warn members to watch for dilution of
contract clauses governing job description, train
ing, wage structure, promotion, benefits, grievance
procedures or other factors normally decided
through collective bargaining.
Third, set up a watchdog committee within the
lodge to monitor quality of worklife committees.
Fourth, keep Grand Lodge informed of your ex
periences with quality of worklife programs.
A discussion with George Poulin, general vice-president of
the IAM, further clarified the international's policy toward
worker participation. 4 The union's first preference would be
for its members and local leaders not to get involved in these
programs in the first place and to bring an end to them where
they have started. The I AM believes that it has not seen any
issues raised by QWL programs which cannot be effectively
dealt with through collective bargaining.
If the participation effort continues to exist in an IAM
facility, its representatives are advised to proceed as follows:
1. Guarantees should be obtained that the process will not
in any way circumvent the negotiations process or the
collective bargaining agreement.
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2. Union stewards should participate and be involved in all
discussions of the QWL groups and play a watchdog
role to insure the agreement or the rights of any workers
are not violated.
3. No workers should be laid off as a result of recommen
dations or decisions of the participation process.
4. Management should agree to negotiate all aspects of the
issues discussed in the participation process. That is, if
the union agrees to open itself up to discussions that
may introduce changes in practices within the bargain
ing unit, then management should also be willing to
discuss aspects of issues that traditionally have been
treated as managerial prerogatives.
This fourth condition is a key to understanding the views
of the IAM. In contrast to its stated opposition to QWL pro
grams, this union has been a leader in calling for full joint
discussions of the use of new technology. It has proclaimed a
"Workers' Technology Bill of Rights" for the introduction
of new technology, reproduced in figure 6-2. 5 One of the
central points contained in this statement on technology is
that employers and union representatives should consult on
all aspects of the decision to introduce new technology from
the earliest stage of the employer's decisionmaking process.
Thus, the IAM is not opposed to union-employer joint pro
grams per se. Instead, it supports joint discussions which it
believes allow the union to participate as a full joint partner
in all aspects of the issues involved.
Poulin summarized another important reason for the
lAM's general opposition to cooperative programs with
employers:
Basically, the whole issue comes down to one
word: recognition. Employers can have it either
way but they can't walk down both sides of the
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aisle. If they want cooperation, they have to be
willing to fully accept unions. On the other hand, if
they want to engage in a ten to fifteen year fight to
see who comes out on top, they can have that too.
But we cannot help them to destroy us slowly by
cooperating in specific plants while they screw us
out of others. The day that the employers in this
country truly accept the right of unions to exist we
will see more changes than anyone could ever
believe.
Our problem is that there is always a hidden
agenda [in the minds of employers]. Employers
have trained us well to know this. They were our
teachers and we have learned this lesson again and
again over the years in the school of hard knocks.
The IAM strategy toward QWL and related workplace
cooperative efforts is part of the union's larger industrial
strategy for revitalizing American industry and reforming
national economic policy. For example, Winpisinger's com
ments on the viability of business-labor-government
cooperative efforts at the national level of the economy are
fully consistent with the I AM policy toward joint
cooperative efforts with specific employers at the workplace:
Since [European style] social-contract systems
work elsewhere and our employers profitably live
with them in other countries where they invest, we
can demand no less here in America. This is where
the discussion of cooperation must begin. In
plainer words, the business community and the
Government must call off their antiunion and an
tisocial dogs. It is unreasonable to expect coopera
tion on the part of workers in the workplace, only
to find a management, in complicity with Govern
ment, stabbing them in the back and cutting the
safety net out from under them in the policy out-
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side the plant gate or office. Cooperation requires
good faith on the part of all parties. It is a two-way
street. 6
Figure 6-2
International Association of Machinists Statement
on Workers' Technology Bill of Rights
Amend National Labor Relations Act, Railway Labor Act, and other ap
propriate acts to declare national policy through a new Technology Bill
of Rights:
I. New Technology shall be used in a way that does not decrease
jobs, but creates or maintains jobs and promotes communitywide and national full employment.
II. Unit cost savings and labor productivity gains resulting from the
use of New Technology shall be shared with production workers
at the local level and shall not be permitted to accrue solely for the
gain of capital, management and shareholders.
Increased leisure time resulting from New Technology shall result
in no loss of real income or decline in living standards.
III. Since the greater part of local, state and national tax revenues
come from taxes on labor, communities and the nation have the
right to require employers to pay a Robot Tax, as a replacement
tax, on all machinery, equipment, and production systems that
displace workers and cause unemployment.
IV. New Technology shall improve the conditions of work and shall
enhance and expand the opportunities for knowledge, skills and
compensation of workers. Displaced workers shall not be penaliz
ed with loss of income and shall be entitled to training and retrain
ing.
V. New Technology shall be used to develop the U.S. industrial base,
consistent with the Full Employment goal, before it is licensed or
exported abroad.
VI. New Technology shall be evaluated in terms of workers' safety
and health and shall not be destructive of the workplace environ
ment, nor shall it be used at the expense of the community's
natural environment.
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VII. Workers, through their trade unions and bargaining units, shall
have an absolute right to participate in all phases of management
deliberations and decisions that lead or could lead to the introduc
tion of New Technology or the changing of the workplace system
design, work processes and procedures for doing work, including
the shutdown or transfer or work, capital, plant and equipment.
VIII. Workers shall have the right to monitor control room centers and
control stations and the New Technology shall not be used to
monitor, measure or otherwise control the work practices and
work standards of individual workers, at the point of work.
IX. Storage of an individual worker's personal data and information
file by the employer shall be tightly controlled and the collection
and/or release and dissemination of information with respect to
race, religious or political activities and beliefs, records of
physical and mental health disorders and treatments, records of
arrests and felony charges or convictions, information concerning
sexual preferences and conduct, information concerning internal
and private family matters, and information regarding an in
dividual's financial condition or credit worthiness shall not be
permitted, except in rare circumstances related to health, and then
only after consultation with a family or union-appointed physi
cian, psychiatrist or member of the clergy.
The right of the individual worker to inspect his or her own per
sonal data file shall at all times be absolute and open to him or
her.
X. When the New Technology is employed in the production of
military goods and services, workers, through their trade union
and bargaining agent, have a right to bargain with management
over the establishment of Alternative Production Committees,
which shall design ways to adopt that technology to sociallyuseful production and products in the civilian sector of the
economy.
SOURCE: Let's Rebuild America, International Association of Machinists, 1983, Appen
dix B.
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Decentralized Neutrality
Perhaps the dominant national union strategy toward
worker participation can be described as decentralized
neutrality. That is, while national leaders speak out from
time to time for or against QWL or other worker participa
tion efforts, each local of the national union is left to decide
generally on its own, in accordance with its own needs and
preferences, how to respond to employer initiatives in this
area. Under this strategy no high ranking national union
leaders or staff specialists are identified as public supporters
of worker participation and no staff specialists are assigned
specific responsibility for encouraging locals to get involved
in joint efforts or assisting them when the issue comes up.
Some of the unions that follow this genuinely neutral and
decentralized strategy have provided locals with summaries
of research on participation. The IUE, for example, has
done this. The guidelines that its local unions are encouraged
to follow are reproduced in figure 6-3 for local unions.
Other unions such as the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW)
provide locals with a checklist of suggested questions to ask
itself and the employer before embarking on a joint program
(see figure 6-4).
Many of the unions that follow this strategy of decen
tralized neutrality, such as the IUE, the AIW, and the
UFCW, deal with a large and very diverse range of
employers, none of which employ a majority of the national
union's members. For this reason, it is difficult for national
union leaders to announce one single policy that fits each
situation. What sets these unions apart from the IAM on the
one hand, and the unions that will be classified in the two re
maining categories on the other, is that they have neither
stated a general opposition to workplace level participation,
nor provided international staff support or leadership to
locals that show an interest in pursuing a joint program.
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Figure 6-3
IUE Guidelines for Local Union Participation
in Quality Circles
1. Go slowly. Make sure the Quality Circle idea is not just a gimmick of
management to improve its own position. Make sure, too, that union
membership knows what Quality Circles are designed to accomplish.
2. Be sure the union is an equal partner in the Quality Circle program. In
this way, the union can insure that its interests and the interests of its
members are protected and respected.
3. Be sure that any management initiation of Quality Circles can deliver
top management support—and that means demanding meetings with
top management. Union leadership does not want to go out on a limb
with its membership and endorse something that is later discontinued.
4. Get assurance that the Circle will not be involved with conditions of
employment and work which is provided for in the terms of the collec
tive bargaining agreement. One way of insuring this is to make certain
that Quality Circle facilitators and leaders are adequately and proper
ly trained.
5. To protect its membership, unions must get some guarantee that the
implementation of Quality Circles does not eliminate jobs. These
guarantees should be put in writing.
6. Unions must be assured that the adoption of Quality Circles does not
turn into a speed-up.
7. Unions must insist that management maintains a balance between the
two aims of the program: management benefits and worker benefits.
8. Unions must insist that savings resulting from the Circles must be
shared with employees. Unions need to ask:
* Are savings being used to improve the company's operation?
* Are savings going to be returned to the workers in improved bene
fits?
Once the Quality Circle is set in motion, the union must:
* Insist workers who take time off for Quality Circles be paid for
that time.
* Keep workers fully informed on all activities beginning with the
first meeting with management.
* Insist on union representation at every Circle.
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* Provide initially for access to company data.
* Make certain there is an organized evaluation system to see if the
program is serving its agreed-upon purpose.
* Make sure there is a clear understanding of operational procedures
on both sides.
* Communication is the most important ingredient.
* One suggestion has been that the union start with a survey of the
membership to determine their needs and interests.
* Another is to get an agreement to periods of discussion on the
proposed program.
* A third is to insist that bulletin boards be placed throughout
the plant to post exclusively what is developing (or taking place)
within Quality Circles.
And, finally, local unions should keep their Internationals informed of
the establishment of Quality Circles so that the Union can keep track of,
as well as develop an analysis of, the impact of these on its members.
SOURCE: "Quality of Working Life Outline," International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, internal document, no date.
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Figure 6-4
Allied Industrial Workers Checklist on Quality Circles
Some Important Questions to Ask

Regarding the Implementation and Operation
of Quality Control Circles at Your Plant
I. Prior History
A. Prior to the introduction of a Quality Control Circle program
at your location, was your relationship with the Company
cooperative?
B. Did the Company propose language for economic conces
sions during the last round of negotiations?
C. Did the Company try to settle most grievances at the lower
steps of the grievance procedure or force most to the final
step?
D. Prior to initiating QCCs did the Company participate on any
joint committees with the Union, for example, a joint health
and safety committee?
II. Program Introduction
A. Was the QCC program discussed with local Union officers
prior to being announced to the general membership?
B. How much information did the Company give the Union
prior to introducing the program?
C. Was the Local Union involved in discussions to determine the
priority problems which would be addressed by the QCCs?
D. Was the Union involved in the initial QCC orientation pro
gram?
E. Was the Union involved in discussing the procedures that
would be adopted in order to implement the program?
III. Implementation and Operation
A. Is the Union officially represented on the QCC Steering Com
mittee?
B. Are there an equal number of labor and management
representatives on the Steering Committee?
C. Is the Union involved as an equal partner in each Circle orien
tation program?
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IV. Program Evaluation
A. Prior to the introduction of QCC did the Company provide
the Union with a statement, with supporting data, as to the
problems they were trying to solve?
B. Has there been any discussion between the Company and the
Union as to how the program will be evaluated? That is, how
will success or failure be measured?
C. Is the Union involved in the evaluation procedure and receiv
ing all material related to the evaluation?
D. Does the Union receive minutes of all Circle and Steering
Committee meetings and related correspondence?
V. Impact on Collective Bargaining
A. Is there a written agreement between the Company and the
Local Union which specifies that the QCC program will not
deal with subjects covered by the Collective Bargaining agree
ment?
B. Has there been any noticeable change in management's
behavior in handling grievances?
C. Has there been a decline in grievance activity since the in
troduction of the Quality Circle program?
D. Will the introduction of this Quality Circle program pose any
problems for your next round of negotiations?
E. Is there the potential that the introduction of a Quality Con
trol Circle program will interfere with the administration of
the Collective Bargaining agreement?
VI. Union Management Cooperation
A. During the implementation of the QCC program did the local
propose any changes in the workplace which would solve
some of its problems?
B. What are some of the local issues which you feel could be pro
posed to management as an indicator of management's
"cooperative spirit?"
SOURCE: Research Department, Allied Industrial Workers, 1983.
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Decentralized Policy with
National Union Support
A third group of unions, most notably the UAW and the
USW, encourage local union experimentation with worker
participation and have one or more high level international
union leaders and/or staff representatives who serve as ac
tive promoters and supporters of such efforts. However,
public endorsement of participation stops short of the office
of the international president of these unions. To understand
the nature of the support provided by these unions, we will
review in some detail the history of the roles of worker par
ticipation in the UAW and the USW.
The UAW. The earliest articulate spokesman for QWL
programs within the labor movement was Irving Bluestone,
who served, until his retirement in 1979, as the UAW vicepresident for the General Motors Department. Bluestone
was the driving force behind the negotiation of the first
QWL clause to be included in a national level bargaining
agreement. Largely at his insistence, the following letter of
understanding was appended to the 1973 agreement between
the UAW and General Motors:
In discussions prior to the opening of the current
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agree
ment, General Motors Corporation and the UAW
gave recognition to the desirability of mutual effort
to improve the quality of work life for the
employees. In consultation with Union represen
tatives, certain projects have been undertaken by
management in the field of organizational develop
ment, involving the participation of represented
employees. These and other projects and ex
periments which may be undertaken in the future
are designed to improve the quality of work life,
thereby advantaging the worker by making work a
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more satisfying experience, advantaging the Cor
poration by leading to a reduction in employee
absenteeism and turnover, and advantaging the
consumer through improvement in the quality of
the products manufactured.
As a result of these earlier discussions and fur
ther discussions during the course of the current
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agree
ment, the parties have decided that a Committee to
Improve the Quality of Work Life composed of
representatives of the International Union and
General Motors will be established at the national
level.
This Committee will meet periodically and have
responsibility for:
1. Reviewing and evaluating programs of the
Corporation which involve improving the
work environment of employees represented
by the UAW.
2. Developing experiments and projects in that
area.
3. Maintaining records of its meetings, delibera
tions and all experiments and evaluations it
conducts.
4. Making reports to the Corporation and the
Union on the results of its activities.
5. Arranging for any outside counselling which it
feels is necessary or desirable with the expenses
thereof to be shared equally by the Corpora
tion and the Union.
The Corporation agrees to request and en
courage its plant managements to cooperate in the
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conduct of such experiments and projects, and
recognizes that cooperation by its plant floor super
vision is essential to success of this program.
The Union agrees to request and encourage its
members and their local union representatives to
cooperate in such experiments and projects, and
recognizes that the benefits which can flow to
employees as a result of successful experimentation
is dependent on the cooperation and participation
of those employees and the local union represen
tatives. 7
Since the signing of this agreement in 1973, the UAW and
General Motors have participated in an ongoing QWL pro
gram and have carried out the intent of this letter by en
couraging the development of QWL programs throughout
GM plants. Bluestone served as the key union proponent for
QWL and advisor to the local unions as they embarked on
their own experiments. Although the same basic letter of
agreement and national committee structure were included in
the Ford and Chrysler agreements with the UAW, Chrysler
has yet to actively embark on a vigorous joint participation
effort with the UAW. Ford and the UAW only began im
plementing this language since 1979, when Donald Ephlin
became UAW vice-president for the Ford Department (see
chapter 3). Thus, the UAW is an example of a major na
tional union that has encouraged the spread of worker par
ticipation projects from the top levels of the union.
Still, however, none of the three UAW presidents who
held office from 1973 to the present time (Leonard Wood
cock, Douglas Fraser, and Owen Bieber) have taken the lead
as the spokesman for the desirability of participating in joint
workplace participation programs. Instead, they have left it
to the international vice-presidents, such as Bluestone and
Ephlin, to serve as the union's publicly recognized pro
ponents of this concept. A recent statement of Bluestone's to
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a GM-UAW plant QWL team perhaps best captures his per
sonal views and the views of the UAW as expressed over the
years by these two vice-presidents.
In my thirty-eight years with the UAW, I par
ticipated in countless hard core bargaining sessions
with General Motors Corporation at both the na
tional level and the local plant level. The collective
bargaining relationship in the U.S. is characterized
by an adversarial climate, strong debate over highly
controversial issues, and occasional crises. In the
years ahead the adversarial aspects of labormanagement relationships will no doubt continue
to play a significant role in advancing the standard
of living of workers and their families in improving
the working conditions.
It is equally true, however, that a vast array of
subjects related to managing the work place and
managing the enterprise are, indeed, not adver
sarial in nature, but are subject to joint problemsolving efforts as matters of common and mutual
concern. As to these issues the negotiating parties
have a stake in undertaking, jointly, initiatives
which are designed to achieve mutually desirable
objectives.
Solving problems at the work place should not lie
solely in the domain of managerial prerogatives. In
fact, in its practical application, problem solving
must be rooted in a process which affords workers
the opportunity for meaningful participation in the
decision-making process. In this sense, "improving
the quality of work life" represents a further step
toward fulfillment of a persistent, historic objective
of unionism: to bring, to the extent feasible,
democratic values and procedures into the work
place. 8
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In this same speech, Bluestone went on to state, as other
union leaders have who are more skeptical of QWL, that
there will always be a need for collective bargaining. He went
farther, however, than most other labor leaders are yet will
ing to go, by endorsing the notion that under appropriate cir
cumstances, QWL processes should be allowed to modify
terms of the collective bargaining process, and indeed serve
as the avenue by which changes in the basic terms of the
employment contract are arrived at.
Unions have and will always have the legal and
moral responsibility to protect fairly and ag
gressively the rights of their members. There will be
a continuing need to utilize a grievance procedure
and engage in collective bargaining negotiation.
The representation collective bargaining role of the
union cannot be jeopardized.
This is not to say that collective bargaining
agreements cannot be altered to meet mutually
desirable objectives of the QWL process, subject of
course to the bargaining process and membership
ratification. At Livonia, (a Cadillac engine plant)
for example, the traditional wage and classification
structure was altered to accommodate the pay-forknowledge wage system. I expect the natural pro
gression will lead to gain-sharing programs, in
which the workers receive financial or other
benefits as their fair share in the improved perfor
mance of the enterprise.
This is more than a subtle difference from the statements
of other labor leaders. It recognizes that QWL efforts can
evolve into more than a supplement to collective bargaining
and not always remain totally subservient to the terms of the
bargaining agreement. In this view, worker participation
processes can serve over time as vehicles for proposing major
modifications in the bargaining agreement. The only con-
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straint is that any actual changes in the agreement must be
negotiated and approved, as would any other modification.
The Bluestone/Ephlin UAW view of the role of worker
participation has expanded in another important way. No
longer is QWL, or Employee Involvement (El) as it is called
at Ford, viewed as an isolated experiment limited only to the
workplace level of the bargaining relationship. Instead, in
volvement of workers and their employers at the local level is
viewed as an integral piece of the larger company and union
effort to return the American automobile industry to a posi
tion of competitiveness, profitability, and growth. At Ford,
for example, the El process is only the most micro part of an
integrated set of structures and practices for information
sharing and consultation at the plant- and company-wide
levels of the bargaining relationship. It was the positive ex
periences with the workplace level El processes at Ford be
tween 1979 and 1982 that set the stage for the 1982 FordUAW agreement that provided for these higher levels of con
sultation as well as expanded joint efforts at retraining and
efforts to negotiate pilot employment guarantee programs in
selected plants.
The USW. Like the UAW, the USW international office
has been actively promoting the diffusion of worker par
ticipation processes (called Labor-Management Participa
tion Teams or LMPTs) since the signing of the 1980 bargain
ing agreement with major employers in the steel industry (see
chapter 3). Responsibility for encouraging and monitoring
the development of LMPTs is assigned at the national level
of the USW to Mr. Sam Camens, special assistant to the
president. Like Bluestone, Camens sees workplace participa
tion teams as a logical step toward the development of fullfledged industrial democracy. 9
He also sees the LMPT experiments as the first step in an
evolving process that will eventually modify the basic nature
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of the employment relationship and the role of management,
unions, and workers.
I tell companies don't start this process if you
think you can stop it. By that I mean the process
takes on a life and a direction of its own and will in
crease the interest of workers in participation as
they get experience with it. It also helps to cut out a
lot of the red tape and standardization and
bureaucratization within management.
It has to be a cultural change. I don't think
enough people understand what labor-management
participation is all about. It is not simply labormanagement cooperation or collaboration. If
that's what people think it is it won't amount to
anything. We might get to more collaboration and
cooperation through participation but the basic
thing that participation must do is to break down
the barriers between workers and supervisors and
the rest of management. Unless this is treated as a
cultural change it will not work. It also has to be a
part of a trade union's strategy—part of the drive
for union and worker democracy. It has to be part
of our strategy to stem the losses of young
members. 10
Thus, Camens—like Bluestone and Ephlin at the UAW,
and as we will see shortly, Glen Watts at the CWA—believes
worker participation must become part of the overall
strategy of the labor movement for reforming the employ
ment relationship and for organizing new union members.
Yet, these beliefs still constitute a minority view within both
the UAW and the USW. They have not been publicly em
braced by the presidents of either the USW or the UAW, nor
have they been officially built into the general policy
statements of either union. The USW, for example, formally
endorsed the use of LMPTs for "distressed" industries and
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firms (i.e., those in serious economic trouble and in need of
cooperative efforts from the union and the workers to regain
competitive health), but it chose to leave any mention of
worker participation out of its statement of bargaining
priorities for firms and industries not currently in financial
trouble. Lynn Williams, secretary/treasurer of the USW
stated the current views of leaders within this union as
follows:
.... the majority of the people in the union still
see [worker participation] as a strategy for helping
those companies in crisis and do not see it as a
natural part of an overall strategy for healthy situa
tions. This point of view probably captures the
position of most of our top leaders. Our leadership
in general is very supportive of the concept of
labor-management participation teams because of
the severe crisis.
There is another group within the union that is
very supportive of the concept of labormanagement participation in general. This group
has a long history within the Steelworkers. One can
go back to the days of Phillip Murray (the first
president of the Steelworkers) and find a statement
of his that endorsed worker participation as his
program for economic recovery. The Scanlon Plan
came out of the Steelworkers. David MacDonald
was an active supporter of human relations and
labor-management cooperation. I.W. Abel endors
ed and supported the concept of productivity and
job security committees and joint efforts at the
plant level.
Finally, there is a third group that is extremely
committed to the concept of worker participation
as a means of extending industrial democracy to the
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American workplace. Sam Camens best reflects
this point of view within our union.
My own view is that there will always be two
elements to the role of unions. One is to help in
crease the size of the pie and the other is to use col
lective bargaining to divide up the pie. Traditional
ly, the union has approached this first task mostly
at the very macro levels of the economy through its
political lobbying and support for national policy
that will promote the growth of the American steel
industry. The tri-partite steel committee that was
active during the Carter Administration is an exam
ple of this. I see the labor-management participa
tion teams at the plant level as the enterprise
counterpart efforts to increase the size of the pie.
Over the long run I think these two functions will
fit together comfortably in the union's strategy. 11
In summary, both the USW and the UAW have articulate
national promoters of worker participation. In both cases,
however, the spokesmen are one step removed from the of
fice of the international union president. Both unions also
have assigned national level staff people to assist locals in
developing participation programs and have put con
siderable resources of the national union into training its
staff and supporting local union participation activities.

Support from the President: The CWA
At this point in time, only one president of a major interna
tional union has publicly gone on record as supporting the
introduction of worker participation efforts as an integral
part of the union's long-run strategy. Glen Watts, president
of the CWA, summarized his views and the posture of the
CWA in a recent speech to a national conference on labormanagement cooperation.
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.... aspects of QWL are seen by many in the
labor movement as a threat. But others—and I in
clude myself among them—see it as offering a great
opportunity to extend the reach of collective
bargaining.
Labor is concerned with the development of
democracy in industry. The collective bargaining
process will always be the foundation of industrial
democracy; but QWL gives us the tools to build
higher than we ever have before.
.... collective bargaining has not been weaken
ed. We work on the traditional issues of wages and
basic working conditions just as we always have.
But through QWL, we are extending our in
fluence into the murky territory of "management
prerogatives," help-to-shape management prac
tices and policies while they are being formed
rather than after the fact.
In the long run, I believe this cannot help but
strengthen the union. That is why we have commit
ted significant resources and effort to QWL. 12
Like his more skeptical colleagues within the labor move
ment, Watts recognizes that many employers and some con
sultants use QWL as strategies for avoiding or undermining
unions. He likewise condemns the use of participation
strategies for these purposes. However, he favors a different
response than some to this tactical use of QWL:
Now I want to come back for a moment to the
other kind of QWL—the gimmicky type—the kind
that aims at narrow productivity goals or undercuts
unions. What should Labor's stand be toward
these?
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I don't think it is sufficient to stand on the
sidelines and attack management's motives. That
strategy puts unions on the defensive and makes
management appear more concerned about
workers than we are.
.... our experience, along with that of the
UAW and the Steelworkers, has provided us a new
strategy.
We have a way of telling good programs from
bad programs. We can offer our own Labor model
of a good QWL process as a challenge to manage
ment. We know that a good worker participation
process involves some basic elements, which I will
repeat:
1. Protection of worker rights, especially the
rights to job security and voluntary participa
tion.
2. Separation of collective bargaining from
QWL.
3. Full equality between union and management.
4. The goal of a better working life for all—not
just higher productivity for the company.
Watts ended his statement on QWL with a comment that
is identical to the views articulated by the leaders of the
IAM—a union at the other end of the continuum of support
for current forms of worker participation:
There has to be a greater acceptance of unions.
The business community cannot ask for coopera
tion on the one hand, and conduct anti-union war
fare with the other.
Several internal union documents further spell out the
CWA's short range, intermediate, and long range strategies
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for worker participation. 13 Key excerpts from a report
prepared by the CWA research staff are reproduced below,
since they illustrate one union's views of how worker par
ticipation might be linked to its broader representational
strategies and activities.
CWA entered into the Quality of Work Life pro
cess with AT&T last year for one immediate
reason: to help reduce job pressures among our
membership. . . . The Union recognized that this
problem could not be dealt with effectively by col
lective bargaining alone; the cooperative QWL
strategy was an attempt to approach it in a new
way.
At the same time, the QWL effort can be seen in
a broader context as just one of a number of routes
by which the Union has tried to increase its role in
managerial planning. As the pace of change
quickens, we have found too often that once the
Company has made a decision it is too late to re
spond effectively. Increasingly it appears that we
need to be in on the ground floor if we are to have a
real effect.

Strategy: The Short Range
Between now [December, 1981] and the 1983
contract [negotiations] the strategy goal should be
to establish "model" workforce teams to explore
the potential of the QWL process. . . .
The Middle Range
The second phase of QWL develop
ment—perhaps the two contracts after 1983—will
present two major strategic issues. The first is con
solidating QWL as a part of normal management
and Union operating style. The second is tying
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QWL into the larger attempt to expand the Union's
role in managerial planning. . . .
The Long Range
In the long run the strategic goal should be to
develop the Union as the representative of workers
in all phases of management decision-making. . . .
The CWA recognizes that the QWL efforts may evolve in
a variety of different ways and will be shaped by forces that
are only partially within the control of the union. This union
has, however, gone farther than any other in attempting to
chart a strategy for shaping this evolution and making
worker participation an integral part of its strategy for
representing current and future members.
Summary
On one key issue there is unanimity within the American
labor movement—the need for employers to accept the
legitimacy of unions at the American workplace in order for
QWL or other forms of worker participation to survive over
time. What differs, as the statements contained in this
chapter demonstrate, are views on the extent to which unions
should take the offensive by cooperating with employers
who do accept the basic right of unions to exist in current
and future workplaces. National union leaders differ as to
whether unions should take a defensive posture while waiting
for a more general acceptance of unions by employers and
within the larger political and social community before en
dorsing workplace participation efforts.
Beyond this basic point, the remaining differences describ
ed in this chapter come down to the questions of how high a
priority current worker participation efforts should be given
on the agenda of the American labor movement and how
much top level union leaders should assert the lead in endors-
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ing and promoting the concept of worker participation.
Ultimately, the strategic question comes down to whether it
is better for the labor movement to be viewed as a cautious
and skeptical watchdog or limited participant in employerinitiated participation efforts, or whether it would be better
for the movement to be viewed as an equal partner with
management, and even the initiator and driving force for
worker participation. Unions must decide whether worker
participation can enhance the effectiveness of their represen
tational role at the workplace and eventually be used as a
means of enhancing industrial democracy within American
society. In our final chapter, we will attempt to spell out in
more detail some of the consequences of these different
strategies for the American labor movement.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
and Implications
The data presented in the preceding chapters suggest there
is strong potential for worker participation processes as
judged by the degree of interest union members expressed in
gaining greater say over decisions affecting their jobs.
However, only some of these processes were successful in
achieving significant improvements in worker influence and
in union member evaluation of their local union perfor
mance. Those that were most successful were ones in which
the union served as a full joint partner in the process, actual
changes were made in the organization of work which
enhanced employment security and improved the economic
performance of the firm, and union leaders were able to link
their support of QWL to their larger collective bargaining
and representational strategies.
Union involvement in worker participation has led to im
portant positive effects for union leaders and their organiza
tions. Specifically, local leaders report that their relations
with management representatives and supervisors have im
proved. Training union activists to serve as QWL facilitators
has produced new leadership skills and enhanced problemsolving without jeopardizing the grievance process. On the
other hand, there is no evidence that worker participation
185
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processes increased membership attachment to unions or in
volvement in local union affairs. The case studies
demonstrated that worker participation processes tend to go
through a natural cycle. Following an initial skepticism on
the part of members and many local officers, a period of en
thusiasm and support tends to occur among those gaining ex
perience with participation. This is often followed by a
plateauing of interest and support within the broader
membership of the local union. Whether the process survives
this critical testing period depends on the ability of the
employer to achieve tangible improvements in economic per
formance and the ability of the union to link its support for
worker participation to its broader bargaining objectives in
representing the bread and butter interests and needs of its
members.
Thus, the central implication of this research is that for
worker participation processes to survive the economic and
political obstacles they encounter over time, each party must
see these processes as contributing to their separate economic
and organizational interests. While improvements in the
psychological rewards workers derive from their jobs are
necessary conditions for success, psychological rewards
alone do not appear to be sufficient to maintain the commit
ment of management, the union and its leaders, or rank and
file workers.

Implications for the Labor Movement
These conclusions imply that rather than adopting a
uniform position for or against worker participation on
some philosophical ground, union leaders need to think
strategically about the conditions that must exist for worker
participation to be in the interests of their members and the
steps needed to link these processes to the union's broader
strategies for improving the effectiveness of its bargaining
relationship.
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Issues Facing Local Union Leaders
The ultimate choice of whether or not to actively support
the development of a worker participation process in a
specific plant, office, or worksite can best be made by local
union leaders based on a consideration of the need for
change in their bargaining relationship and the viability of
some form of worker participation as a partial solution to
their problems. At least three conditions are necessary to
make union support viable: the employer must accept the
legitimacy of the union, top management must be deeply
committed to supporting the process and there must be a
viable economic future for the plant.
Management Acceptance of Unions. Clearly, if union
leaders believe the employer is intent on using the participa
tion process to undermine the support for the union, if clear
evidence exists of the employer's unwillingness to accept the
legitimacy of the union, then it makes little sense for the
union to cooperate with a worker participation process. To
support or endorse a participation process under these cir
cumstances would be tantamount to the local union par
ticipating in its own slow demise. The more difficult case,
however, is one where local management accepts the
legitimacy of the union in its plant, but higher corporate
management uses union avoidance strategies to keep unions
out of other new or existing sites. Local union opposition to
QWL and other participation processes under those cir
cumstances would appear to be a necessary step toward im
plementing the strategy that is favored by most national
union leaders, namely, to force employers to make a choice
between (1) acceptance of unions and the potential growth
of worker participation and other joint union-management
efforts, or (2) continued low trust/high conflict arms-length
relationships.
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Management Commitment. Without a deep commitment
among the key management decisionmakers to supporting a
participation process over an extended period of time,
neither union commitment nor rank and file enthusiasm for
the process can make a worker participation process succeed.
This means, among other things, the willingness to allocate
resources to support participation efforts and to maintain
the commitment of resources through periods of short term
economic crisis. Management (and union) commitment is
likely to be severely tested at various points during the evolu
tion of the process as inconsistencies arise between other
company strategies and objectives and the worker participa
tion process. Thus, the real tests of commitment come when
hard decisions and tradeoffs must be made between main
taining support for the process and pursuing other valued
objectives.
Economic Viability. Worker participation programs can
not be a panacea in the face of economic problems which lie
beyond the control of the local union, the employer, or the
workers. In those cases, a worker participation process may
simply serve to divert attention for a short period of time
from more basic problems and will eventually lead to disen
chantment among the rank and file as the problems worsen.
Sometimes participation programs can be combined produc
tively with steps such as compensation concessions and other
cost reduction strategies. But, unless the economic founda
tion upon which the worker participation process will rest is
itself viable, the union's efforts might better be put to other
uses.
Linkages to Collective Bargaining. Where the conditions
necessary for a potentially viable worker participation pro
cess exist, local union leaders need to consider how this pro
cess will fit into their overall bargaining and representational
strategies. For unions and their members to benefit from the
process, union leaders must do more than react to the
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employer's or the consultant's vision or expectations for
worker participation. As the case studies clearly pointed out,
over time a total separation of worker participation from
collective bargaining is neither possible nor desirable. Thus,
union leaders need to anticipate how the process will evolve
and to consider what part they want it to play in their collec
tive bargaining relationship and in the union's role in the
workplace.
One of the biggest challenges to the traditional role of the
union that a successful participation process will produce is
increased variability in practices and conditions within the
bargaining unit. Three different sources of variation will
arise that will require union leadership attention.
First, because worker participation processes diffuse slow
ly through an organization, for an extended period of time
there will be a group of "participants" and a group of "nonparticipants." Even after the process is widely diffused,
there are likely to be some individuals who prefer to not get
involved in group activities and problemsolving processes.
The existence of these two groups provides a fertile ground
for rumors, competition, and internal political conflicts
within the union. Since participants are likely to be introduc
ing changes in traditional work practices, nonparticipants
may rationalize their noninvolvement by voicing skepticism
toward the QWL process.
Second, introducing changes in work practices based on
the ideas generated in the worker participation process has a
general decentralizing effect on the collective bargaining
relationship. Proposals to modify established customs and
practices, if not formal collective bargaining agreement pro
visions, are likely to arise. This has the effect of reducing the
"common rule" strategy that American unions have used to
limit competition and standardize conditions among in
dividuals and groups in their bargaining units. The standar-
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dization of practices and rules established through the collec
tive bargaining agreement and enforced through the contract
administration process historically has served as a basic
source of worker security and internal union control.
Third, over time there is likely to be a shift away from
detailed job and contractual rules through work reorganiza
tion experiments which broaden out job responsibilities. In
the more advanced cases, such as work team arrangements,
the concept of an individual job description or assignment is
replaced with a set of tasks that lie within the general respon
sibility of the group. The movement toward work teams,
payment for knowledge compensation systems, job rotation,
and semi-autonomous work groups all require workers and
their local unions to partially abandon their historic
strategies for maximizing job control through enforcement
of detailed rules governing specific, narrowly defined jobs.
In return, the workers receive greater training in a variety of
job responsibilities and more control over how the group
organizes itself.
In team systems, workers and their union representatives
often also gain more information about the work and its
contribution to the overall production process and the
economic performance of the enterprise. In short, all of
these changes reduce the reliance on strict rules governing in
dividual worker job rights and responsibilities and increase
the variations in practices and flexibility in the use of human
resources. The shift away from standardized and tightly
detailed jobs also increases the variability across and within
workplaces. Managing this variability and flexibility without
increasing divisiveness and competition will become a major
new role for the national and local union.
Although our findings stress the need to link worker par
ticipation processes to the larger collective bargaining efforts
on a strategic level, this does not imply that there necessarily
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need be a total integration or merger of the participation
process with the procedures for resolving grievances and
negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Issues of con
tract interpretation or alleged violations of individual worker
rights best suited to resolution through the established
grievance procedure will continue to occur. Likewise, basic
differences in economic interests which will require hard
bargaining at periodic intervals will continue to exist between
workers and their employers. The key challenge to union
leaders and management representatives is to manage these
"mixed-motive" relationships such that cooperative problemsolving efforts can comfortably coexist with hard
bargaining and the formal adjudication of disputes.

Strategies for National Unions
Even though worker participation processes are carried
out through local unions, the case studies of the UAW and
the USW experiences reported in chapter 3 suggest that na
tional union leaders and staff play key roles in implementing
a coherent union strategy on worker participation. First, na
tional union leaders must clearly communicate their views on
the conditions under which they believe participation pro
cesses are viable and the conditions under which they would
advise against union endorsement and involvement. Second,
where locals are involved in these processes national leaders
need to provide the training and leadership development ser
vices required to integrate QWL and related processes with
broader national union strategies. One of the most positive
byproducts of QWL experiments is the emergence of a
talented group of new local labor leaders wo have been train
ed in group dynamics, problemsolving, and team building.
Through their roles as QWL facilitators these local union
representatives are also gaining a greater exposure to and
serving a much wider cross section of union members than
most shop stewards or grievance committee members. These
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individuals represent a rich pool of potential future union
leaders.
Along with these facilitators stand the elected local leaders
who have taken the political risks associated with supporting
a QWL process. Together, these elected leaders and QWL
facilitators represent a highly committed group that believes
deeply in both the need for strong unions and in the value of
worker participation. One of the most important contribu
tions that a national union can make toward strengthening
the role of worker participation within the union and diffus
ing the process to a wider spectrum of union members is to
reinforce, support, and draw on the talents and experiences
of these individuals. Failure to provide career opportunities
within their unions for these local activists entails the risk of
losing many of them to management positions or
underutilizing them if they fade back into a less active rank
and file status. Taking advantage of their training and ex
perience by, for example, using them in educational and
training conferences, not only will help others to learn from
their experiences but also will provide the support and rein
forcement needed to encourage them to continue to be active
in their union.

The Role of the AFL-CIO
While there is no expectation that the AFL-CIO, or any
unit at the Federation level, will or should deviate from the
approach of leaving policies regarding worker participation
to their constituent unions, there are several critical func
tions for leaders at this level that are consistent with their
role in the structure of the American labor movement. These
functions are to: (1) foster dialogue on this issue among na
tional union leaders and with representatives of business and
government; (2) convey to the larger public the labor move
ment's strategies for relating worker participation to collec
tive bargaining and broader national economic and labor
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policies; and (3) encourage experimentation with worker
participation efforts that operate under appropriate condi
tions.
There clearly will remain a range of views about the
viability of worker participation efforts and their ap
propriate role within the broader strategies of the labor
movement. While it may not be possible or desirable to press
for a consensus on these issues across the various national
unions and their leaders, it is clear that the issue of how
worker participation efforts fit within the larger collective
bargaining and public policy agenda of the labor movement
needs to be more actively debated at the highest levels of the
labor movement. Out of these discussions may emerge a
clearer picture of what the labor movement's model for
QWL and related processes should be—a limited supplement
to collective bargaining or an evolving step toward an
American brand of shop floor industrial democracy that is
an integral part of the collective bargaining process.
It was noted at the outset of chapter 6 that national labor
leaders have an important role in shaping the image of
unions in the eyes of workers, employers, and the larger
society. If, under appropriate conditions, worker participa
tion is seen as an integral component of the broader
strategies for strengthening the roles and effectiveness of
unions at the workplace and supplementing collective
bargaining, then the task of the top leaders will be to convey
this view of QWL or worker participation efforts to all of
these audiences. The current message conveyed from the top
of the movement is one of "cautious skepticism" and
neutrality. One can envision, however, a different message
that specifies the conditions that must be present, but then
conveys enthusiastic support for experimentation with par
ticular types of worker participation. This shift in the
message communicated would again help challenge manage
ment for the initiative on worker participation efforts and
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would serve to further legitimize and encourage the activities
that are underway within the various national unions.
Implications for the U.S.
Industrial Relations System
Integrating worker participation efforts into the broader
bargaining and public policy strategies of the labor move
ment could potentially lead to a number of important
changes for the larger U.S. industrial relations system.

Impact on Job Control Unionism
The most direct effect of expanded worker participation
efforts, especially those that involve work reorganization, is
a movement away from the detailed job control form of
unionism characteristic of U.S. collective bargaining. This
does not mean that the collective bargaining agreement will
no longer govern the terms and conditions of employment.
However, detailed specification of contractual rules may
give way to a more flexible and varied form of work
organization at the plant level. This implies a major change
in the roles of the local union, supervisors, and higher levels
of management.
For the union, this requires relinquishing one of its tradi
tional bases of power and security in return for greater infor
mation and perhaps influence over a wider array of issues
that traditionally have been reserved to management. The
traditional principle that "management acts and workers
grieve" will have to give way to more joint planning and con
sultation at the workplace.
For the worker, this new arrangement means exposure to a
wider variety of tasks and more advanced training, and,
therefore, wider opportunities for skill acquisition and
enhancement. On the other hand, it also implies greater
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responsibility for decisions that would otherwise have been
left to a supervisor or higher manager.
For management, this development implies a trade of
some traditional prerogatives in return for greater flexibility
in human resource management and a reduction in the
detailed rules governing job definitions and assignments. In
summary, for all the parties, expanded worker participation
implies a more proactive form of labor-management rela
tions based around greater joint research and analysis, plan
ning, and consultation.

Effects on Labor Law
Over time, the expansion of new forms of work organiza
tion and participation may lead to a breakdown in the legal
line of demarcation between "labor" and "management."
These changes place the role of the supervisor in an even
more nebulous status than before. This, in turn, should call
into question provisions in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) governing the definitions of "worker" covered
under the Act and "supervisor" excluded from the Act. It
also challenges the relevance of the NLRA's scope of
bargaining doctrines as interpreted by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). If work teams and union represen
tatives get more deeply involved in sharing information, con
sulting, or perhaps even effectively deciding issues that lie
outside the issues of wages, hours, and working conditions,
the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects
of collective bargaining becomes increasingly blurred and
less relevant.
One further potential outgrowth of these participation ef
forts is development of some form of "works council" ar
rangement at the plant level. In a sense, a form of this
already exists in the joint labor-management steering com
mittees that oversee many of the QWL participation pro
cesses.
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Linkages to National Labor
and Economic Policies
Should worker participation, along with the other changes
in industrial relations set in motion by these projects, be
viewed as part of a larger national strategy for reforming
labor policy and enhancing human capital investment and
development? We believe a strong case can be made for
treating these processes, forms of work organization, and
the labor management relationships which support them as
the micro foundation for a new industrial and human
resources development policy. It may be desirable for public
policy debates over trade or tax policies targeted on par
ticular industries to consider the state of labor-management
relations (and joint efforts to improve them) in those in
dustries.
These are questions that the labor movement and others
concerned about the future of the U.S. industrial relations
system must grapple with in the years ahead. Perhaps the
analysis here will stimulate the dialogue needed to move this
debate closer to center stage. While the material presented in
this book was aimed primarily at the representatives of the
labor movement who need to come to grips with the role of
worker participation processes, ultimately the choice over
the future of these processes is not labor's alone. Instead, the
future of worker participation will be shaped by the strategic
choices made by leaders of unions, firms, and the govern
ment, and in no small part by the workers themselves, as
they all attempt to adapt the U.S. industrial relations system
to a highly competitive world environment.

POSTSCRIPT
Selected Reactions from Union Leaders
Since this study was conducted in cooperation with representatives
from the labor movement, we thought it would be instructive to include
as a postscript to the study the reactions to our conclusions of two key
union presidents. As the following statements of Glenn Watts and
William Winpisinger attest, there continues to be a wide diversity of
views of worker participation processes within the American labor move
ment.

Comments of
Glenn E. Watts
President
Communications Workers of America
This study performs a very valuable function in supplying evidence
about an area which has been largely governed by assumption and im
pression. It happens that we in CWA have recently concluded our own
joint study of our QWL process with AT&T; our conclusions are on
most points similar to those of this book.
1.

2.

We found that in the ten cases we studied, QWL had been suc
cessful on most major dimensions. Survey results showed im
proved job satisfaction, better relations to supervisors, and
(unlike the MIT study) a feeling of increased influence and par
ticipation among the team members. To a lesser extent, these im
provements spilled over to the non-members. Of particular in
terest to us, furthermore, is that attitudes to the union were very
positive, especially among those who saw the union leadership as
strongly committed to the process.
At the same time, we found that many QWL teams run into a
"plateau"—the same term used by the MIT researchers—after a
year or two. We do not, however, attribute this loss of momen
tum to direct negative actions by management. In our case it
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seems to result from the fact that QWL often remains isolated
within the organization as a whole: there is a lack of widespread
support for its basic values, and higher-level policies often con
tradict what the teams are trying to achieve. So their scope of ac
tivity remains limited, and their view of the future is often
pessimistic.
We also found a few areas where commitment from higher levels
3.
of management and the union was strong enough that teams
were encouraged to deal with matters of work-related policy. In
these locations teams had gotten past the "plateau" and were
proceeding with great confidence and enthusiasm to tackle dif
ficult issues.
These findings support the MIT researchers' emphasis on the impor
tance of extending QWL beyond immediate "environmental" issues. I
would certainly visualize QWL teams redesigning jobs; and this would,
as Kochan, Katz and Mower point out, lead teams into areas which are
covered by the collective bargaining agreement. But I do not believe that
there need be any blurring of the distinction between collective bargain
ing and QWL. Our position is very simple: QWL groups cannot bargain
or alter the contract. They can, however, make recommendations; if
their recommendations involve contractual changes, they must then pass
through the normal collective bargaining process before being im
plemented. This approach, I believe, provides both security and flexibili
ty in dealing with advanced developments of the QWL process.
My final comment is about a topic which the MIT study does not
stress. I believe that for QWL to be effective in the long run, it must
become not just a worker "program," but a part of values and relation
ships at all levels. That applies not only to management but also to the
union: we need to consider whether our own structures and internal rela
tions support participative values. We in CWA have recently taken our
commitment to QWL a step further by starting the process within our
own staff. We expect that it will lead to the same improvements we are
seeking in our effort with AT&T—better working relations and greater
organizational effectiveness—so that we can provide that best possible
service to our members in this time of rapid change.
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Comments of
William W. Winpisinger
President
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers
The concept of "quality of work life" is not new to the American
labor movement. From its very beginnings, American labor has been
dedicated to improving the quality of workers' lives. In this effort, joint
labor-management committees have played a role but always within the
context of collective bargaining.
To their mutual advantage, unions and management have participated
as equal partners in national and industry councils, firm and plant coun
cils, apprenticeship and training committees, safety and health commit
tees and local community programs of all kinds, bringing mutual
benefits to all concerned. These efforts have augmented the basic collec
tive bargaining relationship's ability to grapple with the continually
changing problems of the work place. Workers, through the democratic
process of collective bargaining, welcome the opportunity to play a
creative role in helping to resolve problems of the work place. They know
these problems intimately and can play a major role in resolving them.
To the extent that such committees contribute to worker dignity
through pride in their skills and work, to their safety and security on the
job, they greatly enhance the traditional work of the union.
In the past few years, however, there has been a spurt of national in
terest in more formalized Quality of Work Life programs. Corporate
America and an army of so-called labor relations consultants have in
creasingly sought to involve American workers and their unions in
QWLs. These QWLs are supposed to increase productivity and improve
product quality. At the same time, they are touted as a means of pro
moting better worker-employer relations and improving workers' job
satisfaction by ostensibly giving them a say in work schedules, produc
tion processes and the like.
Now, in theory, QWL is a concept which any responsible union
representative would support, i.e., to maintain and improve both pro
ductivity and the quality of the goods or services associated with the
company, and thereby, increase the "pie" to be divided through collec
tive bargaining. Only a quality product will stand the test of the market
place, insure the company's success and, therefore, secure our members'
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jobs. Further, if in the process, management utilizes a resource that it has
long chosen to overlook—the average worker's ability to help solve shop
floor problems—and, thereby, gives the worker more control over the
work place, so much the better.
It is, however, how QWLs are actually being used which arouses our
concern and suspicion. Many anti-union "consultants" and others are
promoting QWL schemes, in organized as well as unorganized work
places, to manipulate workers through the illusion of being consulted.
Through manipulation and rigged committees, workers find themselves
subjected to speedups, unsafe working conditions, or divisive peer-group
pressures. When improvements made through workers' effort and in
genuity exist solely at the discretion of the employer, they may be taken
away arbitrarily or used to deprive the workers of their jobs.
Programs not based on the collective bargaining relationship under
mine the basic element of true democratic participation in the determina
tion of working conditions. They are frequently used as an anti-union
device to obstruct the right of workers to support, join and organize
unions of their choice. A recent newsletter from the notorious unionbuster Charles Hughes extolling the "virtues" of Quality Control
Circles, does little to allay these fears.
Specifically, QWL programs have the potential for being disruptive
and unfair in a number of ways.
First, QWL has often been used by management to divide the worker
and his duly elected bargaining representative. Responsible trade
unionism has and will continue to recognize management's legitimate
concern over quality and productivity. Where there are real problems, we
will work with management through the already existing structure of inplant union representatives, i.e., local lodge officers, shop stewards, etc.
Why do we need some new organization when one already exists to
handle these matters of mutual concern?
Second, QWLs can be used as an instrument to put the entire respon
sibility for "increased productivity" and "poor quality" on the back of
the workers. With regard to quality, we know from experience that
employers generally turn a deaf ear to union and workers' criticism of
management mistakes while continually trying to extract every possible
minute of working time. Think how many times management has
pressured workers to push work out regardless of defects so some super
visor can meet his department's quota. Union members are proud of the
quality of their work and are justifiably critical of management pressure
to push work out regardless of defects.
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Further, no one denies the need for maintaining the high levels of pro
ductivity of the American worker. What is forgotten, however, is that
the worker is not the sole instrument of productivity increases. Because
productivity is most often defined as output per employee-hour, we tend
to forget the other determinants of productivity—technology, manage
ment skills, capital investment, energy use and capacity utilization. In
deed, most experts predict that the greatest improvements in productivity
will come from the new technologies, e.g., robotics, CAD-CAM, FMS,
etc.
This is not to say that workers do not play an important role in the
productivity equation. They do. Their ability to work "smarter,"
however, is directly proportionate to the training and skills they acquire,
primarily on the job. American industry has always been reluctant to
train their employees, unless the associated expense was subsidized by the
government. The shortsightedness of this approach is best illustrated by
today's critical shortage of skilled workers.
Third, QWL programs, especially Quality Control Circles, often result
in significant cost savings for the companies that undertake these pro
grams. These savings result from, among other items, reduced scrap,
reduced rework, reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, etc. Does
the company get it all or is the gain shared with the employees?
Further, the union must be concerned with what the company is going
to do with its share of the savings. Are the savings being reinvested in the
operation to improve it further and enhance its profitability and viabili
ty? Are these savings potentially going to be returned to the workers via
better income and improved benefits? Are the workers who invest their
time and energy in the Quality Circle being adequately and properly
rewarded for their participation? Or are these savings being invested
elsewhere in the corporation in operations which may even be paralleled
to those generating the savings? In other words, are the savings generated
by QWL truly benefiting the company and harming workers?
Last, it is interesting to note that in Japan, where the current QCC
concept first originated, job security is almost always guaranteed in the
major industries in which QCCs function. It is both unreasonable and
unfair to ask workers to engage in problem-solving to improve the opera
tions of the company unless their own jobs are protected. When
American management decides to import another Japanese idea, i.e.,
lifetime employment, perhaps we will reexamine our position on this sub
ject.
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In conclusion, management in America often points to QWL, QCC
and related programs in Japan and various European nations to
demonstrate how productivity can be improved by labor-management
cooperation. They fail to note, however, that in such countries both
management and government recognize and accept the need for unions
in a just society. Corporate America can hardly expect us to cooperate in
these efforts while they simultaneously fund and support a so-called
union-free environment movement dedicated to our destruction.
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